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Post-War Program

VICTORY WITH MacARTHUR

(The following article was written by Colonel Julius Klein, veteran editor, World War I correspondent, and formerly with the Hearst papers in Chicago. Colonel Klein entered active duty in March, 1941, with the 33rd Infantry Division, Illinois National Guard, and has been overseas since early 1943 as Commanding Officer of a large Quartermaster group. He is the recipient of the Legion of Merit and Soldier's Medal for heroism and other numerous citations. The article gives his impression of General MacArthur whom he saw a short time ago on official business.)

BY COL. JULIUS KLEIN, AUS

Somewhere in the Philippines
(8th Army Hq., 19 Aug. 1945)

THE sign over his door read simply "CinC." I entered with the natural awe of a soldier for his commander-in-chief, but as he moved forward from his desk to greet me I felt my heart pounding beneath my khaki shirt as it had so many years ago on my first big assignment as a reporter.

We moved to a corner where there were two comfortable chairs and he offered me a cigarette. His fine hands tamped down the tobacco in the bowl of the long corn-cob pipe which has seen so many beach-heads.

It was late in the day and this man was the nerve center of a gigantic war machine, yet I could detect no trace of nerves or exhaustion in spite of his many callers, conferences and the decisions he had rendered that day.

Even the elements seemed not to affect him. My freshly starched shirt had already wilted in the sweaty Philippine sun but no trace of such discomfort was visible on the General's person.

I had rehearsed my report, believing that the interview could be brief, but MacArthur during the busiest and most historic time of this war, one of the busiest men in the world, seemed eager to relax in conversation.

The last time we had met was more than twelve years ago, in the Washington of Herbert Hoover. I remembered well his youthful dignity, his immaculate dress, and the dashing gallant figure that he cut; I was prepared to see a much older man, weary as Atlas, with the marks of the tragic years upon him—these dark hours of America's history—but the man who greeted me was the MacArthur of old. He has not altered; he remains the erect, charming, youthful, black-haired soldier of those distant days when he was Chief of Staff.

As he spoke I began to realize the greatness of the man—he has long since proved himself the soldier. I knew in a flash why the United States Under-Secretary of War Robert Patterson, in a chat I had with him a few months ago referred to MacArthur as "the General of the Age." One could sense in his presence the great General, the fine patriot, the statesman, scholar, and great humanitarian who embodies all those qualities that make him the most illustrious American of our time.

We discussed various problems facing America now and after the war. The General's great devotion to the sons of America, his interest in the smallest detail concerning the welfare of his men were

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Navy Revises Schedule of Points for Release

A new demobilization point score, which allows one quarter of a point for overseas duty, has been announced by the Navy Department.

Under the new plan on 15 September, each officer and enlisted man or woman in the service will be entitled to one-quarter of a point for each month of duty outside the continental limits of the United States. Also effective 15 September, Medical, Hospital and Nurse Corps personnel will be released in the following manner.

Nurses under a separate critical score of 35 points; male doctors under a separate critical score of 60 points; female doctors under the same critical score as other female officers, 35 points; male and female officers in the hospital corps including hospital specialists under the same critical scores as other male and female officers, 49 and 35 points, respectively; pharmacists mates and hospital corpsmen, both male and female, in the same manner and under the same critical scores as other enlisted personnel, 44 points for men and 29 points for women.

According to the Department, a total of approximately 750,000 persons in the Navy will be eligible for demobilization on 15 September, an increase of 423,000 over the 327,000 who became eligible for demobilization on 15 August when the Navy first announced its demobilization plans.

Approximately 1,100 doctors will become eligible for release on 15 September. A total of 20,000 pharmacists mates and 9,000 hospital corpsmen become eligible for separation at the same time. Approximately 500 nurses are eligible for release on 15 September. Dentists, the Navy said, have been eligible for release since 15 August under the same critical score as other officers, 49 points.

Complete text of the Alnav effecting the Navy's new plan for demobilization is as follows:

PARA 1. The following ALNAVS are hereby cancelled and superseded by this ALNAV:

195-45
200-45
205-45
210-45
213-45
222-45

Cancellation of the foregoing ALNAVS is not to be construed as changing or affecting in any way the right to discharge or release personnel previously transferred for discharge or release or recommended for such transfer under authority of above ALNAVS.

PARA 2. ALNAVS 168-45 and 169-45 are superseded except as follows:

- Applications submitted prior to 15 August 1945.
- Hardship or dependency cases.
- Existing directives covering release to inactive duty or discharge based on the following are not changed by this ALNAV:
 - Enlisted personnel age 42 or over.
 - Marriage of Waves as provided in W.R.C.L. 4-45.
 - Pregnancy.

PARA 4 (a). The following formula, which is hereby established, will determine the precedence for release for personnel of the Navy who are entitled to a discharge or release to

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Navy Personnel Bill

The Navy Department has virtually completed work on a new personnel bill, government promotions and retirements in the post-war service. The measure has not been finally approved by the Department, but as soon as it is it will be sent to Congress for action.

The proposed plan is designed, it is understood, to provide better opportunities for young officers in the post-war expanded Navy. One feature, it is rumored, is to lower the retirement age to 60, similar to the plan now in effect in the Army under which colonels retire at 60, brigadier generals at 62, and major generals at 64.

Meanwhile Senator David I. Walsh has indicated that he intends to introduce a bill which would establish sixty years as the retirement age for the Navy.

Likewise, in the House, Congressman Carl Vinson has also indicated his intentions of introducing a bill which would establish the retirement age at 62.

Marine Corps Point Score

General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, announced that, effective immediately, male officers and male enlisted personnel of the Marine Corps with 70 or more points and all Marine personnel 35 years of age and older would be eligible for discharge.

In connection with the release of personnel over 35 from the Marine Corps, it was pointed out that the Marine Corps point system, unlike that for the rest of the Navy, allows no credit for age.

The critical score for male personnel set initially 15 August under the Marine discharge system was 85. This is the first reduction of that score. The critical score does not apply to enlisted men serving four-year enlistments in the regular Marine Corps or extension thereof.

The new conditions for discharge eligibility apply. General Vandegrift said, "to all personnel, irrespective of whether they are serving within the United States or overseas."

There is no change in the critical discharge score for members of the Marine Corps Women's Reserve, which remains at 25.

Ever since 29 June 1944, Marine commanding officers had been authorized to discharge male Marines, over 38 years of age and serving within the continental limits of the United States. The change now announced lowers that age and applies to all personnel, officers and enlisted, men and women.

The Marine Corps credit system is based on the following: one point for each month of service from 16 September 1940, to 1 September 1945; one point for each month overseas or afloat from 16 September 1940, to 1 September 1945; five points for each decoration and bronze service star, and twelve points for each dependent child (not exceeding three) under 18 years of age.

The Reserve Officer Training Corps program will be reinstituted in schools of the Territory of Hawaii with the beginning of the next term of school.

Army Plans to Reduce Number of Generals

Reductions in the number of general officers in the Army to conform with the demobilization now in progress are now underway, the War Department announced this week.

The announcement of the reductions followed shortly after members of the Senate Military Affairs criticized the Department's action in submitting a new list of nominations for temporary general officers. Some Senators felt that with the War over the Department should be reducing the number of generals rather than making new ones.

Since V-E Day, the War Department announcement states, 70 general officers have left active duty or are under orders to do so and 100 more are in the process of being reduced in grade. Within the next three months only a few of the 136 general officers who were recalled from the retired list for war duty will remain in active service. These will be specialists who are retained for a few additional months to train their own replacement.

The War Department declined to give out the names of the officers who have left active duty or those who will do so in the near future.

The purpose and method of the reductions is explained in the following excerpts from the War Department's announcement:

"Reductions from temporary wartime ranks are being accomplished as part of the Army's demobilization procedure. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, all Army Groups, and a number of Corps and Divisions have been inactivated with a consequent reduction in general officer requirements. Some formerly assigned to these headquarters and units have been placed on other appropriate duties.

"The War Department plans to effect necessary reductions with due consideration for the services and reputation of the individuals concerned. These men have carried heavy responsibilities and have contributed much to the successful war operations. Generally the procedure will be to relieve the officer from his present duties, give him leave to visit his home and reduce him in grade when he is en route to his new assignment. Reductions are being accomplished by a series of general officer boards overseas and here at home which furnish information to a central or master board in Washington. The theater commanders are chairmen of their theater boards. This master board is in continuous session and is weighing the recommendations received from field commanders as well as the entire record of each officer. It recommends to the Chief of Staff what officers are to step down, when, in what order and how far.

"In the process it is unavoidable that men with distinguished records in staff and field assignments will revert to lower ranks. In 1940 the pre-war Army had 100 general officers which amounted to two-thirds of one per cent of the total officer personnel of the Army. When Japan was defeated the Army had approximately 1,600 general officers, or one-fifth of one

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Occupation of Japan

Detroit Free Press—"The 'gloved hand' with which General MacArthur will rule Japan will lack neither experience nor firmness. After his long and intimate contact with Japanese ways MacArthur can be depended upon to use force when necessary."

Washington Star—"It is not to be supposed that General MacArthur contemplates soft treatment of the totally beaten Japanese. He will apply to the full terms of the Potsdam ultimatum."

New York World Telegram—"It will require not only our strength and skill but also our perseverance."

Houston Chronicle—"Prospects for early establish-

ment of democracy in Japan are virtually nonexistent."

Philadelphia Inquirer—"It should be made everlasting plain to him during the occupation period and in the final peace settlement that there will be no 'next time' for Japanese aggressors."

New York Sun—"In dealing with them and their leaders there must be neither laxity nor undue severity, for laxity will bring disorder and excessive severity will bring desperation. In every order he has thus far given General MacArthur has made it plain that he hopes to avoid either extreme."

Ohio State Journal—"One was impressed that our cause in the Pacific is in good, competent hands, that

the right man for the delicate task ahead is in control of the situation."

New York Times—"It is a task for which there are scarcely any precedents."

Boston Post—"The stubbornness of the 'Japs' in peace is having a nettling effect on the people of this nation. For a conquered people their outward aplomb and arrogance is unbelievable. It is galling and it is riling. But there is a side to it which cannot be overlooked. To date, all demands of General MacArthur have been put into effect by the Japanese."

New York Herald Tribune—"We desperately need a consistent and long-range policy for Japan, and it is one that must be made here, not in Tokyo."

U. S. Divisions in Japan

Following occupancy of Tokyo by the First Cavalry Division, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur announced the selection of the following divisions to occupy various Japanese ports and cities on the days given:

Forty-third Infantry Division, Yokohama, 13 Sept.

Fifth Marine Division, Sasebo naval base, 22 Sept.

Thirty-third Infantry Division, Wakayama, 25 Sept.

Ninety-eighth Infantry Division, Nagasaki and Wakayama, 26-27 Sept.

Seventy-seventh Infantry Division, Aomori, 27 Sept.

Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, Yokkaichi, 2 Oct.

Forty-first Infantry Division, Kure; Eighty-first Infantry Division, Ominato; 158th Regimental Combat Team, Ominato, 3 Oct.

Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, Kochi; First Regimental Combat Team of the Twenty-fourth Division, Okayama, 22 Oct.

Sixth Infantry Division, Osaka or Nagoya, 23 Oct.

Cabinet Changes

The resignations of both Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of Navy Forrestal may be handed to President Truman in the very near future, it was learned this week.

Both Secretaries, it is understood have expressed the opinion that their resignations would become effective with the termination of the war with Japan.

According to reliable sources Secretary of Navy Forrestal has been asked to run for Governor of his home State, New York, on the Democratic ticket. It is understood, however, that Mr. Forrestal has not as yet reached a final decision with respect to the proposed nomination.

Secretary Stimson's plans are less definite. It is reported that he may retire completely from public life with the understanding that he may be called upon as an advisor if needed.

Medals of Honor

Two bills have been introduced by Representative Larcade, Dem., La., to authorize the award of the Congressional Medal of Honor to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. One would authorize the President to make the award, in the name of Congress. A supplementary bill would authorize the President to award General MacArthur a Special Congressional Medal of Honor.

Representative Larcade has also introduced a bill which would authorize the President, in the name of Congress, to award a special Medal of Honor to General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

New Asiatic Fleet

A new Asiatic Fleet, possibly larger than the old one, is being revived by Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, it was learned this week.

According to reports from the Admiral's ship off the China Coast, it is understood that the fleet, including battleships, "tin cans" and river gunboats will be born again under the command of the Orient-wise sea dogs under the Admiral's command.

It is understood that the new fleet may be divided into a North China force under Rear Admiral Elliott R. Buckmaster and a Yangtze patrol force under Rear Admiral Clarence T. Joy.

Honor General Wainwright

General Jonathan M. Wainwright, liberated from a Japanese prison camp in Manchuria, arrived in Washington, D. C., 10 Sept., to receive the ovation arranged by military and civic authorities.

Accompanied from the National Airport by General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, General Wainwright and members of his party were greeted at the Pentagon by veterans of Bataan and Corregidor. He then visited the Secretary of War, afterward proceeding to the welcome in Washington and on to the Capitol where he addressed both houses of Congress.

Later, at the White House, President Truman presented General Wainwright with the Medal of Honor. On 29 Aug. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, commanding general of United States Forces in China, presented the Distinguished Service Cross to General Wainwright, as well as to Maj. Gen. George F. Moore and Maj. Gen. Albert M. Jones, who were liberated at the same time.

Members of General Wainwright's party were Brig. Gen. L. C. Beebe, Lt. Col. J. R. Pugh, Maj. Thomas Dooley and T. Sgt. Hubert Carroll.

Speaking before the Senate, General Wainwright touched on the cruelty and neglect in Japanese prison camps. He said:

"The American people must realize fully the nature of the enemy whom we knew so well. Only on a just consideration of his nature as it was revealed to us will we be able to decide such measures as must be taken to insure our future security from his lust for power."

He told the House:

"To men who had faced overwhelming power without the means to meet it, as we did in the Philippines, there was deep satisfaction in seeing how completely the odds had been reversed. How we longed for some of that offensive power on Corregidor. Had this Nation been able to send it through the Jap blockade, tired as we were, there would have been no fall of Corregidor."

General Wainwright told reporters at a War Department press conference of his years of captivity. On Formosa, he said, "even the highest ranking officers were required to perform manual labor like any Chinese coolie, and other indignities were heaped upon us."

Surveillance Duty

The Navy Department this week announced that it had selected 72 warships for duty in Japanese waters.

The ships which will do surveillance duty include eight carriers, 14 cruisers and 50 destroyers of the Third Fleet. The vessels have been directed to transfer between 10 and 20 per cent of enlisted personnel if eligible for discharge to vessels due to return home soon. The assignment of ships to Japanese duty is "subject to later modification," the Navy Department said.

Navy Mail

Letters and packages sent to Naval personnel returning to the United States for discharge, rehabilitation leave or shore duty will be returned to the sender unless the serviceman has left a civilian forwarding address, the Navy announced this week.

No mail, the Navy said, will be forwarded to Naval Separation Centers or receiving ships. However, if a man is definitely known to be assigned to an occupation force, it is permissible to send packages.

President's Physician

Col. Wallace H. Graham, a medical reserve officer of the Army, was appointed personal physician to the President this week, succeeding Vice Adm. Ross T. McIntire, (MC), USN, Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Colonel Graham, a native of Kansas City, Mo., and a personal friend of the President, is a graduate of the Creighton University and Harvard University and did graduate work in Vienna and London. He has seen active service in England, France, and Germany, and participated in the Normandy invasion. He was chief surgeon at the 98th and 24th Evacuation Hospitals. It is understood that while serving as the President's physician he will continue research work he has been conducting at the Army Medical Center.

The appointment of Colonel Graham makes the third Reserve Officer appointed to the President's immediate White House family. Brig. Gen. Harry Vaughn, the President's military aide, and Commodore John K. Vardaman, Naval aide, also being reserve officers.

It is quite likely that Colonel Graham will be appointed a brigadier general, it being recalled that both the military and naval aides were promoted to similar ranks following their White House appointments. A new nomination of Commodore Vardaman was sent to the Senate this week to continue his new rank "while serving as naval aide to the President," to rank from 9 Aug. 1945.

Hold Up Army Generals

The nominations of the new group of temporary general officers, sent to the Senate this week, will be held up by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs pending the outcome on hearings on the plans for demobilization of the Army.

Many members of the Senate expressed the view that with the war over the Department should be reducing the number of general officers rather than making new appointments. To counter this the Department this week announced that a number of general officers already have been retired or reduced in rank.

While holding up the line appointments, the Committee took steps to confirm the appointment of General Wheeler as Chief of Engineers, feeling that his appointment was one that would be necessary to fill a vacancy.

Office of Industrial Relations

Effective 14 Sept., the Division of Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel became the Office of Industrial Relations.

Rear Adm. F. G. Crisp, USN, Director of the Division of SECP, has the title of Chief of the Office of Industrial Relations. No change will be made in the functions of the office, which had administrative control over approximately 700,000 civilian employees who worked during the war in the Navy's shipyards, ammunition depots, air stations and other activities.

Trial Offered Adm. Kimmel

Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel is understood to have informed Secretary of the Navy Forrestal that, in view of the pending Congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster, he does not desire a general court martial.

At the same time the Navy has renewed its pleas to Senators to keep part of its Pearl Harbor investigation file bottled up.

Gen. Pershing's Birthday

President of the United States Harry S. Truman, on the occasion of Gen. Pershing's birthday said:

"This should be one of the happiest of your many birthdays as you remember that this time we went all the way to Berlin as you counseled in 1918."

"I hail a great soldier who exemplifies also the vision of a statesman."

With the fond greetings of the nation and its high officials, General of the Armies John J. Pershing, commander of American forces in World War I, observed his birthday, 13 Sept., with members of his immediate family.

Early in the day the Army Band serenaded the General in his quarters in the Army Medical Center. Maj. Gen. Shelley U. Marietta, Commanding General of the Army Medical Center, was among those calling to pay their respects.

Around a beautiful birthday cake, the General enjoyed a quiet dinner with his sister, Miss May Pershing, his son, Maj. Warren Pershing, his daughter-in-law, Mrs. Muriel Bach Pershing, and his grandson, John Warren Pershing.

Strategic Air Forces

More than 4,500 aircraft have been returned to the United States or deployed to the Pacific by the AAF in Europe since the end of the war with Germany. Of these, approximately 1,500 have been B-17s and more than 1,000 B-24s. Also included are 700 C-47s and C-53s as well as many A-26s, P-47s, P-38s and C-46s.

The future status of the Strategic Air Force in the Pacific has not been announced. When General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was designed as Supreme Allied Commander his new command did not include the Strategic Air Force, which remains under the direct control of General of the Army H. H. Arnold acting as an agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is not known now whether the shift will be made to give General MacArthur direct control of the big B-29 outfit. However, it is said that a great deal of cooperation exists between the two commands, the B-29s performing many missions for General MacArthur such as flying supplies to prisoners of war, and other functions. Undoubtedly these bombers will play an important part in policing the Pacific area, whether under the direct orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as a part of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's command.

Under the present plan several thousand aircraft will remain in Europe. Tasks allotted them include: Enforcement of surrender terms, protection of assigned areas of American occupation and zones of responsibility; protection of installation and zones of communication, completion of disarming the Luftwaffe; providing air lift for airborne forces; providing necessary air transportation for passengers and supplies, and operations in conjunction with ground and Naval forces as required.

Taking into consideration the vast distances involved in the Pacific, many comparable duties will in all likelihood fall to the Strategic Air Forces. Among the aircraft remaining in Europe to carry out the present plan are both heavy and light bombers, P-47s, P-51s, C-47s and other transports, night fighters, and training and liaison planes.

Air-sea rescues in the Pacific area from the Palau Islands to Japan saved 892 out of 967 men, or 89 per cent, during the 1 Dec. to 15 Aug. period.

Enlistment in Regular Services

Representative Andrew J. May, chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, this week filed the formal report urging the adoption of the Committee's bill designed to build up the regular Army and Navy by increasing the benefits so as to encourage voluntary enlistments.

Complete text of the bill was published in last week's ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL. Following are pertinent extracts from the committee's report:

"The bill seeks to accomplish those recommendations of the President. It suspends the existing top limit (280,000) on the number who may be enlisted in the Regular Army by amending the act of 1 June 1945; it enables the Regular Army to accept enlistments from all qualified males not less than 18 years of age; and it clarifies legal uncertainties in existing provisions affecting both the regular military and regular naval establishments and offers inducements described below to those who now voluntarily enlist therein.

"The President indicated in his message that the time was not yet at hand to determine long-range plans for the national security, including the size of the Regular Army and Navy. The committee is in accord with this view. However, if the Congress is to authorize and direct intensive recruiting campaigns, it is obviously desirable for the Congress to retain the means to control the size of the establishments so recruited. Accordingly, the bill provides that the authority to recruit without regard to existing limitations on the size of the Regular Army shall terminate on 30 June 1947. This will enable Congress to examine at that time what the military requirements will be and legislate with respect to the peacetime strength of the Regular Establishment. As a further check the bill also provides for quarterly reports by the War Department to the Congress of the numbers enlisted in the Regular Army since 1 June 1945, so that at any future time the Congress may take appropriate action on the basis of such reports. Legislation controlling the size of the Regular Navy is subject to the jurisdiction of the Committee on Naval Affairs.

"The committee is, of course, aware of the difficulty of forecasting the military needs of the United States during the rest of this fiscal year. Inherent in any occupation by military force of far-distant and hostile lands of defeated enemies are factors which can be understood and weighed only as such occupation proceeds day by day. In war-torn and disorganized Europe, millions of enemy—and friendly—people face the winter months with insufficient food, fuel, and clothing. The situation in the Pacific, even after our troops have safely invested the homeland of Japan, will continue for some time a powder keg. Of one thing, however, we may be sure, the American people will never tolerate that our victories won at so great a cost in war be made a mockery by our failing to retain sufficient strength to establish in a stable peace those principles for which we fought.

"The committee shares the concern of the American people that those who have had long and arduous service in the Army and Navy in time of war should be returned as rapidly as practicable to their homes and loved ones and civilian pursuits. It believes that every measure should be taken to raise and train volunteers in sufficient numbers to attain this objective. If it is to be attained and if the planned rate of demobilization remains unchanged through to 1 July 1946, there must be at that time fully trained and available as replacements overseas a sufficient number of fresh troops to permit the demobilization between now and next 1 September of every man who by that time will have had 2 years' service. If the planned rate of demobilization should be accelerated—and such acceleration may be possible—the dates of 1 July and 1 September just mentioned would be advanced accordingly.

"In order to stimulate recruiting and to permit the maximum number of volunteers to be enlisted, the committee has included in the bill provisions which are described in detail below.

Explanation of Provisions

"Section 2 directs the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to initiate and carry out intensive recruiting campaigns to obtain voluntary enlistments and reenlistments in the Regular Army and Navy.

"The act of 1 June 1945, authorizes the Secretary of War, during the existence of the present war, to accept not to exceed 280,000 enlistments or reenlistments in the Regular Army from male persons who are honorably serving in the Army of the United States or who were honorably discharged therefrom not more than 90 days preceding the date of such enlistment or reenlistment. The act provides that the term of service of persons enlisted or reenlisted thereunder shall be for the duration of the war and 6 months thereafter or for 3 years, whichever is the longer period. Section 3 of the bill amends the act of 1 June 1945, so as also to permit the enlistment or reenlistment in the Regular Army of persons from civilian life. It temporarily suspends the ceiling on the enlisted strength of the Regular Army, and authorizes and directs the Secretary of War to accept enlistments and reenlistments for periods of 2 or 3 years, at the option of the person enlisting, from

among qualified male persons not less than 18 years of age. This section further provides that the authority to accept enlistments and reenlistments thereunder will terminate on 1 June 1947, and requires the Secretary of War to make quarterly reports to the Congress of the number of men on active duty in the Regular Army who were enlisted or reenlisted on or after 1 June 1945. The Secretary of War is authorized by this section to promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to effectuate its purposes.

Retirement Benefits

"Under existing law an enlisted man of the Regular Navy who completes at least 20 years of active service may be transferred to the Fleet Reserve and receive, while on inactive duty, retainer pay at the rate of one-half the base pay he was receiving at the time of his transfer. An enlisted man of the Regular Army, under present law, is required to perform 30 years' active service in order to qualify for retirement for length of service. Retirement benefits for enlisted men of the Regular Army should be comparable to those applicable to enlisted members of the Regular Navy.

"Section 4 of the bill would authorize the retirement of enlisted men of the Regular Army upon the completion of not less than 20 years of active service. Such enlisted men when retired would receive annual retirement pay equal to 2 1/2 percent of the average annual pay, including longevity pay, they were receiving for 6 months immediately preceding their retirement, multiplied by the sum of the number of years of active Federal military service performed by them, not in excess of 29. Section 4 further prescribes that in computing the length of service required for retirement pursuant to its provisions, or any other provision of law providing for the retirement of an enlisted man of the Regular Army, credit shall be given for all active Federal military service performed in the Army of the United States, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, or any component thereof, any fractional part of a year amounting to 6 months or more to be counted as a complete year.

"Under the laws relating to the transfer of enlisted men of the Regular Navy to the Fleet Reserve, such persons are required to serve in time of peace not more than 2 months' active duty in each 4-year period, and must be examined physically at least once during such 4-year period. This section of the bill requires similar service by enlisted men of the Regular Army who are retired pursuant to its provisions and prescribes that they shall be examined physically at least once during each 4-year period.

Enlistment in Grades

"Section 5 authorizes the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to enlist or reenlist volunteers in such grades or ratings as each may severally prescribe.

Furlough Travel

"Section 6 authorizes the payment of a reenlistment furlough travel allowance to persons now in the military or naval service who volunteer for enlistment or reenlistment in the Regular Army or the Regular Navy. Each such volunteer when granted a furlough following enlistment or reenlistment would be paid in advance a furlough travel allowance at the rate of 3 cents per mile for the distance between the place at which stationed when the furlough becomes effective and his home or such place as, subject to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Department concerned, he may select, and from his home or other place so selected, to the place at which ordered to report for duty. Such furlough travel allowance is intended to cover both the cost of travel and subsistence. Whenever sea travel is involved, no such allowance would be paid for that portion of the journey but transportation in kind may be furnished. This section specifically provides that no furlough travel allowance shall be paid thereunder if travel allowance at least as great has been paid under section 126 of the National Defense Act to any person upon discharge or release immediately preceding enlistment or reenlistment in the Regular Army or the Regular Navy. If travel allowance in a lesser amount has been so paid under such section 126 of the National Defense Act, the furlough travel allowance authorized by this section would be reduced by an amount equal to that so paid under such section 126. Like the allowance under such section 126, the furlough travel allowance is to be paid whether travel is performed or not.

Mustering-Out Payments

"Under the provisions of the Mustering-Out Payment Act of 1944, certain enlisted personnel, and certain commissioned officers of the lower grades, who serve in the present war and who are discharged or relieved from active service under honorable conditions on or after 7 December 1941, are authorized to receive mustering-out payments in the amounts of \$100, \$200, or \$300, depending upon the length and character of service performed. These payments may be received by such members of the armed forces only upon final separation from the service or upon ultimate relief from active duty in the armed forces.

"Section 7 of the bill amends the Mustering-Out Payment Act of 1944 so as to authorize mustering-out payments to be received by eligible persons now in the service, if they so elect, when they enlist, reenlist, or are appointed in the Regular Army and Regular

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Post-War Navy

Representative Vinson, Chairman House Committee on Naval Affairs, and Senator Walsh, Chairman, Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, who have been making a study of the size of the post-war Navy for several months, introduced this week similar concurrent resolutions relative to the composition of the post-war Navy.

The resolutions state it is the sense of Congress that the Navy of the United States should consist of ships of the following types and numbers:

- 3 Large Aircraft Carriers (42,000 tons)
- 24 Aircraft Carriers (27,000 tons)
- 10 Light Aircraft Carriers (11,000 tons)
- 70 Escort Aircraft Carriers
- 18 Battleships
- 3 Large Cruisers
- 31 Heavy Cruisers
- 48 Light Cruisers
- 367 Destroyers
- 296 Escort Destroyers
- 200 Submarines

(2) That sufficient aircraft, auxiliary vessels, mine vessels, patrol vessels, landing craft, district craft, and drydocks should be maintained to support the above enumerated Fleet.

(3) That adequate facilities to support the Navy should be maintained wherever necessary.

(4) That sufficient personnel should be provided to adequately maintain and operate the Navy and that proper and adequate facilities be provided and maintained to fully train such personnel.

(5) That ships, vessels, and craft enumerated above should be replaced unit for unit in accordance with existing law, or earlier if the development of weapons, or scientific research make such ship, vessel, or craft obsolete or obsolescent.

(6) That an orderly shipbuilding and aircraft replacement program should be maintained.

(7) That a progressive program of research and development in all fields of Naval warfare be carried on and that an adequate organization and facilities for that purpose be maintained.

Senator Walsh and Representative Vinson stated they understood these resolutions represented, in general, the views of the officials of the Navy Department concerning the size and characteristics of the Navy which would be required in the post-war era. They stated that Committee Hearings would be held on the resolutions in the near future, at which time officials of the Navy Department and other interested persons would be invited to give the Committees their views. They stated further, that in their opinion, the Members of the Committees of which they were Chairmen would not attempt to make a decision on this important matter until after they had made a thorough study of the changes it would be necessary to make in the structure and organization of the Navy due to the probable emergence of new weapons of war employing the principles used in constructing the robot and atomic bombs.

A comparison of the number of vessels in the proposed post-war Navy, the present Navy, and the prewar Navy, is as follows:

Type Vessel	Proposed in Post-war Navy	Present Navy (As Available, B'ding and Authorized)	Total Authorized up to and including the Naval Expansion Act approved May 17, 1938
Large Aircraft Carriers (42,000 tons)	3	3	8
Aircraft Carriers (27,000 tons)	24	27	
Light Aircraft Carriers (11,000 tons)	10	10	
Escort Aircraft Carriers	70	70	
Battleships	18	24	18
Large Cruisers	3	3	..
Heavy Cruisers	31	33	18
Light Cruisers	48	57	28
Destroyers	367	450	144
Destroyer Escorts	296	359	..
Submarines	200	263	56
	1,079	1,308	272

All of the vessels proposed to be retained would not be kept in a full operating status. Approximately one-third will be kept fully manned and ready for any emergency; approximately one-third will

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be organized into Reserve Fleets and partially manned; the remainder will be placed in a decommissioned status and be kept available for recommissioning if and when needed.

Army Nominations

The following Army nominations were sent to the Senate 10 Sept.:

TEMPORARY IN AUS

To be major generals

Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Adcock, (lt. col., CE).
Brig. Gen. Albert F. Hegenberger, (lt. col., AC).

Brig. Gen. Wallace C. Philoon, (col., Inf).
Brig. Gen. Ralph M. Innell, (brig. gen., AGD, NGUS).

Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., (col., CER).
Brig. Gen. Frank E. Lowe, (col., FAR).

To be brigadier generals

Col. Edward A. Noyes, (MC).
Col. Winfred G. Skelton, (lt. col., Inf).

Chaplain (Col.) William D. Cleary.
Col. James K. Herbert, (capt., CE).

Col. Erle O. Sandlin, (lt. col., Inf).
Col. Luther Remi Moore, (MC).

Col. Robert K. Taylor, (maj., AC).
Col. Sidney L. Chappell, (MC).

Col. Robert M. Hardaway, (MC).
Col. James D. McIntyre, (lt. col., OD).

Col. Clyde M. Beck, (MC).
Col. Edward S. Bres, (CER).

Col. Donald B. Adams, (lt. col., CER).
Col. George A. Brownell, (temp. col., AUS).

Col. William C. Menninger, (AUS).
Col. Luther L. Hill, (temp. col., AC).

Col. James F. McMannon, (temp. col., AUS).

REGULAR ARMY

Appointments by Transfer

To Adjutant General's Department—Lt. Col. Joseph M. Glasgow, Cav., (temp. col.).
To Quartermaster Corps—Maj. Paul L. Carroll, Inf., (temp. col.).

First Lt. Amos G. Johnson, Inf., (temp. lt. col.).

To Finance Department—Capt. James F. Stroker, FA, (temp. col.).

To Ordnance Department—Lt. Col. Shirley W. McIlwain, QMC, (temp. col.).

To Field Artillery—Capt. Bernard S. Waterman, CAC, (temp. col.).

Second Lt. Alan L. Partridge, Inf., (temp. 1st lt.).

Second Lt. Paul J. Reinhalter, CAC, (temp. 1st lt.).

To Infantry—First Lt. James M. Boyd, AC, (temp. maj.).

First Lt. Robert J. Delaney, CAC, (temp. maj.).

First Lt. Philip M. Royce, CAC, (temp. maj.).

First Lt. Joel T. Walker, CAC, (temp. lt. col.).

To Air Corps—Lt. Col. Tom C. Rives, SC, (temp. brig. gen.).

Capt. William F. McKee, CAC, (temp. brig. gen.).

PROMOTIONS IN THE REGULAR ARMY

To be colonels from 1 Aug. 1945

Howard J. Houghland, AC, (temp. col.).
John L. Dunn, Inf., (temp. col.).

James G. Monihan, Cav., (temp. col.).

To be captains from 1 Aug. 1945

Opal E. Henderson, AC, (temp. col.).
Daniel I. Moler, AC, (temp. col.).

Lawrence O. Brown, AC, (temp. col.).
Henry B. Fisher, AC, (temp. col.).

Clayton B. Classen, AC, (temp. col.).
William T. Hudnell, Jr., AC, (temp. col.).

Harold L. Kreider, AC, (temp. col.).
John O. Neal, AC, (temp. col.).

Henry A. Sebastian, AC, (temp. col.).
Harrison S. Markham, CWS, (temp. lt. col.).

To be majors, Medical Corps

Heins Kuraner, (temp. lt. col.).
Emmett L. Kehoe, (temp. lt. col.).

Knox Dunlap, (temp. col.).
Stephen D. Berardinelli, (temp. lt. col.).

William J. Power, (temp. lt. col.).
Jacob R. Till, Jr., (temp. col.).

Lawrence C. Ball, (temp. col.).
Richard L. Bohannon, (temp. lt. col.).

John K. Cullen, (temp. col.).

To be captains, Medical Corps

John H. Ames, (temp. capt.).
Harold V. Ellingson, (temp. maj.).

Joseph N. Schaeffer, (temp. capt.).
Alfred S. Blauw, (temp. capt.).

To be colonel, Dental Corps

Albert Fields, (temp. col.).

To be lieutenant colonel, Dental Corps

Harold G. Ott, (temp. col.).

To be lieutenant colonels, Veterinary Corps

Verne C. Hill, (temp. lt. col.).

Elmer W. Young, (temp. lt. col.).

Chaplains, to be Colonels

William R. Bradley, (temp. col.).

James L. McBride, (temp. col.).

Mylon D. Merchant, (temp. col.).

Maurice W. Reynolds, (temp. col.).

Chaplains, to be Major

Stanley J. Reilly, (temp. maj.).

Recently cited for superior performance of duty was a Mediterranean Theater postal directory company, which handled more than 1,500,000 pieces of mail for the Fifth and Seventh Armies during a Christmas holiday period.

USMA Returns to 4-Yr. Course

West Point, N. Y.—Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, superintendent of the United States Military Academy, announced this week that the academic course at West Point will go back to a four-year basis.

The present first, or senior class, will graduate in three years next June. The present third class will be divided into two parts, one part graduating in three years, and the other will remain for the complete four-year course. The basis for dividing the class is now being determined.

The Air Cadets of the First Class will complete their advanced training and will graduate with their wings in June. Thereafter, all Cadets will take the same flying training at Stewart Field, which will consist of about thirty hours in the air on various types of missions in various types of planes. Those qualifying for the Air Corps will be sent, after graduation, to advance flying fields where they will complete their training and receive their wings. By the new system a broader basis of aviation instruction is given to the course of all cadets.

Warrant Officer Appointment

Examinations for and appointments for temporary warrant officers (junior grade) under provisions of AR 610-15, 15 September 1944, are discontinued effective immediately, the War Department disclosed this week.

The new regulation does not affect the appointment of individuals whose recommendations now exist in writing and have been approved by the first forwarding authority. This authority will be terminated V-J plus 30 days.

President to Visit Ft. Sill

Fort Sill, Okla. — "President Truman not only gave me his positive assurance that he would visit Fort Sill in October when I discussed his proposed trip with him at the White House recently, but also expressed enthusiasm over his visit," Representative Jed Johnson (D., Okla.), informed Maj. Gen. Louis E. Hibbs, commandant of the Field Artillery School, last week. The President's only reservation was that he be permitted to fire a 105mm gun.

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UNITED STATES ARMY**Return of Divisions**

Five combat divisions from the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operation, originally listed for return to the United States during the last three months of the year, are scheduled to arrive at eastern ports during September in addition to the previously announced expected arrivals.

Subject to changes at any time resulting from revised shipping capabilities and other requirements, the following planning schedule lists divisions on a monthly basis which were scheduled to embark from European and Mediterranean Theaters for the United States as of September 8:

SEPTEMBER

5th Arm.	60th Inf.
6th Arm.	88th Inf.
7th Arm.	99th Inf.
9th Arm.	103rd Inf.
14th Arm.	106th Inf.
16th Arm.	17th Airb.
63rd Inf.	

OCTOBER

10th Arm.	70th Inf.
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Several additional divisions will be returned in October, but have not been designated as yet.

NOVEMBER

92nd Inf.

DECEMBER

34th Inf.

As of the present date, the following units have been selected to remain in the European Theater of Operations as occupational forces:

1st Arm.	42nd Inf.
4th Arm.	78th Inf.
1st Inf.	84th Inf.
3rd Inf.	82nd Airb.
9th Inf.	

Divisions which returned to the United States prior to September are as follows:

2nd Inf.	35th Inf.
4th Inf.	44th Inf.
5th Inf.	45th Inf.
8th Inf.	85th Inf.
10th Mount.	86th Inf.
13th Airb.	87th Inf.
13th Arm.	91st Inf.
20th Arm.	95th Inf.
28th Inf.	97th Inf.
30th Inf.	104th Inf.

Fifth Army Disbands

The only military force in history to capture Rome from the South, the American Fifth Army, became unoperational on 9 September, the second anniversary of its landings at Salerno.

The Army announced that the organizations headquarters will continue to exist on a skeletal basis at Gardone, on Lake Garda until the end of this month. Then, under Lt. Gen. Lucian Truscott, who succeeded Gen. Mark W. Clark as the Fifth Army's commander, it will head for home as "category 4 unit."

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Recover U. S. Generals

HQ AAF, China Theater — Liberation of Allied prisoners from Mukden, Manchuria, is continuing with the evacuation of 58 men, including 6 American generals, on 31 August.

All the American generals were captured at the fall of the Philippines early in 1942. Among them was Brig. Gen. Carl H. Seals, who was escaping with his wife in a seaplane when it crashed on take-off, 30 April 1942. Ten days later the Japs arrived at his hideout and captured his party which included ten American nurses. His wife and the nurses were sent to another camp. That was the last knowledge he had concerning his wife for three years. A week ago in Mukden he received a letter from his sister in which she wrote that she had heard from his wife. The Japs had evidently held the letter because it was dated last March. Some letters, General Seals said, had been held for as long as a year and a half. He added that the Japs told him that they did not want him to receive a letter until it was at least a year old.

Brig. Gen. Clinton A. Pierce, Commanding General of the 71st Division at the time he was captured, remarked that the Normandy invasion was announced to them by the Japs as a tremendous venture involving the immediate landing of millions of men from hundreds of thousands of ships: "We figured that the numbers were somewhat overstated but could not understand why the Japs wanted to build up American victory," he commented.

Brig. Gens. Joseph P. Vachon, Charles C. Drake, Bradford Chinoweth and Arnold J. Funk arrived today appearing well, but wearing mixed uniforms. They received clean clothes at Mukden.

Demobilization Unfair

Charges that the morale of American servicemen is at a very low ebb because of the War Department's "lack of a fair and equitable" discharge system, have been brought to the attention of the Army by Senator Hugh B. Mitchell, (D.), of Washington State.

The Senator in a letter to Secretary of War Stimson said that many protests have been received by him against the so-called poll of "70 per cent of soldiers" on the best point system to adopt for demobilization. Servicemen, the Senator said, state that they do not think a fair, overall poll was taken.

Status of Promotion

Promotions and Vacancies on the Promotion List (Cumulative) and Promotions on the Non-Promotion List since 31 August 1945

Promotion List

Last promotion to the grade of col.—William F. Freehoff, Inf. No. 66; Vacancies—Twelve; Senior Lt. Col.—Rexford E. Willoughby, Cav. No. 67.

Last promotion to the grade of Lt. Col.—James H. Dickie, FD No. 78.

Last promotion to the grade of maj.—Paul E. MacLaughlin, Inf. No. 197.

Last promotion to the grade of capt.—George M. Jones, Inf. No. 226.

Last promotion to the grade of 1st Lt.—Raymond L. Hoff, QMC No. 660.

Non-Promotion List

None.

Captain Darcy To Retire

Leader of the United States Army Band for ten years and a veteran of thirty-three years' continuous service, Capt. Thomas F. Darcy will retire this week, the War Department announced.

A concert last Sunday night at the Capitol Plaza marked Captain Darcy's final appearance in a concert program with the band which has two years' overseas service during this war under his leadership.

The retirement of Captain Darcy marks the end of an Army career which began in 1912 when the senior band leader of the Army entered the military service as an enlisted man. At the age of 22 he was commissioned leader of the 18th Infantry Band of the 1st Infantry Division and directed its music during World War I.

Captain Darcy was wounded in action during World War I and awarded the Purple Heart. He also wears the Silver Star, the Verdun Medal and the Fourragere.

At the conclusion of World War I, Captain Darcy toured Europe with the official bands of France, Italy and Great Britain as band leader of an American Army composite band made up of musicians from various regimental bands.

Captain Darcy served with distinction as associate leader and trumpet soloist of the United States Army Band from 1926 to 1935, when he became leader. In addition to his duties as director, he was designated as advisor to the War Department on all matters pertaining to bands in the army. Upon reactivation of the Army Music School for warrant officer band leaders early in the present war, Captain Darcy was appointed Dean of the school.

The retiring band leader is a graduate of the Institute of Musical Art, New York City, and also of the Army Music School. A composer in his own right, Captain Darcy's latest composition is "March of the Free People."

During his long career as a musician Captain Darcy has traveled throughout much of the world and has a large collection of souvenirs. He has more than a dozen batons which have been presented by officials of various cities throughout the British Empire.

Pacific Shoulder Patch

Army Hdqs., MidPac., Ft. Shafter, T. H.—Effective 1 Sept., all Army personnel under the Middle Pacific Command, unless authorized to wear an officially approved patch, will wear the familiar blue, red and white shoulder patch which formerly designated men of the Pacific Ocean Areas.

The MidPac directive, which will discontinue at present the use of the red and gold "Lazy H" of the old Hawaiian Department now worn by members of Central Pacific Base Command, was announced by Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, Chief of Staff for Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., commanding Army Forces, Middle Pacific.

The shoulder patch which supplants the "Lazy H" depicts the red arrow of Army strength pointing midway between the silver stars of the Big Dipper and Polaris, and the Southern Cross, all against a background of Pacific blue.

Crossbow Champion

Col. Carl R. Adams of the 17 AAA Group has won the crossbow shooting championship of Eastern Switzerland. His score was shooting a 43 out of a possible 50 on the cross bow range at St. Gallen.

Colonel Adams, an expert shot with rifle and pistol, was taking a GI conducted tour of Switzerland which brought him to St. Gallen on the day of the annual fete in honor of William Tell, the Swiss national hero.

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Naval Medical Transfers

Capt. Edward S. Lowe, MC, USN, from Naval Hospital, Santa Margarita Ranch, Oceanside, Calif., to USS Solace.

Capt. Charles W. Stelle, MC, USN, to Naval Hospital, Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Va.

Capt. William R. Manlove, Jr., MC, USN, from Naval Receiving Station, Nashville, Tenn., to Naval Hospital, Oakland, Calif.

Capt. Roy F. Cantrell, MC, USN, from Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Washington, D. C. to Naval Hospital, Naval Training Center, Sampson, N. Y.

Capt. Henry R. Delaney, DC, USN, from Eighth Naval District to Third Naval District as District Dental Officer.

Capt. Adolph W. Borsum, DC, USN, from Ninth Naval District to Naval Receiving Station, Boston, Mass.

Capt. Frank K. Sullivan, DC, USN, to Camp Terry B. Thompson, San Bruno, Calif.

Capt. Robert M. Askin, DC, USN, from Naval Air Station, San Diego, Calif., to Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Fla.

Capt. Larry J. Dupuy, DC, USNR, from Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Fla., to Eighth Naval District as District Dental Officer.

Capt. James G. Dickson, MC, USN, from Marine Corps School, Quantico, Va., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Fleet, Third Amphibious Corps.

Capt. Robert W. Babione, MC, USN, from Staff of ComServForPac, to further assignment.

Capt. Rae D. Pitton, DC, USN, from Naval Dental School, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md., to Naval Air Station, San Diego, Calif.

Capt. Clemens V. Rault, DC, USN, from Third Naval District, to National Naval Medical Center, Naval Dental School, Bethesda, Md.

Capt. Toson O. Summers, MC, USN, from Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Va., to Camp Wallace, Tex.

Capt. William W. Hall, MC, USN, from USS Solace, to Camp Wallace, Tex.

Capt. Chester M. George, MC, USN, from Naval Repair Base, New Orleans, La., to Charleston, S. C., as District Medical Officer, Sixth Naval District.

Capt. Frank P. Gilmore, MC, USN, from Marine Training Command, Camp Joseph Pendleton, Oceanside, Calif., to the Bureau of Medicine & Surgery, Washington, D. C.

Capt. Everett H. Dickinson, MC, USNR

U. S. NAVY & MARINE CORPS

Navy Recreation Program

Rapid expansion of the Navy's recreational, educational and athletic program in the far reaches of the Pacific is now underway.

Recreation officers from Naval commands throughout the Pacific attended a ten-day recreation conference just concluded at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C. They were acquainted with plans for the entertainment of Naval personnel during the next twelve months, and made recommendations, based on field experience, to the conference regarding the administration of these plans in the field.

Chairman of the conference was Capt. T. J. O'Brien, USN, Director of the Welfare Activity, Bureau of Naval Personnel. He was assisted by Col. Emery E. Larson, USMC, Chief of the Special Services Branch of the Marine Corps, and Comdr. D. B. Cushing, USN, Director of the Special Services Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Naval officers from the Pacific who attended the conference were: Comdr. George S. Halas, USNR, now serving on the staff of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, and who, in civilian life, was president of the Chicago Bears, a professional football team; Comdr. Walter H. Orion, USNR, staff, Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet; Comdr. Nathan L. Mallison, USNR, staff, commander of a service squadron in the Philippine area; Comdr. Stockard R. Hickey, USN, staff, Commandant, 14th Naval District; Lt. Comdr. William Post, USNR, staff, Commander, Marianas; Lt. I. R. M. Schultz, USNR, staff, Comdr., Western Sea Frontier; Lt. Col. Adolph Zuber, USMCR, staff, Fleet Marine Force, Pearl Harbor; and Lt. Dorothy J. Tollefsen (W), USNR, WAVES recreation officer in the Hawaiian area.

Bomb Disposal School

The Navy's Bomb Disposal School at American University, Washington, D. C., which has trained over a thousand Navy and Marine Corps officers and men, will be decommissioned on 30 Sept. 1945.

On 11 Sept., Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN, Aide and Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Rear Adm. George Hussey, USN, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and other ranking officers made the final inspection of the school, which is under command of Lt. Comdr. J. P. David, USNR.



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Navy Nominations

The following Navy nominations for temporary service were sent to the Senate 11 Sept.:

Civil Engr. Lewis B. Combs with rank of rear adm.

The following to continue in their present temporary grades:

Adm. Samuel M. Robinson.
Vice Adm. Louis E. Denfeld.
Rear Adm. Cato D. Glover, Jr.
Rear Adm. Austin K. Doyle.
Rear Adm. Thomas G. W. Settle.
Rear Adm. Milton E. Miles.
Commo. Oscar Smith.
Commo. Benjamin V. McCandlish.
Commo. Gordon Rowe.
Commo. Elliott B. Nixon.
Commo. James K. Vardaman, Jr., USNR.
Commo. William S. Parsons.
Commo. William W. Behrens.
Commo. Mark L. Hersey, Jr.

Navy Nurse Corps Promotions

The promotion of 986 officers of the Navy Nurse Corps, 400 Regular and 586 Reserve, was approved 1 Sept. by the President.

The promotions are temporary and are to the next higher rank for those lieutenants (junior grade) of the Navy Nurse Corps, Regular and Reserve, who reported for continuous active duty as ensigns 28 Feb., 1943, or earlier.

Navy Relaxes Athletic Policy

Regulations governing Navy athletic teams and individual athletes this week were relaxed by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, whose new directive now makes it possible for naval service teams to travel outside the teams' National Collegiate Athletic Association district and participate in certain benefit contests.

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Marine Corps Assignments

The following changes affecting the status of Marine Corps personnel have been announced:

Brig. Gen. Franklin A. Hart, from overseas to Headquarters.

Brig. Gen. Charles R. Sanderson, Ret'd., from Headquarters, to resume inactive status on retired list.

Col. Kenneth H. Weir, from Miramar, Calif., to Quantico, Va.

Col. Clayton C. Jerome, from Miramar, Calif., to Headquarters.

Col. Benjamin W. Atkinson, from Philadelphia, Pa., to overseas.

Col. Harold C. Major, from overseas to Miramar, Calif.

Col. Nels H. Nelson's orders to San Diego Area modified, to Portsmouth, N. H.

Col. Harry C. Grafton, Jr., from overseas to be relieved from active duty.

Col. James N. N. Hudnall, from overseas to San Diego Area.

Col. Fred G. Patchen, Ret'd., from Portsmouth, N. H., to be relieved from active duty.

Lt. Col. Spencer S. Berger, from overseas to San Francisco, Calif.

Previous orders of Lt. Col. William J. Piper, Jr., from Camp Lejeune, N. C., to overseas revoked; ordered to Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. Edward F. Knight, from overseas to Miramar, Calif.

Lt. Col. Henry S. Massie, from Camp Lejeune, N. C., to overseas.

Lt. Col. Kenneth P. Corson's orders from San Diego Area to be relieved from active duty revoked.

Lt. Col. Harold W. Whitney, Ret'd., from Parris Island, S. C., to be relieved from active duty.

Lt. Col. Francis S. Kieren, Ret'd., on discharge from Naval Hospital, Great Lakes, Ill., ordered home to await retirement.

Lt. Col. Jonathan W. Dyer, from Miramar, Calif., to be relieved from active duty.

Lt. Col. Arthur J. Stuart, from overseas to San Diego Area.

Lt. Col. Randall L. Stallings, from Norfolk, Va., to overseas.

Lt. Col. Thomas J. Mitchell, from overseas to Headquarters.

Lt. Col. George A. Percy, from Camp Lejeune, N. C., to be relieved from active duty.

Lt. Col. Lowell S. Reeve, from El Toro, Calif., to duty overseas.

Lt. Col. Thurston J. Davies, from Headquarters, to be relieved from active duty.

Lt. Col. LeRoy Hauser from Philadelphia, Pa., to Headquarters.

Lt. Col. John C. Miller, Jr., on discharge from Naval Hospital, San Diego, Calif., to temporary duty, Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. William McNulty from Camp Lejeune, N. C., to be relieved from active duty.

Lt. Col. Francis X. Beamer, from San Diego Area to Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Richard C. Nutting, from overseas to Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Frank S. Flack, Ret'd., from Parris Island, S. C., to be relieved from active duty.

Lt. Col. Paul A. Fitzgerald, from Camp Lejeune, N. C., to temporary duty, Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. George W. Hays, from San Diego Area, to temporary duty, Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Alton D. Gould, from overseas to temporary duty, Quantico, Va.


Lt. Col. Robert C. McGlashan, from Navy Department to temporary duty, Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Boyd O. Whitney, from Cherry Point, N. C., to temporary duty, Quantico, Va.


Lt. Col. William W. Young, Jr., from Headquarters, to be relieved from active duty.

Lt. Col. Edward W. Sturdevant, Ret'd., from Navy Department, to be relieved from active duty.

All Russian displaced people in Norway, totaling 93,000, have been returned to the Soviet.



—BUT NO MATTER
WHERE WE ARE—
LIFEBUOY GETS THE
DIRT AND GRIME...
ITS PURIFYING
LATHER STOPS "B.O."



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ALGIERS

LOS ANGELES

MEXICO CITY

NOME

the tomorrow that came today!

It didn't come the way you may have thought it would. It hasn't changed your everyday life much . . . as yet. In fact, it wouldn't be surprising if you are still thinking about the Air Age as something promised for *tomorrow*. But take a look at what has actually happened.



Recently adopted as the standard aircraft for Troop Carrier combat operations, the Curtiss C-46 Commando is equipped with jump doors on both sides of fuselage . . . can drop 36 fully equipped paratroopers in double streams.

JUST recall the historic record-breaking day when 14,000 planes were over Germany in one 24-hour period. That meant probably 50,000 men in the air at one time. Thousands of tons of bombs, shells, medicine, food — delivered to one country within a few hours. *Mass air travel and mass air-cargo transport are here!*

Huge, modern air transports, powered by Wright Cyclones, with cargo space nearly equal to two average box cars, now fly across the country coast-to-coast in approximately 6 hours . . . Giant planes have taken off every 13 minutes to hop the Atlantic and every 90 minutes to span the Pacific . . . 3 Curtiss Commandos recently transported 23,000 pounds of critical radar equipment from Miami to India in just 4 days . . . You are living in the Air Age *right now!*



To make air travel convenient, hundreds of air terminals are already established—many more are on the way. For instance, 15 nations are already seeking landing facilities at New York's great new Idlewild airport. Set your hopes high — the Air Age has already begun.

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Curtiss  Wright

AIRPLANES • ENGINES • PROPELLERS

ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL

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"Established in obedience to an insistent demand for an official organ for members of the American Defense and those concerned with it, The Army and Navy Journal will be published in the interest of no party; it will be controlled by no clique. Its independence will be absolute. Its interest will be directed solely to the fuculation of sound military ideas and to the elevation of the public service in all its departments."—From Vol. 1, No. 1, of the Army and Navy Journal, published August 29, 1933.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1945

OUR PRIORITY LIST

1. Victory.
2. Assurance now that personnel and equipment for our land, and air forces will be maintained after the present war at such strength as the responsible heads of those Services determine necessary to assure this nation against future aggressors.
3. Protection of Service personnel, active and retired, against undue reductions in their pay through imposition of the Victory tax and income taxes.
4. Institution of studies looking toward the protection and development of just post-war systems of promotion for personnel of the permanent establishments.
5. Strengthening of the post-war status of the National Guard and Reserves to assure their efficiency and permanency with continuance of full training facilities after the war.
6. Upward revision of pension scales to assure Service widows a living income.
7. Compensation for service personnel who use privately owned automobiles on government business.

LOOKING toward the solution of the post-war problems of the Armed Forces, it is essential that there should be decided upon now the permanent general and flag officers who will constitute the high command in the period of reconstruction of our National Defense forces. Because of his determination to retire, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, apparently is leaving the selection of permanent general officers of the Regular Army to General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who is slated to succeed him. There are now ten vacancies in the list of permanent major generals of the Regular Army and twelve vacancies in the brigadier generals. Many additional vacancies in these grades are in immediate prospect inasmuch as a number already have indicated their intention to retire, and others are approaching the statutory retirement age. Only three of the permanent major generals—Delos C. Emmons, Eisenhower, and Joseph T. McNarney—are still in their fifties. In the Navy the situation is equally uncertain, because under the law suspending permanent promotions, no advancements to permanent flag rank have been made since early in 1942. In this Service, too, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations—already beyond the retirement age—apparently plans to turn these problems over to his successor, who most likely will be Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The present law suspending permanent promotions in the Navy will not expire until the 30th of June of the "fiscal year following that in which the present war shall end," so that the earliest date of return to permanent promotions, if no further legislation is enacted, would be 30 June, 1947. However, for the efficiency and morale of the Service it is imperative that there be an earlier return to permanent promotions in the Navy and Marine Corps so that the senior officers who will guide those forces in the reestablishment of their peacetime organizations can be selected and assume their duties. There has been some criticism in the Senate of the Army's action in continuing to nominate temporary generals now that the war has ended, but these nominations must nevertheless be confirmed, for the men involved have won their advancement by demonstrated merit in war, and the Army has important assignments for them. Their confirmation should be followed by prompt nomination and confirmation of slates of general and flag officers for the Regular Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

THERE is victory in defeat as well as in achievement, and the American government and people are expressing their understanding of this fact in the honors they have paid to General Jonathan M. Wainwright. Indeed, deserving as General Wainwright personally is of those honors because of his magnificent defense of Bataan and Corregidor, he realizes with becoming modesty, that in conferring them upon him the Nation is paying tribute to every American whom he surrendered, and to every other American who had the misfortune to be captured by the brutal Japanese. The day of liberation, and of recognition of the gallantry all these men displayed, whether of the ground, naval or air forces, was long in coming. But here it is at last, and they have learned that throughout the period of agony they were forced to endure, the heart of their country beat for them and never hesitated in its grim determination to effect their rescue. They know, too, that while no punishment can be inflicted upon their sadist captors that will approach the treatment they underwent, our mill of justice will grind relentlessly upon the great and small, and so dispose of them that the horror of their experience will estop the future militarist from incurring the like wrath of his time. Since the initial attack upon Luzon, General of the Army MacArthur has kept an expanding list of these criminals, and he has begun their apprehension for trial. High on that list are the Japanese militarists who former Premier Konoye said, were determined upon war with the United States, and who, as he further averred, caused the world to regard Japan as a liar unworthy of trust. There were Tojo and his immediate clique, who seized the Government and launched the sneak attack upon Pearl Harbor. There was the infamous Hashimoto, leader of the nationalist group, who was so eager for war that he ordered the air attack on our gunboat Panay helpless in the Yangtze river in 1937, and whose "punishment" by his government upon our demand, was a slap on the wrist which was an encouragement to his fellows to pursue his tactics, and permission to him to continue the movement for war upon the United States. Tojo, an attempted suicide, may live or die—we hope he will live to face the Allied Tribunal. But whether he does or not, his associates, including the whole Kwantung gang who are alive, will be so exposed that the Japanese people will realize how they were duped by power seeking fanatics. For such criminals, there will be no escape through hari-kari. They will be guarded and receive not death from the guns of a file of our soldiers, but death by the rope than which to them there is no greater disgrace. It will be a fitting end to men who are responsible for a war that brought pain and death to hundreds of thousands, and misery and hardships to untold millions.

Service Humor

Articles of War

An officer's popularity is frequently determined by the speed with which he can read the Articles of War to his men.

—Ft. Warren Sentinel.

Pa Pays

Bride—"You mustn't expect me to give up my girlhood ways all at once."

GI Husband—"That's all right, honey. You go right on taking an allowance from your father."

—The Roger.

Keyhole Trouble

It was in the small hours of the morning. A befuddled gentleman was fumbling for the keyhole. Seeing his difficulty, a kindly policeman came to the rescue. "Can I help you find the keyhole, sir?" he asked.

"Won't be necessary," said the other cheerfully. "You jus' hold the house still and I can manage."

—Golden Gate Guardian.

Little Ann (in the wee hours): "Gee, Mummy, I can't sleep, please tell me a story."

Mummy: "Just wait a bit, dear, and that sergeant father of yours will come home and tell us both a story."

—Bowie Blade.

Rehabilitation

"When I looked out the window, Johnny, I was glad to see you playing marbles with the boy next door."

"We weren't playing marbles, Ma. We just had a fight and I was helping him pick up his teeth."

—Exchange.

Horse of Another Color

Admiral Halsey tells about getting to a football game late and stepping on a sailor's foot while scrambling to his seat.

The sailor, not looking up, yelled, "Get off my foot, you big lug." Then recognizing the Admiral, he blurted: "Oh, my goodness, beg pardon, sir. Here's my other foot—go ahead—step on it!"

—The Right Hand.

Big Help

"I understand a wife is a great help to a man."

"Oh, yes, she'll stand by you in all the troubles you wouldn't have had if you had not married her."

—The Oak Leaf.

P. O. W.

1st WAVE: "How come you're in the brig?"

2nd WAVE: "It was just my luck that the sailor I replaced had to serve 90 days."

—Jaz Air News.

Army Morale

A chaplain reported to his commanding officer: "I think we have the morale of the men too high, sir. They want to know if it's true that some day they might have to return to civilian life."

—Skyscrapers.

Home Again

CO: "Did you enjoy your leave, Lieutenant?"

LT: "Yes sir, but there's nothing like the feel of a good desk beneath your feet again."

—Harpoon.

ASK THE JOURNAL

Please send return postage for direct reply.

T.R.K.—We are advised by the War Department that the present authorized warrant officer strength of the Regular Army is 1500. The eligible list, the Department says, has been broken down into about 50 classifications. Until this revised list is released by the War Department we are unable to furnish any information as to an eligible's standing or the remaining number of eligibles. It is recommended that you submit an official letter, through channels, to the Adjutant General of the Army requesting clarification of your status.

M.R.—Marriages are governed by the laws of the state in which they are solemnized. For information pertaining to the marriage laws of a state you should consult your legal aid officer or a district attorney in the state where marriage is contemplated.

N.P.L.—H.R. 3935, introduced by Representative Sikes of Florida, would permit all sea duty and all duty performed beyond the continental limits of the United States and Alaska during World War II to be counted double for retirement purposes.

A. J. M.—A bill is now pending in the Senate which would permit enlisted military and naval personnel who served as officers during World War II to retire after 20 years' service in the highest rank held by them during the war. They would receive retired pay equal to 50 per cent of active-duty pay, at the time of retirement.

In The Journal

One Year Ago

The Allied armies in France have invaded German soil, with American troops thrusting at two points toward the Siegfried Line; they have liberated Luxembourg, adding the capital city of that small country to Paris and Brussels in the list of the freed capitals.

10 Years Ago

Capt. Forde A. Todd, commandant of midshipmen, and his family have returned to the Naval Academy after several weeks at Jamestown, R. I.

25 Years Ago

General John J. Pershing, USA, entertained at dinner 13 Sept. at Highwood, his home in Chevy Chase, Md., to celebrate his birthday anniversary. His guests were members of his staff and some close friends.

50 Years Ago

Experiments with liquid fuel will commence at Brooklyn Navy Yard just as soon as a lunch for this purpose can be secured. Coal is at present exclusively used as fuel in United States men-of-war. The main objection to coal is the length of time required to start the fires. This objection would be done away with by the use of liquid fuel.

80 Years Ago

Some interesting trials were recently made with nitro-glycerine as an explosive agent. A chamber was drilled in a dolomitic rock. The drill ran into a mass of clay (at 8 feet) and the hole was tamped, leaving a depth of 7 feet. A pint and a half of nitro-glycerine was poured in, occupying 5 feet. Water was poured on, and a slow match applied. The effect was so great as to produce one fissure 50 feet in length and another 30 feet.

Army Casualties

Following are the officers included in lists of dead, wounded, missing and liberated prisoners of war issued this week by the War Department.

In all cases the next of kin have previously been notified and have been kept informed directly by the War Department of any change in status.

DEAD—PACIFIC REGIONS

2nd Lt. D. R. Donaldson
1st Lt. A. L. Thompson, III
2nd Lt. W. C. Roessig, Jr.
2nd Lt. S. D. Avery, Jr.
Capt. P. L. Balkom

DEAD—EUROPEAN REGIONS

2nd Lt. T. P. Barnwell
2nd Lt. C. Seddon
2nd Lt. W. D. Wine
1st Lt. W. J. Warren
2nd Lt. L. P. Turner
2nd Lt. M. Bernstein
1st Lt. P. S. Ostrander
1st Lt. L. A. McAllister, Jr.

WOUNDED—PACIFIC REGIONS

1st Lt. R. E. Swisher
2nd Lt. W. S. Bailey
Capt. G. B. Hafeman
2nd Lt. J. E. Sonderoth

MISSING—PACIFIC REGIONS

1st Lt. L. J. Winiecki, Jr.
1st Lt. H. Yassas
1st Lt. F. M. Bennett, Jr.
1st Lt. L. W. Buffington
2nd Lt. J. Heathcote, II
2nd Lt. W. C. Pennington
1st Lt. W. J. Sykes

LIBERATED PRISONERS—JAPAN

Capt. A. C. Tisdelle, Jr.
Capt. A. Abraham
Brig. Gen. C. Blumel
1st Lt. L. B. Bollne
1st Lt. I. B. Hard
1st Lt. J. B. Heinen
1st Lt. S. Medcalf
2nd Lt. I. S. Newman
1st Lt. R. E. Stensland
Maj. H. J. Mann
Maj. W. H. Rogers
1st Lt. C. H. Bell
Capt. C. A. Cates

Sea Service Casualties

SAFE

U. S. Marine Corps

†Col. S. L. Howard

DEAD

U. S. Navy

Lt. (jg) H. B. Freeze

U. S. Naval Reserve

*Lt. M. J. Marcussen, Jr.

U. S. Marine Corps

*Lt. B. S. Mather

U. S. Navy

*Ens. O. E. Northington

U. S. Naval Reserve

*Ens. C. A. Ray

U. S. Marine Corps

*Ens. H. G. Morris

U. S. Navy

Ens. J. J. Gaffney

U. S. Naval Reserve

Ens. C. J. Smith

U. S. Marine Corps

Lt. (jg) G. A. Gustin, Jr.

U. S. Navy

*Lt. (jg) K. L. Stafne

U. S. Naval Reserve

Lt. (jg) N. D. Craymer

U. S. Marine Corps

Ens. O. F. Fisher, Jr.

U. S. Navy

*Lt. (jg) R. H. Frazer

U. S. Marine Corps

*1st Lt. C. E. Van Ray

U. S. Navy

*1st Lt. G. K. Benson

U. S. Naval Reserve

*1st Lt. H. L. Chaitin

U. S. Marine Corps

Lt. (jg) A. W. Davis

U. S. Navy

Lt. (jg) C. H. Wheelon

U. S. Naval Reserve

Ens. C. R. Schweitzer

U. S. Marine Corps

1st Lt. J. H. Stockman

U. S. Navy

Lt. Comdr. K. I. Stout

U. S. Naval Reserve

Lt. J. D. Spencer

U. S. Marine Corps

Lt. C. I. Jenney

U. S. Navy

Ens. R. A. Littmann, Jr.

U. S. Naval Reserve

Lt. (jg) P. A. McGuirk

U. S. Marine Corps

Lt. (jg) K. H. Morse

OFFICIAL ORDERS

(Publication suspended for duration of War)

Ens. T. A. Sikes
Ens. P. H. Eames, Jr.
Lt. (jg) J. G. Hjelmstrom
Lt. (jg) M. L. Malone, Jr.
Ens. H. A. Sohrweid
Lt. (jg) T. H. Backus
Lt. (jg) J. H. Wamsley
Lt. (jg) R. I. Kop-pang
Ens. T. F. Morgan
Ens. R. C. Gause, Jr.
Lt. (jg) L. J. Clinton
Lt. (jg) E. S. Goeckel
Lt. Comdr. C. D. Hayes
Lt. (jg) C. Barry
Lt. J. M. Roche
Lt. (jg) H. C. Crews
Lt. (jg) K. I. MacFarland
Ens. E. A. Triemer
Ens. J. F. Herstine
Ens. R. A. Keeney

* Previously reported missing.
† Previously reported prisoner.

Army Promotions

The following temporary promotions in the Army of the United States have been announced by the War Department:

Lt. Col. to Colonel

O. E. King, AC
P. L. Schroeder, MC
F. A. Warner, MC
R. L. Harrison, CE
L. C. Thomas, MC
W. J. Allen, CWS
W. E. Litke, INF

Maj. to Lt. Colonel

W. F. Daly, AGD
D. A. Covatt, MC
J. M. Scott, JAGD
C. C. Counsellman, AC
N. D. Vaughan, AC
M. G. Sherman, AUS
F. C. Stansbury, MC
J. McC. Wright, MC
P. H. Rankin, MC
R. C. Green, AC
B. R. Allen, MC
G. W. Tackabury, JAGD
J. T. Rhudy, Sig C
H. M. Hayes, AUS
A. Chessier, AC
C. T. Sinnard, AC
E. C. Stone, Jr., INF
R. E. Gilvin, AC
H. T. Wilson, CAC

Captain to Major

H. P. Dawson, Ord.
L. M. Burgess, AGD
O. G. Idom, AC
G. B. Seeley, Jr., AC
F. D. Hunter, MC
A. M. Threlkeld, MAC
P. B. Robertson, AGD
Albert Alberi, AC
W. R. Hillbrink, AC
C. W. Giffin, Jr., AC
J. H. King, CE
B. J. Reed, AC
Chas. Carveth, AC
L. Peterson, Sig C
J. H. Campbell, TC
C. R. Parker, Sig C
W. P. Miller, CE
A. J. Beyer, OD
R. F. Johnson, AC
E. A. White, CE
H. R. Ude, OD
G. F. Seeley, CAV
Rae Sanders, AC
C. E. Gilbert, CMP
G. C. Foster, AGD
C. L. Karl, CE
E. N. Carples, SC
Harold Reid, CE
B. G. Seltz, CE
J. D. Rockett, AC
Sinclair Tebo, AUS
D. P. Archer, MC
G. C. Bogart, Jr., CE
S. J. Pearson, SC
G. B. Meyer, SC
L. H. Doar, INF
G. E. Tate, INF

E. F. P. Kearney, MC
R. C. McCullough, AC
G. H. Heller, MC
C. W. Heimiller, INF
E. A. Smedal, MC
C. E. Bents, CE
J. M. MacMillan, MC
I. G. Hodge, MC
E. M. Bevilacqua, MC
L. R. Barnett, AC
B. J. Ambrose, AC
M. N. Hineh, OD
J. P. Shovlin, MC
A. D. Roberts, MC
H. J. Gregory, CMP
I. F. Dodd, Sig C
M. E. Johnson, MC
H. B. Parker, AC
W. C. Gardner, AC
C. I. Tod, AGD
A. G. Green, Jr., INF
N. R. Dunbar, OD
R. O. Brannard, AC
J. C. Maxwell, AC
W. W. Wied, JAGD
B. C. McKee, TC
G. O. Kelley, AC
W. H. Peth, AC
L. W. Lawder, AC
J. N. West, AC
G. W. Long, CE
C. E. Grent, GE

Army Nurse Corps

Promotions to Lt. Colonels: Jessie M. Braden, Mary G. Sanders.

To Majors: Madolyn L. Allum, Mary M. Merrick, Peggy G. Carbaugh, Emma Dick, Alice C. Merchant, Genevieve M. Streett, Florine N. Thomason, Johanna R. Vreeland, Bernice Regan Rich, Dorothy L. Seymour, Elizabeth T. Hanna, Emma M. Kuehlthau, Dorothy E. Day.

To Captains: Eleanor Theresa Bauman, Eugene Barnell Bos, Inez Harris, Olive M. Liesenfeldt, Ann McGovern, Alice K. Hurley, Mechtildes C. Crowley, Marion A. Kratzer, Rose E. Rieper, Helen M. Flannigan, Virginia Heenan Kegerreis, Margaret R. Jurek Bennett, Alice Marie Weaver, Florence M. Pecora, Mary V. Neal, Charlotte I. Johnston, Mary B. Henry, Werdna M. Downey, Mary Ella Wyly, Ruth A. Krueger, Florence E. Lake, Polly L. Hunter, Emma Jean Lorenzetti, Elizabeth J. Miller, Genevieve L. Norwood, Genevieve E. Pearl, Mable E. Robertsof, Margaret D. Fox, Martha Ivys Glasgow.

Lubov Wilcha, Kathryn C. Wilson, Margaret Bernhard, Dolores Lorraine Kera, Mary M. Lentsch, F. Elliott Bricknell, Helen J. Cherrier, Ruth I. Kerr, Mary Florence Campbell, Iolanda M. Cicerchia, Rachel J. Witte, Matilde Yanez, Elizabeth Ann Beam, Bernice A. Nelson, Janet Blanche Peterson, Marie Terbeck, Adeline S. Golkowski, Ione J. Harriman, Mary Ann Harmon, Opal M. Jones, Sarah J. Kerkulas, Helen M. Keone, Elma C. Niederst, Jeannette F. Pluntnicki, Marie T. Stofko, Kate Mae Smith, Charlotte Mary White, Sophia R. DeMuro, Lucile S. Spencer, Norma L. Barco, Yvonne Faye Cigan Hudock, Alice P. Newman, Josephine A. Parsons, Helen F. Sander-son, Ramona M. Saar.

Retired: Lt. Col. Mildred P. Carter, Capt. Dona G. Walsh, 1st Lt. Edna Lucille Anderson, 2nd Lt. Janet Chandler Best, 2nd Lt. Iola S. Boil, 1st Lt. Mabel E. Butcher, 1st Lt. Corinne C. Carlson, 1st Lt. Catherine M. Clarke, 1st Lt. Katherine E. Colvin, 1st Lt. Lenore F. Davin, 2nd Lt. Eleanor Judson Dietrich, 1st Lt. Alice Thomas Eppard, 1st Lt. Gladys Ruth Rasmussen, 1st Lt. Mary J. Gegan, 2nd Lt. Cecile S. Hambleton, 1st Lt. Marjorie Jessup Holmes, 2nd Lt. Kathryn Jayne Kelly, 1st Lt. Faye Maxine Kubichek, 1st Lt. Irene T. Labrie, 2nd Lt. Anna V. Lee, 1st Lt. Frances C. Lubin, 2nd Lt. Dorothea Mae Malchow, 1st Lt. Lelah Melick, 1st Lt. Jeannette M. Noble, 1st Lt. Erma D. Packard, 2nd Lt. Virginia D. Richter, 2nd Lt. Margaret A. Rooney, 2nd Lt. Dora J. Sherman, 2nd Lt. Katherine M. Smiley, 1st Lt. Ruth Louise Spitzer, 1st Lt. Laura E. Teeple, 1st Lt. Shirley Watson, 2nd Lt. Audrey J. Woog, 2nd Lt. Helen Zelinskas, Capt. Ruth A. Muse, 2nd Lt. Elizabeth V. Adams, 1st Lt. Gretchen B. Bernatz, 2nd Lt. Elaine E. Bogan, 2nd Lt. Mary A. Baczek, 2nd Lt. Myrtle Belle Carl, 1st Lt. Jeanne A. Carter, 1st Lt. Mary M. Cockey, 1st Lt. Ann E. Connors, 1st Lt. Mary Boyle Dent, 1st Lt. Mildred B. Dossin, 2nd Lt. Helene Rose Edwards, 2nd Lt. Eunice I. Camache, 1st Lt. Flora C. Hahn, 1st Lt. Alberta Hausmann, 2nd Lt. Ruth Eleanor Horn, 2nd Lt. Marie A. Krug, 1st Lt. Mary E. Kunts, 1st Lt. Freida W. Landgraf, 2nd Lt. Elfrieda E. Loehnerts, 1st Lt. Bertha M. P. Mahan, 2nd Lt. Margaret B. McQuail, 1st Lt. Margaret Jean Miller, 2nd Lt. Elizabeth Kathryn Noel, 1st Lt. Elizabeth Akin Rawls, 2nd Lt. Alice A. Rockwell, 2nd Lt. Mary Elizabeth Sharkey, 2nd Lt. Mildred Marie Skender, 1st Lt. Nancy T. Smith, 2nd Lt. Mary Lorena Spivey, 2nd Lt. Oral Henkel Thompson, 2nd Lt. Mary Weiss, 1st Lt. Anna M. Yager.

Separations: 196 (July) 278 (August).
Died: Three.

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SERVICE NEWS AND GOSSIP

► **FOREIGN AFFAIRS.** The face of the world and the fate of hundreds of millions of people as they are to be, are being determined in camera by the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London. Being revealed to this small group but not to the peoples affected, are the conflicting claims for territory and special interests, with the eye of each claimant upon the strategic value of the military plane, and particularly upon that of the secret atomic bomb. Likewise proceeding in camera are the negotiations in Washington between the United States and Great Britain with reference to the amount and conditions to be fixed upon the aid the latter is insisting it must have in order to relieve its dire need. Meanwhile, General of the Army MacArthur as Supreme Allied Commander is inaugurating policies for the disarmament and rule of Japan, Korea and the islands which the Tokyo government must surrender, prosecution of war criminals and promotion of democratic education and institutions. Controlling the Council of Foreign Ministers and General MacArthur are the decisions of Teheran, Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam. As those decisions are in general merely declarations of broad principles, it is the specific application of those principles that has precipitated conflict of interpretation and necessary compromises, if the final peace settlements are to be attained, and if the World Peace and Security Organization is to begin satisfactorily to function. In connection with aid to Britain, a guiding factor is the Lend-Lease agreement made with the United Kingdom, our determination to pursue the policy of Former Secretary of State Hull to remove barriers in the way of international trade, which President Truman is carrying on, and the hard-bolled attitude of Congress toward facilitating the English experiment in socialism to which the Atlee Government is committed, and, since the agreement with Britain would be a precedent, the financial strengthening of the Soviet Union, which would promote communism. Entering into this matter of foreign assistance is the recognized fact that unless the rest of the world move toward prosperity, America's own welfare would be affected; therefore, our disposition to be as helpful as our own interests and resources permit.

Without a true understanding of the situation in Japan and Korea, and the limitations imposed by Allied understanding on the policies to be pursued toward the beaten enemy, some critics are voicing their disapproval of the manner in which the conquered people and the Koreans are being treated. The record, however, speaks clearly of the rapid progress that has been made since the surrender documents were signed on 2 September, and justifies the public approval given by President Truman. In the less than two weeks that have passed from that notable date, our Troops and Ships have landed at strategic points or occupied important bases in the four islands remaining to Japan; military and naval disarmament has proceeded swiftly; the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, which made the final decisions in time of war has been abolished, and the Imperial General Staff is to be suppressed as will be the National Defense Headquarters created specifically to repel our landing, and anti-foreign societies. Under our control are some ten thousand planes the Japanese had kept in reserve to be used largely as suicide bombers to destroy our warships and transports as they began the actual invasion, and the heavy cost the Navy paid in casualties and ships for the conquest of Okinawa forecasts the terrific losses we would have suffered had the war continued. To stop anti-allied propaganda, General MacArthur imposed a strict censorship upon the Japanese Press and radio. Under his orders many Japanese, including General Tojo, who attempted to commit harikari by the pistol instead of by the sword, have been or will be arrested as war criminals and held for trial; and, incidentally, their defense will throw a flood of light upon Pearl Harbor. Thus General MacArthur, in accordance with the first Potsdam demand for surrender, has moved to eliminate the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan; in accordance with the second demand, occupied strategic points; in accordance with the fourth demand—the third restricts the Japanese to the four home islands—almost completed the complete disarmament of the Japanese military forces; and, in accordance with the fifth demand, has caused the arrest of the war criminals. Under the sixth demand, Japanese industries are being surveyed to separate those for peace production from those for war munitions manufacture. To achieve the further pledge "that the Japanese shall not be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a Nation" and the aim of a peacefully inclined and responsible government established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people, General MacArthur must work in all domestic matters entirely through the Japanese Emperor, who is his creature for this purpose and for the execution of the terms of surrender. Were he to do otherwise, he would violate the explicit promise of the Allies, and, moreover, lose the tremendous advantage of employment of the influence of this ruler, which national and military acceptance of his order to surrender shows he possesses. To promote democracy, he has announced that freedom of speech on all domestic questions or issues will be permitted. The result of all of his steps to date is orderly acquiescence in our occupation by the people, and the way thus is being paved to our eventual withdrawal and the return home of the occupying forces.

Korea presents an entirely different condition than that appearing in Japan. Because of it, the Allied leaders merely agreed that the country would obtain its independence "in due course," this limitation being imposed because of a history of ignorant and incompetent self-government, of Japanese administration for the last thirty-five years, and of confusion in the native mind as to the meaning of self-rule. To throw out the Japanese officials instantly would have been to precipitate chaos, and gravely embarrass and even intensify our operations, and until the 1.5 million Japanese residents of the country have been repatriated to their homeland, and to prevent attacks upon them, it was necessary to continue for a time the use of the Japanese administrative machinery. Lt. Gen. John F. Hodge, the Military Governor, never intended that this use should be permanent, since he is in sympathy with the desire of the Koreans for independence, and knows that it is a pledge of the Allied Nations. However, General MacArthur has disposed of the misunderstanding of his orders by directing the replacement of all Japanese in governmental positions as rapidly as possible "consistent with the safety of operations," which, of course, is paramount. Russian controlled press dispatches—American and other foreign correspondents are not admitted to the area—tell of local self-government to be established in Northern Korea within a few days and of a thousand natives joining the workers and peasants labor union, all with the "constant" assistance of the Soviet military authorities; but Domei Agency reports describe concern over the safety of Japanese nationals and fear of "abominable incidents." As Generalissimo, General MacArthur has discussed northern Korea with the Russian representa-

tive in Tokyo. Before long, it is expected the General will organize the Allied Council which will insure coordination on all occupation questions. China, once a suzerain of Korea, is especially anxious that peace shall rule within the borders of its close neighbor. However, China is endeavoring to establish her own internal peace through negotiations between the Chung-King and Yenan factions. The latest reports are that these negotiations are dragging along with threats of failure, but the United States is continuing its pressure to bring about agreement, and in our policy we have the support of Russia and Great Britain, though both the latter prefer a weak rather than a strong nation.

No one expects that the vital and complex questions being discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers will be settled until there shall be developed compromises resulting from prolonged consideration of different formulae. Believing it the easiest to be resolved, Secretary Byrnes induced the Council first to draft a treaty of peace for Italy to replace the outmoded armistice which still remains secret. But involved in this proposal were Russia's desire for Anglo-American recognition of the Balkan Governments, which is not acceptable to Washington or London; establishment of Italian boundaries beneficial to France and Yugoslavia; disposition of Italian colonies, with Yugoslavia claiming Adriatic islands and Greece the Deodecanese group; Ethiopia seeking an outlet to the Red Sea through Eritrea and Somaliland, and Russia reportedly asking for a Red Sea base on that colony; and an international trusteeship for Tripoli, Libya and Ciranaica. Then there is Britain concerned about Pantalleria and adjacent islands which Anglo-American forces captured on the way across the Mediterranean from Tunis to Sicily. There are also the questions of the reparations Italy shall pay to France, Yugoslavia and Greece, satisfaction of Russia's demand for Italian shipping, war and mercantile, and financial and coastwise shipping aid to the former enemy so that he can get on his feet economically. It would seem that in general a grab game is in progress, with France, for example, not only wanting to possess a strip of northern Italian territory adjoining her own boundary, but certain oases in the Lake Tehad District of Africa, and a section of Fezzan which cuts into southwestern Libya. In addition, she is seeking expansion of the zone she occupies in Germany and, if that be denied, then international control of the Ruhr and Rhineland. France also wants clarified her arrangements with Lebanon and Syria, and complete recognition of her sovereignty over Indo-China. Yugoslavia is demanding all of Istria and Fiume from Italy, and appears willing at this juncture to permit Trieste to be an international port. Above all are the higher politics in this situation, with de Gaulle making suggestions of the inter-locking interests of the small southeastern nations and France, which has intensified the suspicions in Moscow that a continental bloc is to be formed which would serve as a counter-balance to Russia.

It is disclosed that Britain wants credits from \$3 to \$6 billions, which shall bear no interest and be unsecured. The agenda adopted by our representation and the British delegation, calls for consideration of financial problems, lend-lease settlement, commercial policy and surplus property disposal. Of special interest to the Services is the proposal made by President Truman in his recent Message to Congress that we take to heart one of the costliest lessons of our unpreparedness and provide stockpiles of strategic materials which can be obtained only from foreign sources. The British Empire has such materials which could be turned over to us as a small repayment of its debt, or which we could purchase on terms that would evidence the realization that our strength is essential to its interests and world peace and at the same time provide it with dollars. Whatever the results of the negotiations, Congress will give them careful scrutiny, since the feeling exists at the Capitol that we must not further deplete our own resources. Meanwhile, the preliminaries for the meeting of the Assembly of the World Peace Organization remain under discussion in London, and probably they will not be determined upon until the Allied Powers are further along on the solution of the problems which at present are irritating their relations, to say the least.

► **NAVY SHIPS.** **USS Maryland:** The battleship USS Maryland, three times damaged by the Japanese in ten months, was on her way to strike the enemy again when word of Japanese surrender was officially announced. One of the ships "sunk" by the Japs at Pearl Harbor, the battleship was under attack 100 times during the war.

The Maryland suffered her last battle damage from a suicide plane at Okinawa on 7 April. The Kamikaze crashed into the top of the main battery turret three. The explosion of its bombload and gasoline tanks enveloped the after part of the ship in flames, claiming the lives of 11 men, injuring 36 others and causing the listing of six others as missing in action.

Under the command of Commo. (then Capt.) Herbert J. Ray, USN, the Maryland took part in the bombardment and invasion of Kwajalein Atoll. But "old Mary," as her crew called her, suffered her first major injury in the Marianas.

USS Tuscaloosa: The USS Tuscaloosa's crew celebrated the vessel's eleventh birthday on 17 August, along with the fall of Japan. During the last four years the heavy cruiser has been from the northern shores of Russia to the island chain of the Ryukyus.

Adding to the peacetime renown, the cruiser has battled its way through the German-infested icy sea lanes to Murmansk, the invasions of North Africa, Normandy, and Southern France, and the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa—all without major damage.

At Iwo Jima, the Tuscaloosa, using its scout planes for spotting, had furnished continual close support to the Marines ashore. Again at Okinawa the vessel was assigned to the bombardment group. Throughout the campaign, beginning a week before the actual invasion, the vessel fought off wave after wave of suicide planes, while carrying out her bombardment assignments according to schedule.

In May of 1944, Rear Admiral Morton L. Deyo, USN, chose the Tuscaloosa as his flagship.

USS Tang: The Navy Department has received information from Manila, disclosing the names of nine survivors of the submarine USS Tang, which was reported on 5 February, 1945, to be overdue and presumed lost. Among the nine reported by the Navy were Commander Richard H. O'Kane, USN, and Lieut. Lawrence Savadkin, USNR.

USS Diodon: Mrs. Genevieve Cullinane on 10 September christened the submarine USS Diodon. The vessel was built at Electric Boat Company, Groton, Mass. Mrs. Cullinane is the widow of the late Daniel Cullinane, Chief Motor Machinist's Mate, USNR, who was declared missing on 1 August, 1943, and later declared dead. He was serving aboard the USS Grunion when that submarine was lost.

USS Underhill: Details of one of the strangest Pacific actions—a fight to the death between a destroyer escort, the USS Underhill, and a pack of Jap midget submarines, may now be told with the arrival in the United States of survivors.

Two of the six Jap subs were sunk in the battle, but the Underhill and ten of her

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officers and 102 men were lost in an explosion which followed the ramming of the second sub. The action took place off Southern Luzon on 24 July, 1945.

Captain of the Underhill at the time was Lt. Comdr. Robert M. Newcomb, USNR. He was among those listed as killed or missing in action.

USS Saratoga: Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, announced this week that the 35,000-ton aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and 18 escort carriers are being assigned immediately to troop transport duty in the Pacific. Forty more escort carriers and 197 attack transports will also be assigned to this duty as soon as they can be released from their present work of moving aircraft and troops from the Philippines, Marianas, and Ryukus into Japan, the Navy said.

USS St. Paul: The heavy cruiser the USS Saint Paul, under the command of Capt. E. H. Von Heimburg, USN, fired the last naval salvo on the island of Honshu—the last salvo on the main islands of Japan.

The Saint Paul was the last, new, large combat ship to join the fighting Third Fleet and Task Force 38 in the final drive of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet against Japan.

ARMY GROUND FORCES. Two major changes on the Headquarters staff of Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General of Army Ground Forces, were announced here this week.

Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, GSC, was assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, vice Maj. Gen. Clyde L. Hyssong, GSC, and Maj. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, GSC, was assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, vice Brig. Gen. Loyal M. Haynes, GSC.

Brig. Gen. Edmund B. Sebree, native of Olney, Ill., and a graduate in 1919 of the United States Military Academy, has been assigned as Chief of the Special Information Section.

Brig. Gen. Emil Lenzner has been assigned here as Ground Signal Officer, vice Col. Otis K. Sadtler, Sig. C.

Two officers were present here for conference purposes, several days of last week. They were Col. R. C. Sander, Inf., former Infantry representative on the Army Ground Forces Board, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Col. Willard F. Millic, FA, former Field Artillery representative who served on the same board.

Officers newly assigned here for permanent duty include Col. Harry D. Easton, FA, Ground G-1 Section; Col. Joseph P. Donnovin, FA, Ground Requirements Section; Col. George L. Simpson, Inf., Ground Plane Section; Lt. Col. Wayne C. Higgins, OD, Ground Ordnance Section; Lt. Col. Leon J. deP. Rouge, Inf., Ground Plans Section; Maj. John A. Benner, CAC, Ground G-1 Section; Maj. Everett C. Clark, Jr., Inf., Ground Special Information Section; Maj. Glen L. Foote, Cav., Ground G-1 Section; Maj. Joseph P. D'Arezzo, CAC, Ground Requirements Section; Capt. Clifford O. Harris, CE, Ground Engineer Section; CWO Frederick J. Coupe, AUS, Ground Requirements Section; and WOJG George A. Callahan, AUS, Ground Signal Section.

Antiaircraft Command—Maj. Gen. G. Ralph Meyer, Commanding General, resumed command recently following a successful operation at William Beaumont General Hospital.

Col. Lawrence E. Shaw was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, succeeding Col. Herbert T. Benz, who assumed new duties with the Antiaircraft Artillery School. Col. Auston M. Wilson replaced Lt. Col. John A. Rega as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. Lt. Col. Rega left this headquarters for an overseas assignment.

Lt. Col. Paul A. Hastings was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, succeeding Lt. Col. Harold A. Gardner, who left for an overseas assignment.

Col. Walter R. Goodrich, former Chief of Overseas Information Division, retired from service after 28 years in the Coast Artillery and Antiaircraft Artillery. Col. Goodrich will make his home in California.

Col. Bird S. DuBois was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, succeeding Lt. Col. Arthur C. Smiley, jr. Col. DuBois arrived at this headquarters following a tour of duty in the Pacific.

Antiaircraft Artillery School—Lt. Col. Kenneth G. Merriam, Capt. John T. Castles and Capt. Albert A. McClure received awards for meritorious service. Brig. Gen. Robert H. Van Volkenburgh, Commandant, Antiaircraft Artillery School, presented the awards. Following the presentation the School Troops Detachment passed in review as the 84th AGF Band offered a medley of march airs.

Infantry School—Brig. Gen. J. N. R. Weaver landed at Lawson Field, Fort Benning 8 Sept. It was the end of a long trip home after more than three years in the Philippines.

Gen. Weaver was in command of the armored forces on Bataan, and was taken by the Japanese when it fell. He was rescued only three weeks ago by an allied parachute team, who found him in a prison camp in Manchuria.

He was greeted at Lawson Field by his daughter, Marian, Major Gen. John W. O'Daniel, Commandant of The Infantry School, Major Gen. Frank L. Culin, jr., Commanding Officer of the 87th Division, Brig. Gen. John McKee, Assistant Division Commander of the 87th, Brig. Gen. W. H. Hobson, our Post Commandant, Col. Samuel Buracker, Col. John E. Alberts, and Col. James W. Coutts.

The General and his family will spend his leave at 1115 Lockwood avenue, Columbus, Georgia.

With him on the plane was Brig. Gen. Will Brougher, of Decatur, and Brig. Gen. Edward P. King, Atlanta. They flew on to Atlanta from Lawson Field after participating in the greetings for General Weaver here.

Cavalry School—Maj. Alvin T. Netterblad, jr., Staff and Faculty, has been transferred to Headquarters, Replacement and School Command, Birmingham, Ala.

Lt. Col. Roland H. Del Mar has been relieved from attached unassigned, School Troops, and assigned to the Academic Division.

Capt. Vincent P. Visconti, FA, has been relieved from the Department of Tactics, Staff and Faculty, and transferred to the Officers' Replacement Pool, Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, Fort Sill, Okla.

1st Lt. Lawrence R. Lang, FA, School Troops, has been transferred to the Officers' Replacement Pool, Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, Fort Sill, Okla.

The following Cavalry officers have been relieved from assignment with the Staff and Faculty, and will be relieved from active duty at the Separation Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Capt. George G. Bonnyman, Capt. James E. Boothe, Capt. James F. Carter, Capt. William T. Ezzard, Capt. James K. Hackett, Capt. Reeves R. Houghton, 1st Lt. Howard E. Boucher, Capt. Richard S. Davies.

CWO Lloyd K. Stockton will be relieved from active duty at the Separation Center, Ft. McArthur, Calif., and WOJG Mark J. Hunt, at the Separation Center, Camp McCoy, Wis.

Capt. Lester B. Johnson, Infantry, has been newly assigned to School Troops.

The following Field Artillery officers have been relieved from assignment with School Troops, and assigned to the Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, Fort Sill, Okla.: 1st Lt. Jess W. Smith, 2nd Lt. John C. Jansma, 2nd Lt. Oliver L. Holmes and 2nd Lt. Milton E. Reeder.

Maj. Robert J. Barth, Field Artillery, Staff and Faculty, will go to Ft. Leavenworth, Kans., on temporary duty to attend Naval Support of Land Operations, Naval Gunfire Support and Naval Operations, a phase of the regular Command and Staff School.

The following Cavalry officers are relieved from assignment with School Troops, and are assigned to the 95th Infantry Division, Camp Shelby, Miss.: Capt. Charles H. Edwards, 1st Lt. Stephen J. Hughes, and 2nd Lt. Roger M. Bonline.

Capt. Jesse D. Stallings has been detailed as Fire Marshal of School Troops.

1st Lt. Albert F. Winslow, FA, has been relieved from assignment Field Artillery Training Detachment and assigned to Battery A, 611th Field Artillery Battalion (Pk.).

1st Lt. Robert M. Young, FA, has been relieved from assignment with Battery A, 611th Field Artillery Battalion (Pk.), and assigned to the Field Artillery Training Detachment.

1st Lt. Thomas W. Wilson, FA, has been appointed Commanding Officer of Battery A, 611th Field Artillery Battalion (Pk.).

1st Lt. William E. Kennedy, jr., FA, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, School Troops, has been assigned S-2 of School Troops.

Armored Center—Col. Thomas F. Taylor, a graduate of the United States Military Academy, class of 1929, has been appointed Chief of the Equipment and Materiel Section. He previously served as G-4 of the V Corps, and Executive G-4 of the 12th Army Group. Earlier, he held a post similar to his present one as G-4 of the Armored Command.

Maj. D. J. Reisinger, Signal Officer, has left for Camp Stoneman, Calif., en route to an overseas assignment.

2nd Lt. Preston K. Johnson, jr., has been appointed Assistant Staff Judge Advocate.

Armored Replacement Training Center—Lt. Col. Wilburn L. Strickland, who for the last four months has served as S-1 of the ARTC, has been appointed Commanding Officer of the 10th Battalion. Other changes in officer personnel of the Center resulted in Maj. Willard M. Shope being named Executive Officer of the 10th Battalion, and Capt. James L. O. Foster becoming a member of the Operations and Training Staff of the S-3 Section.

Maj. Alfred P. Backhaus has been named Inspector General of the ARTC, replacing Maj. George W. Husted, who was transferred. A reserve officer, having been commissioned upon graduation from the University of Maryland in 1937, Maj. Backhaus was called to active duty in 1941. He later attended the Engineers' School at Fort Belvoir, Va.

Miss Martha Orendorf, of Bowling Green, Ky., has been named Chief Librarian of the ARTC, succeeding Miss Helen Fry, who left to take a similar post in the European Theater of Operations.

Armored School—Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffney, who commanded two Armored divisions and an Army Corps against Germany, recently became the fourth Commandant of the Armored School. He succeeded Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, who had been commandant 18 months.

Officers newly assigned to the Armored School include Maj. Robert A. McKerlicher, Training Literature Department; Capt. Donald M. Thompson, Communication Department, and Capt. Stewart B. Van Dyke, School Troops.

Field Artillery School—Lt. Col. J. T. Malloy, Paso Robles, Calif., has been assigned as Commanding Officer of the Infantry Training detachment at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla., succeeding Maj. John M. Ewbank, who was relieved for an undisclosed assignment.

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LOS ANGELES 23, CALIF.

► ARMY AIR FORCES. Lt. Col. Thomas G. Lanphier, jr., was the AAF flier who shot down the plane of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Navy, it was learned this week. Acting on information relayed to commands in the Southwest Pacific by former Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Colonel Lanphier and a group of AAF fliers in P-38s led by Lt. Col. John W. Mitchell, (then Major), departed from Guadalcanal on the morning of 18 April, 1943. Leading his flight which had been directed to attack the enemy planes while others flew protective cover, Colonel Lanphier successfully shot down the Admiral's plane which was seen to fall in flames at an altitude so low as to preclude the possibility of anyone escaping. Reason for the delay in announcing the details of Yamamoto's death were also made known by the Army this week, when it was disclosed that Colonel Lanphier's brother, 1st Lt. Charles W. C. Lanphier, a Marine Corps fighter pilot, has been a prisoner of the Japanese.

The "Green Project," aerial redeployment by the AAF Air Transport Command of American troops in the European and Mediterranean theaters for further duty in the Pacific, was discontinued 10 Sept. At the same time, release of a portion of the air transport facilities from the Atlantic service will make an increased air lift available for speeding Pacific personnel home for discharge. It was also announced that ATC's regularly established routes across the North Atlantic will remain in operation, but they will be cut back to provide an air lift of approximately 10,000 United States-bound passengers monthly. Considerable aircraft and personnel from ATC's South Atlantic, North African and Caribbean Divisions will be returned to the United States. When ATC operations in the Caribbean area and in South America are drastically reduced, certain air bases will be operated on a standby basis by skeleton crews to meet the needs of forces still overseas.

Two models of target planes are now standard equipment for the AAF, the OQ-3 and the OQ-14. They are used as targets for aerial gunnery practice by B-29 gunners and also for antiaircraft practice by ground forces. Able to fly at speeds ranging from 100 to 200 miles per hour and at altitudes up to 3,000 feet, controlled by radio from the ground, the target planes have recently been used for another purpose, that of training students of radar in tracking flying objects in the air for gunnery practice. The OQ-3 is a high-wing monoplane, nine feet long, with a wing span of 12 feet three inches. It weighs 100 pounds and is powered with an eight horsepower gasoline engine. The OQ-14 has a wing span of 11 feet six inches and is powered with a 22 horsepower engine. Take-off is by catapult and landing is made by parachute, released either by the control operator or automatically as a result of damage from vital hits.

Air Technical Service Command. Consolidation of the Procurement and Readjustment Divisions, ATSC, under the single name of Procurement Division, with Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Rawlings as chief, has been announced. Brig. Gen. D. C. Swatland, former chief of the Procurement Division, is being relieved from active duty, at his own request, and will revert to an inactive status to resume his practice of law. General Rawlings has been chief of the Readjustment division since its activation in July, 1944.

The danger of fuel systems as a potential cause of airplane accidents has been practically eliminated as a result of a new continuous flow fuel system developed recently by AAF engineers at the ATSC.

School of Aviation Medicine. A class of 18 flight nurses were graduated from the AAF School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, Tex., 8 Sept. The nurses, picked volunteers from AAF installations throughout the United States, had completed a six weeks' course.

Safety Award. Mr. Ned H. Dearborn, president of the National Safety Council, 6 Sept. presented to the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe its highest safety award. The award was accepted by Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Anderson, former deputy commander for operations of USSTAF and present Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1.

Troop Carrier Command. Important staff changes in the Headquarters of the I Troop Carrier Command were announced recently by Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams, newly-assigned commanding general. New chief of staff is Col. James E. Duke, jr. Deputy chief of staff is Col. Harry W. Generous. New staff officers heading sections of Command Headquarters are: Lt. Col. Herman E. Hurst, A-1; Lt. Col. John C. Marchant, A-2; Col. Glenne M. Jones, A-3; Col. John W. Oberdorf, A-5; Col. James C. Van Ingen, A-6.

Heading the Special Staff sections are: Lt. Col. Marion S. Tilghman, Adjutant General; Lt. Col. Elmer F. Estrumse, Air Inspector; Lt. Col. Richard B. Winder, Budget and Fiscal Officer; Lt. Col. Urven V. White, Command Chaplain; Maj. Joseph J. Casey, Chemical Warfare Officer; Lt. Col. Charles G. Burbridge, Engineering Officer; Lt. Col. Robert E. Dake, Chief Aircraft Engineering and Maintenance; Col. David H. Passell, Finance Officer; Col. Robert J. Bénéford, Surgeon; Lt. Col. David D. Porter, Judge Advocate; Lt. Col. Joseph W. Gable, Ordnance; Maj. George H. Rogers, Personal Affairs; Capt. Roy J. High, Postal Officer; Lt. Col. Vincent P. Wilber, Public Relations; Maj. Bernard L. Zarrow, Quartermaster; Lt. Col. Richard J. Kent, Weather Officer; Lt. Col. Harold F. Smith, State Control Officer; Maj. Lewis B. Eldridge, Transportation Officer; Maj. J. F. Linn, Commanding Officer in the Headquarters Base Unit.

China Theater. Brig. Gen. Russell E. Randall, formerly commanding general of the 312th Fighter Wing, of the Fourteenth Air Force, has been appointed to head the AAF Liaison Mission to the Chinese Air Force, according to a recent announcement by Lt. Gen. George B. Stratemeyer, commanding general of the AAF in the China Theater. The mission, which is located in General Stratemeyer's Chungking headquarters, provides technical advice and administrative to the Chinese Air Force.

► ARMY SERVICE FORCES. Lt. Col. Joshua W. Davis has been relieved from Special Training Unit, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., and assigned to Office, Director of Military Training, Hq., ASF, Washington, D. C.

Col. Charles L. Main has been relieved from Office, Director of Military Training, Hq., ASF, and assigned to Third Service Command, 3332 SCU, LaFayette College, Easton, Pa.

Col. Gabriel T. Mackenzie, having returned from overseas, is being assigned to Office, Director of Military Training, Hq., ASF, Washington, D. C.

Col. Marion Carson has been relieved from EDC, Southern Land Frontier, Fort McIntosh, Texas, and assigned to Requirements Section, AGF, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. Donald S. Dundas has been relieved from AAF, RS, No. 4, Santa Ana, Calif., and assigned to MPD, ASF, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. Edgar W. Glenn has been relieved from Maintenance Div., ASF, Washington, D. C., and assigned to IPD, ASF, Washington, D. C.

Col. William B. Leitch has been relieved from Attached, Unassigned, Det. of Patients, Walter Reed Gen. Hospital, Washington, D. C., and assigned to Eighth Service Command, Dallas, Texas.

Lt. Col. Geo. V. Riley has been relieved from Fourth Service Command, AG&SFRS, Miami Beach, Fla., and assigned to Office of the Military Aide to the President, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. Albin M. Ayers has been relieved from Distribution Division, ASF, Washington, D. C., and assigned to Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Command, Hq., ASF, Washington, D. C.

Col. John DuV. Stevens has been relieved from Hq., AGF, Washington, D. C., and assigned to AAA ORP, Ft. Bliss, Texas.

Corps of Chaplains. Maj. Judah Naditch, Chief Jewish Chaplain in the American Theater of Operations in Europe, has assumed his new duties as special adviser on Jewish problems to the General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General of the United States Forces in the European Theater.

This appointment, which was requested by General Eisenhower, further implements the expanded Jewish refugee and repatriation program recently initiated by the Combined Displaced Persons Executive Division. This is one of the few divisions in USFET Headquarters organized to continue as a combined British-French-United States operation after the dissolution of SHAEF.

Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) Luther D. Miller, Chief of Chaplains, USA, delivered the invocation at the ceremony in honor of General Jonathan Wainwright at the Washington Monument on 10 Sept.

Chaplain (Col.) Patrick J. Ryan, Officer-in-Charge, Planning and Training Division, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, has returned from leave and is now on duty.

Chaplain (Maj.) William M. Frost, Army Ground Forces Liaison Division, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, preached at the morning service in the First Church of Arlington, Va., on 9 Sept.

Chaplain (Maj.) Eben. Cobb Brink, Technical Information Division, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, preached at the morning service in the Eckington Presbyterian Church, Washington, D. C., on 9 Sept.

Chaplain (Capt.) Henry P. Simpson, Technical Information Division, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, preached morning and evening on 9 Sept. at the Carmel Baptist Church, Carmel, N. Y.

Chaplain (Capt.) Karl L. Darkey has been assigned to Planning and Training Division, Office of the Chief of Chaplains. He came from an overseas assignment of forty months, the last assignment being with the 118th Infantry in Germany.

Transportation Corps. The \$16,000,000 German luxury liner Europa, one of six captured Nazi ocean-going vessels earmarked for service as U. S. troop transports, will soon carry her first load of soldier-passengers home from Europe. Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross, Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces, disclosed that the former queen of the North German Lloyd Lines will begin her maiden trans-Atlantic crossing under the American flag on 19 Sept., when, loaded with homebound American veterans, she will sail from Southampton for New York.

The war against Japan cost the Army a total of 200,058 ship tons of cargo lost at sea—the equivalent of 20 fully loaded Liberty ships—in 31 vessels sunk and two vessels damaged while en route from the United States to the Pacific, Alaska and India theaters. Army cargo shipped to these areas in the 44 months of the war totalled 43,520,000 ship tons. Those supplies lost at sea, therefore, represented only 0.46 per cent of the total amount shipped. This means that for each 10,000 ship tons of cargo sent from the United States to the Pacific, 46 were lost at sea. General Gross disclosed that despite the far greater sea distances in the Pacific, cargo losses there were less than half proportionately than those suffered in the Atlantic.

Quartermaster Corps. Quartermaster troops, during the mop-up of Japanese troops on Okinawa, scored at the top in numbers of prisoners taken. "Reason for the larger numbers of Japs captured," the Quartermasters say, "was that the remaining enemy, many of them hiding in caves, were starving and spent plenty of time trying to pilfer U. S. Army 'C' rations from the many caves and above-ground dumps in which our Army food was stored." With the hungry Japs trying to steal in at night, either singly or in small groups, it was "duck soup" for the Quartermaster men, who were in charge of food storage and distribution, to pick the foragers off in large numbers. Quartermaster Corps officers, recently returned from Okinawa, say their men turned in an almost constant flow of Jap prisoners. During a period of only a few days, one small group that was guarding a supply dump, captured 81 Japanese, all caught while attempting to steal rations.

Plans are being made for a long-range Army dog-breeding and training program, to replace wartime training measures. In carrying out the new program, the Remount Service Branch of the Army's Quartermaster Corps will place brood bitches with competent civilian dog breeders, under a plan similar to that long followed by the Army in breeding and training horses. In announcing the program Lt. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory, The Quartermaster General, stated that "no additional dogs will be procured under the wartime program inaugurated by the Army in July, 1942." That program called for voluntary donation of dogs to the Army by American owners. Under the new system the Army will control civilian breeding and select for training those puppies best suited for Army service. Dogs will be used for sentry duty in the armies of occupation and in experimental work by the Army on new uses of dogs in war.

Designation of Capt. Maurice R. Gehrke as Chief of the Storage Division of the Jeffersonville (Ind.) Quartermaster Depot was announced by Brig. Gen. Guy I. Rowe, Commanding General of the installation.

Medical Corps. Col. Bernard J. Finan, Commanding Officer of the Boston Quartermaster Depot has announced that eleven Medical Corps officers have arrived at the Depot to attend a week's orientation course at the Depot's Orthopedic Clinic. The officers and the General Hospitals they represent are as follows: Capt. Robert W. Augustine, AMC, Washington, D. C.; Maj. Donald W. Bree, Madigan Gen. Hosp., Ft. Lewis, Wash.; Capt. Richard G. Jackson, Bushnell Gen. Hosp., Brigham City, Utah; Capt. Robert C. Keys, Hosp. Ctr., Camp Edwards, Mass.; Maj. Julian E. Jacobs, Lawson Gen. Hosp., Atlanta, Ga.; Maj. Maurice M. Pike, Dibble Gen. Hosp., Menlo Park, Cal.; Capt. Frank E. Urbanek, McCloskey Gen. Hosp., Temple, Tex.; Capt. Benjamin F. Miller, Hosp. Ctr., Cp. Carson, Colo.; Capt. Kenneth F. Stotz, Dibble Gen. Hosp., Menlo Park, Cal.; Capt. A. W. Clami, Billings Gen. Hosp., Ft. Ben Harrison, Ind.; and Capt. Bernard W. Sollod, Halloran Gen. Hosp., Staten Island, N. Y.

The course will be under the direction of Maj. S. S. Steinbergh, Orthopedic Consultant to the Clinic, and Lt. Gaynor O'Gorman, jr., Director of the Clinic.

Army Nurse Corps. Members of the Army Nurse Corps have been awarded 1,008 decorations since 7 December 1941. Two Distinguished Flying Crosses (one posthumous award); four Silver Stars for gallantry in action (one posthumous award); 12 Legion of Merit awards; 433 Bronze Stars or Oak Leaf Clusters in lieu thereof; 388 Air Medals or Oak Leaf Clusters in lieu thereof; five Soldier's Medals and 60 Purple Hearts (15 posthumous); 103 unit citations or commendations have been reported to this date.



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Wave Separation Centers

Officers in charge have been designated for the five Women's Reserve separation centers in Washington, D. C., New York City, Great Lakes, Ill., Memphis, Tenn., and San Francisco, Calif., where WAVES eligible for discharge under the Navy's point system will be released. The five centers are expected to open about 1 Oct.

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Development of Atomic Bomb

(Following is a continuation, from last week's issue of the ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL of the text of the report on the development of atomic energy for military purposes. The report was prepared by H. D. Smyth, chairman of the Department of Physics of Princeton University, at the request of Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves, USA, who had charge of the atomic bomb project.)

Military Policy Committee; Functioning of the OSRD Committees

5.25. A conference was held on 23 September, 1942, among those persons designated by the President to determine the general policies of the project, and certain others. Those present were Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, Dr. J. B. Conant, Dr. V. Bush, Maj. Gen. Brehon Somervell, Maj. Gen. W. D. Styer and Brig. Gen. L. R. Groves. (Vice-President Henry A. Wallace was unable to attend.) A Military Policy Committee was appointed consisting of Dr. V. Bush as Chairman with Dr. J. B. Conant as his alternate, Maj. Gen. W. D. Styer, and Rear Adm. W. R. Purnell. General Groves was named to sit with the committee and act as Executive Officer to carry out the policies that were determined. The duties of this committee were to plan military policies relating to materials, research and development, production, strategy, and tactics, and to submit progress reports to the policy group designated by the President.

5.26. The appointment of the Military Policy Committee was approved by the Joint New Weapons Committee, established by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and consisting of Dr. V. Bush, Rear Admiral W. R. Purnell, and Brig. Gen. R. G. Moses.

5.27. The creation of the Military Policy Committee in effect placed all phases of the DSM Project under the control of Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, General Styer, Admiral Purnell, and General Groves.

5.28. The OSRD S-1 Executive Committee held meetings about once every month from June 1942 to May 1943 and once after that time, in September 1943. These meetings were normally attended by General Groves, after September 1942, and Col. Marshall, and frequently by representatives of the industrial companies concerned with the production plants. Recommendations of the Committee were not binding but were usually followed. Thus it served as an advisory body to Dr. Bush and General Groves, and as an initial liaison group between the scientific, industrial, and military parts of the DSM Project. The S-1 Executive Committee has never been formally dissolved, but it has been inactive since the fall of 1943.

5.29. The procurement and engineering functions of the Planning Board were taken over by the Manhattan District in the summer of 1942 and that board then became inactive.

5.30. By the spring of 1943 it was felt that the Manhattan District was in a position to take over research and development contracts from the OSRD. Such a transfer was effected as of 1 May 1943, and marked the end of the formal connection of OSRD with the uranium project.

5.31. In July 1943 Conant and R. C. Tolman were formally asked by General Groves

to serve as his scientific advisers. They had already been doing so informally and have continued to do so. Coordination of the various scientific and technical programs was accomplished by meetings between General Groves and the leaders of the various projects, in particular, Compton, Lawrence, Oppenheimer (see Chapter XII), and Urey.

Subsequent Organization; the Manhattan District

5.32. Since 1943 there have been no important changes in the form of the organization and few of importance in the operating personnel. General Groves has continued to carry the major responsibility for correlating the whole effort and keeping it directed toward its military objectives. It has been his duty to keep the various parts of the project in step, to see that raw materials were available for the various plants, to determine production schedules, to make sure that the development of bomb design kept up with production schedules, to arrange for use of the bombs when the time came, and to maintain an adequate system of security. In discharging these duties General Groves has had the help of his tremendous organization made up of civilian scientists and engineers and engineer officers and enlisted men. Many of the civilians have been mentioned already or will be mentioned in later chapters dealing with particular projects. Brigadier General T. F. Farrell has acted as General Groves' deputy in the important later phases of the project. Colonel K. D. Nichols, the District Engineer of the Manhattan District with his headquarters at the Clinton Engineer Works, has been connected with the project since 1942. He has been concerned with the research and production problems of both U-235 and plutonium and has always shown exceptional understanding of the technical problems and their relative importance. Two other officers who should be mentioned are Colonel F. T. Matthis and Colonel S. L. Warren. Colonel Matthis has discharged major responsibilities at the Hanford Engineer Works in an extremely able manner; his duties have been concerned with both the construction and operational phases of the project. Colonel Warren is chief of the Medical Section of the Manhattan District and therefore has had ultimate responsibility for health problems in all parts of the project.

Summary

5.33. By the end of 1941 an extensive review of the whole uranium situation had been completed. As a result of this review Bush and his advisers decided to increase the effort on the uranium project and to change the organization. This decision was approved by President Roosevelt. From January 1942 until early summer of 1942 the uranium work was directed by Bush and Conant working with the Program Chiefs and a Planning Board. In the summer of 1942 the Army, through the Corps of Engineers, was assigned an active part in the procurement and engineering phases, organizing the Manhattan District for the purpose. In September 1942, Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, General Styer, and Admiral Purnell were appointed as a Military Policy Committee to determine the general policies of the whole project. Also in September, General Groves was appointed to take charge of all Army activities of the project. The period of joint OSRD and Army control continued through April 1943 with the Army playing an increasingly important role as the industrial effort got fully under way. In May 1943 the research contracts were transferred to the Corps of Engineers; the period of joint OSRD-Army control ended and the period of complete Army control began.

5.34. Since the earliest days of the project, President Roosevelt had followed it with interest and, until his death, he continued to study and approve the broad programs of the Military Policy Committee. President Truman, who as a United States Senator had been aware of the project and its magnitude, was given the complete up-to-date picture by the Secretary of War and General Groves at a White House conference immediately after his inauguration. Thereafter the President gave the program his complete support, keeping in constant touch with the progress.

CHAPTER VI

THE METALLURGICAL PROJECT AT CHICAGO IN 1942

Introduction

6.1. As has been made clear in Chapters IV and V, the information accumulated by the end of 1941 as to the possibility of producing an atomic bomb was such as to warrant expansion of the work, and this expansion called for an administrative reorganization. It was generally accepted that there was a very high probability that an atomic bomb of enormous destructive power could be made, either from concentrated U-235 or from the new element plutonium. It was proposed, therefore, to institute an intensive experimental and theoretical program including work both on isotope separation and on the chain-reaction problems. It was hoped that this program would establish definitely whether or not U-235 could be separated in significant quantities from U-238, either by electromagnetic or statistical methods; whether or not a chain reaction could be established with natural uranium or its compounds and could be made to yield relatively large quantities of plutonium; and whether or not the plutonium so produced could be separated from the parent material, uranium. It was hoped also that the program would provide the theoretical and experimental data required for the design of a fast-neutron chain-reacting bomb.

6.2. As has been explained in Chapter V, the problems of isotope separation had been assigned to groups under Lawrence and Urey while the remaining problems were assigned to Compton's group, which was organized under the cryptically named "Metallurgical Laboratory" of the University of Chicago. In this chapter and the following two chapters we shall describe the work of the Metallurgical Laboratory and the associated laboratories up to June 1945. In later chapters we shall discuss isotope-separation work and the work of the bomb development group, which was separated from the Metallurgical Laboratory early in 1943.

6.3. It would be foolish to attempt an assessment of the relative importance of the contributions of the various laboratories to the overall success of the atomic-bomb project. This report makes no such attempt, and there is little correlation between the space devoted to the work of a given group and the ability or importance of that group. In deciding which subdivision of the atomic-bomb project should be discussed first and most fully, we have been governed by criteria of general interest and of military security. Some developments of great technical importance are of little general interest; others both interesting and important must still be kept secret. Such criteria, applied to the objectives and accomplishments of the various laboratories set up since large-scale work began, favor the Metallurgical Laboratory as the part of the project to be treated most completely.

Objectives

6.4. In accordance with the general objectives just outlined, the initial objectives of the Metallurgical Laboratory were: first, to find a system using normal uranium in which a chain reaction would occur; second, to show that, if such a chain reaction did occur, it would be possible to separate plutonium chemically from the other material; and, finally, to obtain the theoretical and experimental data for effecting an explosive chain reaction with either U-235 or with plutonium. The ultimate objective of the laboratory was to prepare plans for the large-scale production of plutonium and for its use in bombs.

Organization of the Work

6.5. The laboratory had not only to concern itself with its immediate objectives but simultaneously to bear in mind the ultimate objectives and to work toward them on the assumption that the immediate objectives would be attained. It could not wait for a chain reaction to be achieved before studying the chemistry of plutonium. It had to assume that plutonium would be separated and to go ahead with the formulation of plans for its production and use. Consequently problems were continually redefined as new information became available, and research programs were reassessed almost from week to week. In a general way the experimental nuclear physics group under E. Fermi was primarily concerned with getting a chain reaction going, the chemistry division organized by F. H. Spedding (later in turn under S. K. Allison, J. Franck, W. C. Johnson, and T. Hogness) with the chemistry of plutonium and with separation methods, and the theoretical group under E. Wigner with designing production piles. However, the problems were intertwined and the various scientific and technical aspects of the fission process were studied in whatever group seemed best equipped for the particular task. In March 1942, Thomas W. Moore was brought in to head the engineering group. Other senior men in this group were M. C. Leverett, J. A. Wheeler and C. W. Cooper, who later succeeded Moore as head of the Technical Division. In the summer of 1942 the importance of health problems became apparent and a health division was organized under Dr. R. S. Stone. The difficult task of organizing and administering a research laboratory growing in size and complexity with almost explosive violence was

(Please turn to Page 106)

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Army Pearl Harbor Board

(Continued from Last Week)

It will be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin were responsible for the Joint Estimate, particularly with reference to air, and that this was based upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. In that estimate they put attack by air as the primary threat against Hawaii.

Contrast what Admiral Bellinger said on this record:

"If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, I assume they would have been in a functioning status." (R. 1626)

Contrast what General Martin said:

"I didn't see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is from a surprise attack with the information we had." (R. 1827)

Admiral Kimmel said:

"We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor." (R. 1771)

The foregoing statement by Kimmel was in 1944 before this Board, whereas the joint agreements he entered into with the Army and the instructions from the Secretary of the Navy as well as his own recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy show that an air attack was the principal concern.

Likewise, Admiral Bloch, who signed the Joint Air Agreement based on the air estimate of Bellinger and Martin, testified as follows:

"General Frank. Was the attack a complete surprise to you?"

"Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir." (R. 1518)

General Short was the signer of the agreements specifying the air attack as a primary threat and he had received the Marshall letter of 7 February 1941, and similar letters of General Marshall, and had replied setting forth in letters that the air attack was his primary concern.

Witness what General Short says on this record to the contrary:

"General Gruent. Was the attack of 7 December a complete surprise to you?"

"General Short. It was." (R. 536)

We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the Generals and Admirals in Hawaii, all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor. As a general statement, when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it.

Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified:

"Well, I was not surprised." (R. 4072)

Short's Standard Operating Procedure, which he had formulated with his staff in July and finally put into complete form on 5 November 1941, (R. 333) had been sent to the Chief of Staff. (R. 431) General Marshall wrote General Short on 10 October that it had just come to his attention and that upon an examination of the Standard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated 14 July, containing those three alerts, "I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units." (R. 29)

He objected to the assignment to the Hawaiian Air Force of the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all airfields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks, and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty. He thereby clearly warned General Short that the air force should not be used for antisabotage, for General Marshall further said in his letter:

"This (the action of using the air force for antisabotage duty) seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided." (R. 29)

General Short replied on 14 October, as follows:

"The plan was to use them (Air Force personnel) for guarding certain essential utilities. . . . However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon."

General Marshall again wrote General Short on the 28th of October, and in it he clearly indicated to Short that he should change his alert plan (of which there was no proof that he ever did) and only use the Air Force for guard during the last stage when the Air Force as such had been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. General Marshall further indicated that no potential ground duty should be used as an excuse for not continuing the specific Air Force training, saying:

"I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to

their own specific training requirements.

"It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned." (R. 30)

Here, again, General Marshall cautioned Short to use his Air Force for its normal purposes and not upon anti-sabotage guard duty and emphasizes that the use of the Air Force must be free and unfettered.

On 16 October Short received the following Navy message:

"The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the C.N.O. which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote: 'Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American and extremely nationalistic. If the Konohe Cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan.' (R. 279)

On 18 October 1941, a radiogram was sent by the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reading as follows:

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent." (R. 4258)

This message was dated 18 October 1941, according to the Gerow statement, Exhibit 63, but in the copy of communications produced by General Marshall, the same message was dated 20 October 1941, as No. 266.

On 28 October, General Marshall wrote General Short as to details of the training of the air corps personnel.

On 24 November the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message that Short thinks he saw, reading as follows:

"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military force is, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action. . . . Inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action." (R. 4258)

On 26 November 1941, the following secret cablegram was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24s on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines x x x before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24s are fully supplied with ammunition for guns." (R. 4259)

On 27 November the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message which was delivered by the liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, to G-3 of General Short, which reads as follows:

"Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenaro." (R. 1775)

And on the same day the Chief of Staff sent the following radio to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

No. 472. "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm

the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." (R. 280-281, 4259-4260)

This completes the pattern of the communications and information that was in Short's possession when he made the fatal decision to elect the antisabotage Alert No. 1 and not select either Alert No. 2 or No. 3 which would have constituted the defense against the most serious attack that could be made upon him in view of the previous estimate of the situation and warnings he had received from all quarters of an air raid.

On the same day, 27 November 1941, but after his decision to select Alert No. 1 and the sending of a reply to the message, Short received from G-2, War Department, through his G-2, Hawaiian Department, the following message:

"Advise only the C. G. and the C. of S. It appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possibilities that hostilities may begin." (R. 4260)

Short was asked what were his reasons for his action. The following colloquy is important:

"General Frank. I would like to develop this thought for just a minute. This is in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?"

"General Short. Yes."

"General Frank. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our War College teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now, in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?"

"General Short. The worst."

"General Frank. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in this instance?"

"General Short. Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had." (R. 436-437)

"General Frank. All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in general may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith in the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of Naval opinion and to a certain extent of the line of thought as a result of what was contained in messages between the 16th of November and the 27th?"

"General Short. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions of the War Department in not replying to my message and stating they wanted more, and in sending planes without any ammunition."

"General Frank. All right. Did you feel that the wording of messages coming in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control?"

"General Short. I thought that it indicated very definitely two things: That they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to violate territorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures."

"General Frank. The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as to why, when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not taken to meet it. I assume that the answer—

"General Short. You mean the estimate of the year—you mean the year before?"

"General Frank. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate."

"General Short. Oh."

"General Frank. Of 1941."

"General Short. Yes."

"General Frank. I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the question asked two or three questions back."

"General Short. Yes." (R. 471-472)

General Short within an hour after receiving the message from the Chief of Staff of 27 November ordered the No. 1 Alert, which continued up to the attack on 7 December. (R. 282) His message in reply to General Marshall was:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. Round four seventy two 27th Nov." (R. 38, 286)

The indorsements so appearing on this reply are as follows: In the handwriting of the Secretary of War there appear the words "Noted HLS," written in pen; "Noted—Chief of Staff," stamped by a rubber stamp on the

message without initials; and a rubber stamp "Noted, WPD" (in red ink) followed by pen initials "L.T.G." (R. 38, 4287)

An examination of the wire received from General MacArthur, in response to a similar message sent to General Short, shows the same indorsements, including "Noted—Chief of Staff," with a rubber stamp, but no initials. However, this message has written in General Marshall's handwriting the words "To Secretary of War, OCM." This indorsement does not appear on the following message that came from Short. (See General Marshall's explanation below.)

The message from Short to the Chief of Staff indicates that it was the "Action Copy" as noted in pencil at its foot "OCS/18136-120."

When questioned about this vital message, the Chief of Staff said:

"General Russell. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message in which he refers to the 27 November message from you over your signature by number. That message of General Short reporting action merely states:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh."

"The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initiated by Secretary Stimson and has a stamp 'Noted—Chief of Staff,' and was initiated by General Gerow."

"The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates to stamping documents which do not bear your signature. Does that indicate that you did or did not see those messages?"

"General Marshall. Well, I think if you look at the preceding message from the Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp on there, 'Noted—Chief of Staff.'"

"General Russell. That is true."

"General Marshall. And you will find it at the top of the message. You will find my initials."

"General Russell. Yes; I do see them."

"General Marshall. But not on the other one. I do not know about that. I do not know what the explanation is. I, initial them all; that is my practice. One goes to the particular section that has the responsibility for working on it, which in this case was the War Plans Division, now the Operations Division, and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution; I check it to him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified, I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. As a matter of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection at all."

"General Russell. The fact that it reached the Secretary of War's office and was by him initialed—would that or not indicate that you had sent it up to him or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else?"

"General Marshall. In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not initial it. They evidently came in together."

"General Russell. If they were together you might or might not have seen them?"

"General Marshall. I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be that I had seen it." (R. 38-40)

No one of these persons, or any of their subordinates, have any record, either internally in the War Department or externally, of any message to Short showing the slightest exception taken to his course of action. It will be noted as to the Chief of Staff, that while he did not initial the Short reply, he did initial the top message from General MacArthur on the same subject, and apparently they both went together to the Secretary of War, as they had come at substantially the same time in answer to the same message from the Chief of Staff. The inference from General Marshall's testimony is that possibly he only initialed the top one, but that is speculation, as he said, "I do not know what the explanation is." (R. 39)

2. Analysis of the Situation from 24 November to 27 November: The vital message of 27 November No. 472, heretofore quoted as having been sent by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, can be understood and its proper place in this narrative determined only when we know the events which led up to its being sent; when we know by whom drafted and by what procedure the drafting was accomplished; and the circumstances under which it was forwarded. Its relationship to surrounding circumstances and other documents must also be understood before we proceed to analyze the message and the meaning of each part of it.

The War Council met on the 25th of November 1941. Fortunately, we have the advantage of the contemporaneous diary of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who has pictured in his diary with great clarity and precision the events as they transpired, which were material to this issue. This diary reads:

"At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the (Please turn to Next Page)

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proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic. . . . We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. Then at twelve o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem." (R. 4050-4051)

This was the end of the discussions on the 25th of November, 1941 (R. 4050-4051), with the exception that when the Secretary of War returned to his office, he found a G-2 message that a Japanese expedition had started southward, south of Formosa; and he at once called Mr. Hull and sent him copies of the report and a copy to the President.

On the following day, 26 November 1941, the diary continues:

"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them that he had no other proposition at all." (R. 4051-4052)

There is some proof that, before General Marshall left Washington for North Carolina on maneuvers on the afternoon of the 26th, he had drafted in the rough a proposed message to General Short apprising him of the situation as it was developed. General Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, testifies that he believes he discussed such a draft with General Marshall. (R. 4244-4246)

General Marshall was away on the 27th and returned on the 28th, at which time he saw the complete draft of the message of the 27th together with the report from General Gerow of the events during the 27th which we are now about to relate. (R. 36-37)

Before the closing of the story of the 26th, Mr. Stimson defines it as:

"The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it." (R. 4051-4052-4053)

What the Secretary of State appears to have done was to have his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors and to hand to them the "Ten Points." As Ambassador Grew testifies, the Japanese considered these "Ten Points" to be an ultimatum. (R. 4221) Whether or not the Secretary of State considers now that this is not an ultimatum (see his letter of 28 September 1943), nevertheless, the Japanese did so consider it and acted upon it as such by notifying the task force, as the evidence shows was waiting at Takan Bay, to start the movement against Hawaii, and it did move out on the 27th-28th of November. As well put by Ambassador Grew:

"Naturally, they (the Japanese) had all their plans made for years beforehand, in the case of war with America. They were very foresighted in those respects, and they had their plans drawn up probably right down to the last detail; but as for the moment at which the button was touched, I don't myself know exactly how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were to the point at which they attacked Pearl Harbor; but it has always been my belief that it was about the time of the receipt of Mr. Hull's memorandum of 26 November that the button was touched." (R. 4215)

On the morning of the 27th of November 1941, Mr. Stimson's diary reads:

"The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.'"

Then the Secretary of War states:

"I then called up the President and talked with him about it."

He (Stimson) then approved the orders presented to him by General Arnold to move two large planes over the Mandated Islands to take pictures. (R. 4053)

The Secretary related that General Marshall "is down at the maneuvers today," and "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow." At this point he says:

"A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed." (R. 4054)

This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more time within which to prepare; but it was too late, as the die had been cast by the

Secretary of State in handling the "Ten Points" counter-proposals to the Japanese on the previous day, which was, as the Secretary of State remarked, "washing his hands of the matter."

When Ambassador Grew so testified he apparently did not know of the very complete evidence in this record of the movement of the Japanese task force starting on the 27th-28th from Takan Bay to the attack. Mr. Hull's statement on this subject is of interest:

"I communicated on 26 November to the Japanese spokesmen—who were urgently calling for a reply to their proposals of 20 November—what became the last of this Government's counter-proposals. . . . It will thus be seen that the document under reference did not constitute in any sense an ultimatum." (Letter from Secretary of State to the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 28 September 1944.)

3. The Drafting of the Message No. 472 of the 27th: We now turn to the drafting of the message of the 27th as related by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and other witnesses. The first meeting was between Mr. Stimson, General Bryden and General Gerow. (R. 4239-4240) A second meeting between Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark and General Gerow was held later in the day. (R. 4240) As the diary of Mr. Stimson says:

"But the main question at this meeting was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was." (R. 4055)

To continue with the diary:

"So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him (Mr. Stimson here verbally testified—'We were sending the messages to four people, not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska'). So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was." (R. 4056)

The Secretary of War then stated:

"The thing that I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two governments, and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right." (R. 4056)

The two sentences which the Secretary of War apparently wrote in the message of the 27th were these:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

The Secretary continues his testimony:

"That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had been a decision which I had heard from the President, as I have just read, and I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and the envoys from Mr. Hull; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my mind, as I quote my talk with the President, was to send a final alert, namely, that the man should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was here." (R. 4056)

The task that the Secretary of War was engaged upon was normally that of the Chief of Staff. As Mr. Stimson said:

"That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally do; to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts." (R. 4057)

The message to Hawaii now under consideration of the 27th has endorsed upon it, "Shown to the Secretary of War." (R. 4057)

The Secretary testified:

"I went over very carefully the whole message. . . . And I saw it after it was finally drawn, as was shown by the memorandum there." (R. 4058)

With reference to the other meeting that took place on the 27th in the drafting of this message, No. 472, General Gerow's testimony is that at the meeting with the Secretary of War the first two sentences, reported by the Secretary of War as being drafted by him, were sentences which were softened by instructions or information furnished by the Secretary of State in a conversation over the telephone with the Secretary of War the morning of the 27th. (R. 4247) General Gerow testifies that the sentences so softened originally read "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated." (R. 4270)

The sentence, "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment" was put in by General Gerow or Colonel Bundy. (R. 4247)

The sentence, "If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act," was thus phrased because as Gerow said he testified before the Roberts Commission:

"We pointed out in the message the possible danger of attack and directed reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully

carrying into effect the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against Japan, and the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit the first overt act." (R. 4251-4252)

The next sentence:

"This policy should not, not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense"

was inserted by General Gerow or by Colonel Bundy. The purpose of this language was to insure freedom of action to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. (R. 4252)

General Gerow said that there had been no discussion of the ambiguity of the message or its apparent conflicting instructions as a "Do-or-Don't" message. (R. 4252)

He said that nothing in the message told General Short about the relations between the American Government and the Japanese Empire. (R. 4256) The sole information passed on to General Short by the War Department from 20th October to 27th November about what the soldier calls "enemy information" was in this particular message. (R. 4263) The only previous message that Short had had of the international situation from the War Department was on 20 October, which read:

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent." (R. 4264)

The sentence:

"This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense"

was put in by the War Plans Division. (R. 4271)

With reference to the phrase, "You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary," apparently at that time no investigation was made by the War Department to ascertain just what means General Short had of conducting the reconnaissance; but aside from this fault, the fact is that General Short did have some planes plus radar to conduct a degree of reconnaissance. This the record shows he did not fully and gainfully employ these means for this purpose. General Short was recalled at substantially the end of all the testimony and questioned on this point. Short's position on this message was that the direction to him to conduct reconnaissance was a futile directive and that it indicated to him that the man who wrote the message was entirely unfamiliar with the fact, "that the Navy was responsible for long distance reconnaissance." He said this was

"In spite of the fact that the Chief of Staff had approved that plan that provided for that, whoever wrote the message was not familiar with it, or it had slipped his mind that it was the Navy and not the Army that was responsible." (R. 4436-4437)

He said when questioned as to why he did not call attention to this matter in his reply to the War Department:

"I think if the War Department had intended to abrogate that agreement, they would have told me so."

He said he based everything on the responsibility of the Navy for long distance reconnaissance, because it had been approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. (R. 4438)

He could not explain why he failed to use his own reconnaissance aircraft even though the agreement was not actually in effect at that time or the War Department had overlooked the agreement because he says, as elsewhere admitted, that the Army and Navy agreement was not to go into effect until hostilities, or their equivalent, had occurred. His reconnaissance planes were still under his control and could have been used by him to carry out this direct order in this message.

For instance, the following colloquy occurred:

"62. General Grunert. You might clear up two additional points. First, we will take up the point that you have brought out there, that the War Department had evidently overlooked the agreement that your command had with the Navy, as to distant reconnaissance. Did you call the War Department's attention to the fact, when you were ordered to make reconnaissance, about that agreement?"

"General Short. I did not, but I reported to them exactly what I was doing."

"63. General Grunert. Then you considered your report the answer to that?"

"General Short. They called on me for a report. If they had not called on me for a report, I think the situation would have been quite different; but they definitely told me to 'report action taken,' which I did; and I heard nothing further from them."

"64. General Grunert. We have had testimony before the Board, from a member of the Navy, calling the Board's attention to the fact that this Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not operative until an emergency arose, and apparently the emergency, or the imminence of such an emergency, was not agreed to, locally, to make the provisions operative. With that understanding, was it the Navy's business to conduct long-distance reconnaissance, prior to such an emergency?"

"General Short. If the emergency existed, it was their business; if it did not exist, there

was no necessity."

"65. General Grunert. Then, when do you judge the emergency came about?"

"General Short. It very definitely came about, at 7:55 on the morning of the 7th." (R. 4438-4439)

This is sufficient in itself to clearly demonstrate that Short was not taking the action which he could and should have taken of either more fully carrying out the order, or of specifically and definitely reporting the complete circumstances of his inability to do so. He did not call the attention of the War Department to what was an apparent misunderstanding on its part. He was relying upon the Navy reconnaissance without any reasonable energetic inquiry to ascertain the correctness of his assumption that the Navy was conducting long distance reconnaissance. He has no adequate explanation for not using the radar 24 hours a day (which was in full operation Sunday prior to 7 December) after getting the message of the 27th, and which was used continuously after 7 December. (R. 4441-4444) For some time after 7th December the situation as to the dearth of spare parts was the same as before 7th December.

The Secretary of War did not know the authorship of the part, "Report measures taken . . . Limit dissemination . . . to minimum essential officers." (R. 4071) He said he knew it was there and he understood it.

There were two conferences with the Secretary of War, one at 9:30 the morning of the 27th, and one later in the day. At the first conference, the Secretary of War, General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, and General Gerow were there. At that time General Gerow received instructions with reference to the preparation of the message. He then consulted Admiral Stark. (R. 4239-4240) The second conference took place later with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and Mr. Stimson. (R. 4240) General Bryden has testified that although he was Deputy Chief of Staff, and Acting Chief of Staff in General Marshall's absence, he does not remember the message nor the conference thereon. (R. 900) While the Chief of Staff reviewed the message of the 27th on the 28th, it is unfortunate that during this critical period he was off on maneuvers in North Carolina and missed the drafting of the message which was the composite work of a number of people, which may account for its confusing and conflicting tenor. Possibly had he been present, the Marshall-Stark memorandum might have reached the President in time to have influenced the momentous decisions of 28th November.

It is equally obvious that the 27th November message was the only message that attempted to translate the long and tempestuous course of events terminating in the counter-proposals on the 26th of November to Japan.

No other picture of the situation was given to Short, except in this message. It is apparent that the message of 27 November was entirely inadequate to properly and adequately translate to Short's mind the background of events that had been taking place. While this does not excuse Short, it does necessitate an assessment for the responsibility on others.

The three principal Major Generals who were commanders under Short have testified that they received substantially nothing by way of information as to the international situation except what they read in the newspapers. The fact that the newspapers were urgent and belligerent in their tone was discounted by them, because they were not receiving any confirmatory information from the War Department through Short. Information that was of tremendous value both as to content and substance, which the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and other high officers of the War Department had, was not transmitted to Short. The only summary of this information was the brief and conflicting tone of the message of 27 November, which was but a faint echo of what had actually occurred.

It is significant that the Japanese upon the termination of negotiations by the counter-proposals of the 26th, considered by them as an ultimatum, were thereby in full possession of all the information, which our ultra-secretary policy did not permit of full transmission to field commanders. The Japanese knew everything. The War and Navy Departments transmitted to Short and Kimmel only so much of what they knew as they judged necessary.

It is also significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call Mr. Hull to get the information on what amounted to the practical cessation of negotiations, which was the most vital thing that had occurred in 1941. If it had not been for Mr. Stimson's initiative in calling the Secretary of State, it is uncertain as to when he would have been advised of this most important event. As it turned out, the delay of from ten to twelve hours in getting the information was not material, since the Japanese delayed striking until 7th December.

The effect of the counter-proposals of 26th November on the resulting responsibilities of the Army and Navy is indicated in Mr. Stimson's quotation of Mr. Hull's comment to him, as follows:

"Now it is up to the Army and Navy to take care of the matter. I have washed my hands of the Japanese."

4. Analysis of the 27 November 1941, Message. The message of 27 November 1941, from the Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, consists of the following:

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ing component parts:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practicable purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government may come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

Comment: This statement on Japanese information is inadequate. It did not convey to Short the full import of the information concerning the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War Department. It was misleading in that it stated that there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which carried with it the implication that such resumption would influence the Japanese-American relations, i.e., that war might not come. The War Department was convinced then that war would come.

The statement that "Japanese future action unpredictable" was in conflict with the Navy message which the War Department had directed be shown to Short, to the effect that the attack would be in the Kra Peninsula and elsewhere in the Far East. It did not convey to Short the fixed opinion of the War Department General Staff as to the probable plan of Japanese operations.

A warning that "hostile action possible at any moment" indicated the necessity of taking adequate measures to meet that situation. This is particularly true in view of the Navy message of 16 October, 1941, which said that there was a possibility that Japan might attack. There was also received from the Navy on 27 November a message containing these words:

"Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days."

The next statement in the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided comma the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense."

Comment: This instruction embodied our well known national policy against initiating war. The responsibility for beginning the war must be Japan's. It gives Short the right of defense, notwithstanding the restriction, but creates an atmosphere of caution which he must exercise in preparing for such

defense.

The third portion of the message is this: "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken."

Comment: This was an order. Short could take such measures, including reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere.

Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the weight of evidence indicates that a higher form of alert than that taken would not have alarmed the public.

Short did report within an hour the measures taken. (R. 286)

Short's answer to General Marshall's radio said:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Round four seven two twenty seventh."

This in itself was sufficient to show that such steps were inadequate, but as he did not say he was taking any other steps, the War Department erroneously assumed that its responsible commander was alert to sabotage and to liaison with the Navy and was taking the necessary responsible other steps mentioned in the radio because he had been warned in this radio of the 27th by General Marshall.

Having asked for a report of what he was doing, the War Department placed itself in the position of sharing the responsibility if it did not direct Short to take such measures as they considered adequate to meet this ser-

ious threat. This is particularly true in view of the fact that much material information relating to Japanese-American relations was in the War Department, which had not been made available to Short.

The next and last portion of the message: "should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Number 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

Comment: (a) This was a clear recognition, and advice to Short, that his basic war plan and all joint Army and Navy plans based upon it was to be used and was a clear indication to him to adopt adequate preparatory measures to insure the execution of Rainbow Number 5.

(b) As to the directive to "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers":

The War Department was security-conscious. The construction which Short appears to have placed upon this language may have unduly limited the information which reached responsible subordinate commanders. This part of the message left broad discretion in Short as to the dissemination of the information contained in the message, and had the personnel operating the Air Warning Service on the morning of 7th December known of the absolute imminence of war they doubtless would have interpreted the information obtained from the radar station much differently.

It is of a piece with the other provisions of the instructions—not to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and to avoid commission of the first overt act.

Comment on the message as a whole: General Short, as the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was charged with the de-

fense of the Hawaiian Islands and as such had a fundamental duty to properly employ all available means at his disposal for that purpose in the face of any threat, with or without notification of impending hostilities.

Notwithstanding receipt of conflicting and qualifying information, which undoubtedly had its effect on Short's mental conception of the situation, the responsibility rested on him to take measures to meet the worst situation with which he might be confronted, and such action on his part, as Commander on the spot, was mandatory despite the fact that he was not kept fully advised by the War Department of the critical situation and of the positive, immediate imminence of war.

The same day G-2 of the War Department wired to G-2 Hawaiian Department, which clearly indicated that both sabotage and hostilities might begin and be concurrent. This message said:

"Advise only the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Actions of sabotage and espionage probable. Also probable that hostilities may begin."

This G-2 message nullifies all Short's explanation that his mind was put on sabotage because of the War Department's emphasis on this subject. The message shows that hostilities were just as possible as sabotage. His decision to adopt Alert Number 1 came on the 27th, before receipt of any message having reference to sabotage. He had two threats: he only took measures as to one. The third message, upon which he particularly relies as to

(Please turn to Next Page)

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Army Pearl Harbor Board (Continued from Preceding Page)

sabotage, which came on 28 November from the War Department (G-2), came after he had made his decision to go to Alert Number 1. This last message again mentions the critical situation as to sabotage activities. It does not in any way change previous messages. Short should have known, as a trained soldier, that a G-2 message is informative and is of lesser authority than a command message from the Chief of Staff.

When General Short was asked if he had known that negotiations with Japan had practically ended when he received the message on 27th November, he said:

"I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically unavoidable. . . . If I knew it was immediately imminent, but if I had known it was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone into Alert Number 3. . . . It would have looked to me definite that the war was almost upon us." (R. 450)

"General Russell. General Short, did you know that on the 26th of November the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum which G-2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the Japanese government?"

"General Short. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out.

"General Russell. Did you know on the 27th of November, when you received that message that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th of November told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as far as it could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces?"

"General Short. I did not.

"General Russell. Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in which he stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor?"

"General Short. At that time I was not in command; but I have known of that later. I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about it at that time." (R. 451)

This concludes the status of affairs of the 27th. There still remained the period from the 27th to the 6th of December, inclusive, during which time messages and even letters could have been sent outlining and completely delineating the entire situation to Short. Even a courier could have reached Honolulu in 36 hours from Washington. The War Department, although it had additional information of a most positive character, left Short with this fragment of information regarding the U.S.-Japanese negotiations contained in the two sentences inserted in the message of the 27th by the Secretary of War, and took no action either to investigate Short's reply to the message of 27 November to determine the steps being taken for defense, or to assure that adequate defensive measures were being taken.

5. Messages 28th November to 6th December, inclusive: On 28th November the War Department sent message No. 482 to Short, reading as follows:

"Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department (See paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty-five) stop. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This does not repeat mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions."

Short sent a reply to wire 482 of 28th November on the same day which outlined at length the sabotage precautions he was taking. The War Department copy of this wire, which is addressed to the A.G.O., shows that a copy was sent to the Secretary of the General Staff, but no other indorsements are on it showing it was read or considered by anyone else. This wire reads:

"Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Dept. paren paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this HQrs by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad

powers vested in him by Section sixty seven of the organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the Commanders of Military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this HQrs to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Dept. to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters. Short."

It is to be noted that the official file does not show a copy of radio No. 482, sent to Short by the War Department on 28th November.

On 3 December 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the following wire to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet:

"On 3d December we have, 'Op Nav informs'—this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir. * * * 'informs C in C Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents.'" (Admiral Bloch, Vol. 13, Page 1513, APHB)

The story as to whether Short ever saw or received this message is as follows: Admiral Kimmel visited Short 2 December and 3 December 1941. (R. 1513) Short says: "I never saw that message" (R. 424), referring to the 3 December message. He also denied seeing the message from the Navy of 4th and 6th December hereinafter quoted. (R. 424-425) However, Short was advised by the F.B.I. that it had tapped the telephone line of the Japanese Consuls' cook and had found the Consul was burning his papers. (R. 3204) All other lines were tapped by the Navy. (R. 3204) Phillips testified Short was "informed of it" but nothing was done about it. (R. 1243) Short denies such G-2 information, saying: "I am sure he didn't inform me." (R. 525) Colonel Fielder says the matter was discussed by Colonel Phillips at a staff conference, but nothing was done about it. Colonel Bicknell, G-2, Hawaiian Department, confirmed Fielder. (R. 1413-1414)

This record does not provide either a true copy or a paraphrase copy of the message of 4 December 1941, or 6 December 1941. The information we have is no better than that contained in the Roberts Report, which reads as follows:

"the second of 4 December 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only); and the third of 6 December 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific Islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment." (Roberts Report, page 8)

These messages were received because Admiral Bloch testified that he remembered them. (R. 1513-1514)

Irrespective of any testimony on the subject the record shows that on 3 December 1941, Short and Kimmel had a conference about a cablegram relative to the relief of marines on Wake and Midway. (R. 302, 394)

There is a serious question raised why the War Department did not give instructions to Short direct which would have put him on his guard as to the tenseness of the situation.

On 6 December there was reported to the Chief of Staff, Phillips, the message about the Japanese burning their papers, and he reported it at a staff meeting on 6 December. (R. 1414)

6. 7 December 1941 Message: This brings us to the final message from Washington. It was filed by the Chief of Staff at 12:18 p.m. Washington time, 7th December, which was 6:48 a.m. Honolulu time.

"Japanese are presenting at 1 p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop. Inform naval authorities of this communication."

The story of the sending of this message, which, if it could have been sent so as to have reached Short a few hours prior to the attack might at least have greatly lessened the

results of the attack, will be set forth at length. It was sent by commercial radio, the R.C.A. This is a commercial line. Early in the morning in Honolulu the Hawaiian Department radio had had great difficulty in keeping in communication with the War Department radio. It is significant that the Hawaiian Department only had a small 10 k.g. set. It was not a powerful set, like that of the Navy or the R.C.A. The Message Center of the War Department, which is charged with the expeditious handling of messages, decided to send this vital message by commercial R.C.A. Instead of War Department radio, because it could not get through on its own net. Why this message was not sent by the Navy radio, by F.B.I. radio, or by telephone, and why these means of possibly more rapid communication were not investigated, is not satisfactorily explained. The explanation that "secrecy" was paramount does not appear to apply to these means.

Shivers of the F.B.I. testified: "We had our own radio station. . . . I would say within—depending on the length of the message; a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington by—could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within a period of twenty minutes. . . . our channels were not jammed. . . . We used a frequency that was assigned to us by the F.C.C. . . . All of the stuff that went out from here to—that went out over that radio, was coded." (R. 3221)

"General Gruent. Then any message that Washington wanted to get to you during that morning or just prior to the attack on that morning you think could have gotten to you within the leeway of an hour?"

"Mr. Shivers. The message could have been sent out within an hour, yes. Yes, sir." (R. 3221)

It is to be noted in this connection that not only was the F.B.I. radio working between Washington and Honolulu on 6-7 December, but that testimony shows numerous telephone conversations were conducted just after the attack, over the telephone between Washington and Honolulu.

The story of the sending of this message in the War Department is as follows:

This message arrived in Honolulu at 7:33 a.m., Honolulu time, 7th December. The attack struck 22 minutes later. The message was not actually delivered to the signal office of the Hawaiian Department until 11:45 a.m., the attack having taken place at 7:55 a.m. The message was decoded and delivered to The Adjutant General at 2:58 p.m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack.

The status of communications between Washington and Hawaii on the morning of 7th December and for 24 hours previous to that time was as follows: The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone connection direct with Washington by which you could ordinarily get a message through from Washington to Hawaii in ten or fifteen minutes. After the attack on 7 December, Colonel Fielder (G-2) himself talked to Washington twice on this phone and received a call from Washington on the same phone: It took no more than an hour as a maximum to get the call through despite the heavy traffic to Hawaii by reason of the attack (R. 2099) Furthermore, a war message could have demanded priority.

It is important to observe that only one means of communication was selected by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring the use of multiple means of communication in an emergency. In addition to the War Department telephone there also existed the F. B. I. radio, which was assigned a special frequency between Washington and Hawaii and over which it only took twenty minutes to send a coded message from Hawaii to Washington or vice versa. Shivers of F. B. I. so testified. (R. 3222) Short testified:

"General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that it took some time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there was a possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy was more important than the time element in getting the information to us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information seven hours after the attack." (R. 310)

Apparently, the War Department at that time did not envisage an immediate attack, rather they thought more of a breaking of diplomatic relations, and if the idea of an attack at 1:00 p.m. E.S.T. did enter their minds they thought of it as probably taking place in the Far East and not in Hawaii. Hence secrecy was still of paramount interest to them. We find no justification for a failure to send this message by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or F.B.I. radio or the scrambler telephone or all three.

The result was the message did not get through in time due to the failure of the War Department to use the telephone as the Chief of Staff used it to the Philippines (Short R. 310) or take steps to insure that the message got through by multiple channels (by code over naval or F.B.I. radio to Hawaii). If the War Department radio was not working, He left Short without this additional most important information. Short testified as follows:

"If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it through in ten or fifteen minutes we

would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer idea of danger from that message and we would have had time to warm up the planes and get them in the air to meet any attack." (R. 310)

Colonel French, in charge of Traffic Operations Branch, Chief Signal Office, in the War Department testified that on 7 December 1941, Colonel Bratton brought the message to the code room in the handwriting of the Chief of Staff which "I had typed for clarity" in a few minutes. Colonel Bratton read and authenticated it. The message was given to the code clerk and transmission facilities checked. It was decided to send the message by commercial means, choosing Western Union, as the fastest. He stated that he personally took the message from code room to the teletype operator and advised Colonel Bratton it would take 30 to 45 minutes to transmit message to destination. It left at 12:01 (Eastern Standard Time, 6:31 a.m. Honolulu time). The transmission to Western Union was finished 12:17 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, or 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. It took 45 minutes in transmission. The message was actually delivered at 11:45 a.m. Honolulu time. The messenger was diverted from his course during the bombing. (R. 189-202)

Colonel French had no knowledge of the type of communication the F. B. I. used to Hawaii; he never used the scrambler telephone and sometimes he used the Navy to send messages, but did not inquire on the morning of 7 December, although the Navy has a more powerful radio. (R. 203-204)

7. Failure of Navy to Advise Short of Enemy Submarine in Pearl Harbor on morning of 7 December 1941.

The second failure was by the Navy Department, upon whom Short so trustingly relied. A two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor area at 6:30 a.m. Between 6:33 and 6:45 a.m. it was sunk by the Navy. This was reported at 7:12 a.m. by naval base officers to the Chief of Staff but the Navy made no such report to Short. (R. 310-311; See Roberts Report p. 15) As Short said:

"That would, under the conditions have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not—at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack." (R. 311)

8. Failure of Aircraft Warning Service to Advise of Approaching Planes, 7 December 1941.

The third event that might have saved the day was the following:

The aircraft warning service had established mobile aircraft warning stations on the Island of Oahu, as elsewhere related in detail, and had set up an Information Center to utilize the aircraft warning information, plot the course of any incoming planes and to advise the responsible authorities. The organization was set up and operating and was being utilized from 4 a.m. to 7 o'clock on the morning of 7th December as a training method and had been so used for some time past. The Navy was supposed to have detailed officers in the Information Center to be trained as liaison officers, but had not yet gotten around to it. In the Information Center that morning was a Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps, whose tour of duty thereat was until 8 o'clock. It was Tyler's second tour of duty at the Center and he was there for training and observation, but there were no others on duty after 7 o'clock except the enlisted telephone operator. He was the sole officer there between 7 and 8 o'clock that morning, the rest of the personnel that had made the Center operative from 4:00 to 7:00 a.m. had departed.

At one of the remote aircraft warning stations there were two privates who had been on duty from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. One of them was Private Lockard, who was skilled in operating the radar aircraft detector, and a Private George E. Elliott, who was the plotting man to plot the information picked up on the radar. This plotter was anxious to learn how to operate the radar, and Private Lockard agreed to show him after the station was supposed to close at 7 o'clock and while they were waiting for the truck to take them to breakfast. He kept the radar open for further operation to instruct his partner, Private Elliott. While Lockard was adjusting the machine to begin the instruction of Private Elliott, he observed on the radar screen an unusual formation he had never seen in the machine. He thought there was something wrong with it, as the indicator showed such a large number of planes coming in that he was sure that there was nothing like it in the air and there must be a machine error. He continued to check, however, and finally concluded that the machine was operating correctly and that there was a considerable number of planes 132 miles away from the island approaching from a direction 3 degrees east of north. The time was 7:02 a.m., 7

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December 1941.

In this record Private Elliott, now Sergeant Elliott, testified that he plotted these planes and suggested to Lockard that they call up the Information Center. After some debate between them, Lockard did call the Information Center and reported to the switchboard operator. The switchboard operator, an enlisted man who testified, was unable to do anything about it, so he put Lieutenant Tyler on the phone. Tyler's answer proved to be a disastrous one. He said, in substance, "Forget it." Tyler's position is indefensible in his action, for he says that he was merely there for training and had no knowledge upon which to base any action; yet he assumed to give directions instead of seeking someone competent to make a decision.

If that be a fact, and it seems to be true, then he should not have assumed to tell these two men, Private Lockard and Private Elliott, to "forget it," because he did not have the knowledge upon which to premise any judgment. (R. 1102) He should, in accordance with customary practice, have then used initiative to take this matter up with somebody who did know about it, in view of the fact that he said he was there merely for training and had no competent knowledge upon which to either tell the men to forget it or to take action upon it. By his assumption of authority, he took responsibility and the consequences of his action should be imposed upon him.

If Tyler had communicated this information, the losses might have been very greatly lessened. As General Short testified:

"If he had alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air. . . . It would have been a question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action." (R. 312-313)

The attack actually took place at 7:55 a.m. When the information that showed up on the oscilloscope was communicated, apparently Lieutenant Tyler had in his mind that a flight of B-17s was coming from the mainland and he thought that they might represent what was seen on the screen of the radar machine. As a matter of fact, that probably had something to do with it, as they did come in about this period and were attacked by the Japanese, some of them being destroyed.

9. Navy Failure to Advise Short of Suspected Naval Concentration in the Jaluit.

About 25 November 1941, the Navy through its intelligence sources in the 14th Naval Dis-

trict at Pearl Harbor and in Washington had reports showing the presence in Jaluit in the Marshall Islands of the Japanese fleet composed of aircraft carriers, submarines, and probably other vessels. Information of this fleet ceased about 1 December 1941. As Jaluit was 1,500 miles closer to Oahu than the mainland of Japan, the presence of such a strong force capable of attacking Hawaii was an important element of naval information. This information was delivered to G-2 of the War Department as testified to by General Miles. No information of this threat to Hawaii was given to General Short by either the War or Navy Departments in Washington nor the Navy in Hawaii. Short and his senior commanders testified that such information would have materially altered their point of view and their actions.

Such information should have been delivered by the War Department or the Navy for what it was worth to permit Short to evaluate it; this was not done.

The fact that the actual force which attacked Hawaii has now been identified does not change the necessity for the foregoing action.

10. The Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked Pearl Harbor; Sources of Information to Japanese.


The following account is based upon the testimony of Captain Layton, who has been Fleet Combat Intelligence Officer, and was at the time of 7th December and shortly before Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

He said that the task force which had been identified by the Navy through numerous captured documents, orders, maps, and from interviewing prisoners who were in a position to know personally the orders and preparations for the attack, had the following history, according to the Navy view of the correct story:

Japan started training its task force in either July or August, 1941, for the attack on Pearl Harbor. They were evidently trained with great care and precision as disclosed by the maps which were found in the planes which were shot down in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in the two-man submarines. These papers and orders show meticulous care in planning and timing, which would take very considerable practice. The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at Takan Bay was about 22nd November, and they awaited word to act before the force moved out on the 27th-28th of November, 1941.


The elements of the fleet for this task force consisted of six carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and a destroyer division. This is one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled and after the

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


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Army Pearl Harbor Board (Continued from Preceding Page)

state of the attack upon Pearl Harbor, it took part in a number of similar successful and very disastrous attacks in the Pacific southwest. The elements of this task force left individually from the Japanese mainland and assembled at Tonkan Bay in an uninhabited spot where they would be unobserved. The assembly was completed and the task force departed on 27th-28th November, Eastern Longitude Time, which was apparently after the date that the counter-proposals (considered by the Japanese as an ultimatum) were delivered by the President of the United States to Japan through Secretary Hull on 26 November 1941. It is significant that the attack of the Japanese task force aircraft upon the Army and Navy planes parked together wing-to-wing as protection against sabotage (Alert No. 1) must have been as a result of knowledge of that fact, in view of their carefully rehearsed and scheduled attack formations in which they ran down the aprons, setting the planes on fire with incendiary ammunition: it is equally significant that it was well known in the island that Alert No. 1 was put into effect 27th November and therefore can be assumed to have been communicated to Japan, and that advantage of such information was apparently taken by reason of the nature of the attack and the way it was conducted.

It is also significant, a map having been found upon the pilot of a shot-down Japanese attacking plane, and another map having been found upon one of the crew in a two-man submarine, that there had been entered on these maps, which were old Geodetic Survey maps of the Pearl Harbor area, the location of the hangars that had been built on Hickam Field and of those that were yet to be built. Five of these hangars had been built. Earlier 1936 maps issued by the Hawaiian Department or by the Air Force, showing Hickam Field, showed five of these hangars in full lines and three in dotted lines as being hangars yet to be built. The Japanese are well known as precise copyists. It is apparent that when they made the maps found on the aviator and the submarine crew members they had knowledge later than 1936 of construction either that had been constructed or was to be constructed, because they entered on such maps the additional three hangars in full lines.

The task force proceeded in radio silence due east to a point substantially due north of Oahu and thence proceeded southward under forced draft to a point between 300 and 250 miles from Oahu, from which the flight took off. The two-man submarines were carried on top of the mother submarines and released adjacent to the harbor.

Captain Layton further testified that the orders that were captured and those that they had knowledge of did exist, as reported by captured prisoners, show that the attacking forces were to destroy without a trace any third power's vessels including Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force; to capture and maintain in radio silence any such vessels including Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force, but if such vessels had sent any radio communication to destroy them. (R. 3043) This is a good evidence of Japanese character, being unwilling to trust their own people and to sink them without mercy because they happened to be operating by accident in this vacant sea where no vessels normally operate.

This task force was very powerful in the air, having a total of approximately 424 planes; (R. 3048) of this number about 300 actually attacked Pearl Harbor. (R. 3053) The pilots were of the highest quality and training that have ever been encountered in this war with the Japanese, with the exception of the Battle of Midway where four of these same carriers were engaged and were sunk. (R. 3046) The maximum total number of airplanes on carriers that the United States could muster on 7th December, on the carriers "Lexington" and "Enterprise," was approximately 180 planes. (R. 3049)

Captain Layton testified that our Navy in Pearl Harbor would have been unable to have brought the Japanese task force under gunfire because our battleships were too slow and the remainder of our force would probably have suffered severe damage if not defeat on the high seas by reason of the great superiority in the air before our superior gunfire could have been brought to bear. The only possible hope of overcoming such a Japanese force would be in weather that prevented flight of their planes so that the United States forces would have superiority of gunfire, irrespective of Japanese superiority of air power.

He stated that no word of this task force was received in any way, from any source, by the Navy. The attack was wholly unexpected, and if it had been expected the probability of this task force was not a bright one. He stated that this task force represented a substantial per cent of the entire Japanese Navy. It provided alone on the Jap carriers 424 aircraft against a possible 180 which we might have mustered if we had had our own two carriers available to operate against them. (R. 3048-3049)

The information upon which the story of

the attack is based has been revealed so far as coming from several sources. First, the Otto Kuehn trial revealed his complete disclosure of the fleet dispositions and locations in Pearl Harbor in the period 1 December to 6 December and a code delivered with the information, so that communication of the information to Japanese offshore submarines adjacent to Oahu could be used. The same information was delivered by the Japanese Consul direct to the homeland.

Otto Kuehn and his co-conspirators, Japanese of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, had conspired to send information as to the units of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and their exact positions in the harbor. This information the Japanese Consul communicated principally by commercial lines to Japan. Additionally Kuehn provided a code indicating what units were in the harbor and what were out and means of signaling consisting of symbols on the sails of his sailboat, radio signals over a short-wave transmitter, lights in his house, and fires in his yard, all in order to signal to Japanese submarines offshore. The period during which the signals were to be given was 1 to 6 December. If such information has been available to our armed forces it would have clearly indicated the attack. The messages taken from the Japanese Consulate on the subject show clearly what was done and the intention of the Japanese. If authority had existed to tap these lines, this information would have been available to both the Army and Navy. Kuehn was tried by a military commission after signed confessions of his actions and sentenced to death. This was later commuted to imprisonment for fifty years. It is significant that Kuehn was a German agent and had for a long time been living on funds forwarded to him from Japan and had conducted his espionage with impunity until after Pearl Harbor, right under the nose of the Army, the F.B.I., and Naval Intelligence.

As Shivers, head of the F.B.I. in the islands, said:

"If we had been able to get the messages that were sent to Japan by the Japanese Consul, we would have known, or we could have reasonably assumed, that the attack would come, somewhere, on 7 December; because, if you recall, this system of signals that was devised by Otto Kuehn for the Japanese Consul general simply included the period from 1 December to 6 December." (R. 3218)

Shivers testified that the reason why the information being sent over the commercial lines to Japan, other than telephone, was not secured was that while he had the approval of the Attorney General to tap the telephone wires and to intercept telephone conversations, yet they could not get the information out of the cable offices. He testified:

"Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask him one question. What other means of communication did the Japanese Consul have with the homeland other than a telephone connection?" "Mr. Shivers. He had commercial communication system."

"Colonel Toulmin. Did you have any opportunity of tapping the commercial lines or of securing any information off the commercial lines?"

"Mr. Shivers. Off of the lines themselves?"

"Colonel Toulmin. Yes."

"Mr. Shivers. No, sir."

"Colonel Toulmin. So that he did have a free, undisturbed communication over those lines?"

"Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir." (R. 3223)

It was later discovered, when the torn messages of the Japanese Consul were reconstructed after they had been taken on 7th December, that many vital messages were being sent by the Japanese Consul, who was keeping Japan advised of the entire military and naval situation and every move we made in Hawaii.

Another example of this Japanese activity is the telephone message on 5th December from the house of Dr. Mori by a woman newspaper reporter, ostensibly to her newspaper in Japan, an apparently meaningless and therefore highly suspicious message. It was this message that was tapped from the telephone by the F.B.I., translated, and delivered to Military Intelligence and submitted by it to General Short at six o'clock on 6th December. (R. 1417-1419, 2993) As Short was unable to decipher the meaning, he did nothing about it and went on to a party. (R. 1420) The attack followed in the morning.

In this same connection, the story of the spying activities of the German, von Osten, is in point. (R. 2442-2443, 3003) The telephone lines of the Japanese Consulate were tapped by the Navy with the exception of one telephone line to the cook's quarters, which was overlooked, and this was tapped by the F. B. I. (R. 3204)

The last and one of the most significant actions of the Japanese was the apparent actual entry of their submarines into Pearl Harbor a few days prior to 7th December, their circulation in the harbor, by which they secured and presumably transmitted complete information as to our fleet movements and dispositions.

The story of the bold Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor prior to the attack on 7 December is even more astounding as to the complete freedom with which Japan operated in getting intelligence out of Hawaii. Shivers of the F.B.I. produced maps 1 and 2, which were copies of maps captured from the Japanese

two-man submarines that came into Pearl Harbor on 7 December. The F.B.I., in endeavoring to reconstruct the intelligence operations of any agent who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to the attack, secured these maps from Naval Intelligence. (R. 3210) Maps 1 and 2 have a legend translating all of the Japanese characters and writing appearing on the maps. Shivers said:

"An examination of the map indicated to me rather definitely that there had been Japanese submarines in Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack." (R. 3210)

"Now, on this map is various information relating to the installations at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places." (R. 3211)

There appeared on the map a code in Japanese which was translated by the F.B.I. and shows that it was intended for use by the submarine commanders in communicating with the Japanese task force enroute to Hawaii. It contains such messages as "Indication strong that enemy fleet will put out to sea," or "enemy fleet put out to sea from or through"; in other words, describing the presence, size, composition, and movement of the fleet. (R. 3212)

As this map shows the complete timed movement in and out of the harbor of the submarine and this information had been prepared partly written in Japanese, it is obvious that the Japanese must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were moving into and out of the harbor at will. The data on the chart shows the submarine was so well advised that it went in at about 0410 when the submarine net was open to permit the garbage scow to leave the harbor, and stayed in the harbor until about 0600 and then left by the same route. The map shows the location of our battleships and other naval vessels observed by the submarine. (R. 3212-3213) As the ships actually in the harbor on 7 December were somewhat different from those shown on the map, it is conclusive proof that this submarine was in the harbor and probably advising the fleet of Japan as to our dispositions prior to 7 December. (R. 3210-3213)

The real action that should have been feared from the Japanese was not open sabotage, but espionage. It is obvious that the reason why the Japanese aliens did not commit sabotage was that they did not want to stimulate American activity to stop their espionage and intern them. That was the last thing they intended to do; and Short appears to have completely misapprehended the situation, the psychology and intentions of the enemy, by putting into effect his sabotage alert.

Undoubtedly the information of the alert, the placing of planes wing-to-wing, etc., as well as the disposition of the fleet was reported by Kuehn through the Japanese Consul, were all known to the Japanese task force proceeding toward Hawaii. That will explain why they were able to conduct such precise bombing and machine-gunning. The bomb pattern on Hickam Field and the machine-gunning of that field, as well as other fields, show that the attack was concentrated on the hangars, marked on the Japanese maps, and upon the ramps where the planes were parked wing to wing. There was no attack of any consequence upon the landing strips.

From the foregoing it appears that there were a large number of events taking place bearing on the attack; and that a clue to such events and the Japanese actions was in part available to Short and in part not available to him. Both the War Department and the Navy failed to inform him of many vital matters, and our governmental restrictions as to intercepting the communications of the Japanese Consul prevented him from getting still additional information.

If General Short had any doubt on the subject of his authority, he had ample opportunity from 27 November to 6 December to inquire of higher authority and make his position and his actions certain of support and approval. This he did not do.

11. Information Not Given Short. In judging the actions of General Short and whether he carried out his responsibilities, there must be taken into account information that he was not told either by the War Department or by the Navy. Briefly summarized, the fundamental pieces of information were the following:

1. The presence of the task force in the Marshall Islands at Jaluit from 27 November to 30 November and the disappearance of that force. Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department saw fit to advise Short of this important piece of information.

2. The fact that the Chief of Staff with the Chief of Naval Operations had jointly asked (on 27 November) the President not to force the issue with the Japanese at this time. (R. 9)

3. The delivery on the 26th of November to the Japanese Ambassadors by the Secretary of State of the counter-proposals; and the immediate reaction of the Japanese rejecting in effect these counter-proposals which they considered an ultimatum and indicating that it was the end of negotiations.

4. Short not kept advised of the communications from Grew reporting the progressive deterioration of the relationship with the Japanese.

5. No reaction from the War Department to Short as to whether his report of 27 November as to "measures taken," i.e., a sabotage

alert and liaison with the Navy, were satisfactory or inadequate in view of the information possessed by the War Department.

6. The following information not furnished also existed in the War Department:

Information from informers, agents and other sources as to the activities of our potential enemy and its intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know their potential moves against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions and proposals.

This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by the Army and Navy gave only a small fraction of this information. It would have been possible to have sent safely, information ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives for an all-out alert.

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and cannot be disclosed to them, it would appear incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directives to such commanders.

Short got neither form of assistance after 28 November from the War Department, his immediate supervising agency. It is believed that the disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been lessened to the extent that its defenses were available and used on 7 December if properly alerted in time. The failure to alert these defenses in time by directive from the War Department, based upon all information available to it, is one for which it is responsible. The War Department had an abundance of vital information that indicated an immediate break with Japan. All it had to do was either get it to Short or give him a directive based upon it. Short was not fully sensitive to the real seriousness of the situation, although the War Department thought he was. It is believed that knowledge of the information available in the War Department would have made him so.

General discussion of the information herein referred to follows:

The records show almost daily information on the plans of the Japanese Government. In addition to that cited above and in conjunction therewith the War Department was in possession of information late in November and early in December from which it made deductions that Japan would shortly commence an aggressive war in the South Pacific; that every effort would be made to reach an agreement with the United States Government which would result in eliminating the American people as a contestant in the war to come; and that failing to reach the agreement the Japanese Government would attack both Britain and the United States. This information enabled the War Department to fix the probable time of war with Japan with a degree of certainty.

In the first days of December this information grew more critical and indicative of the approaching war. Officers in relatively minor positions who were charged with the responsibility of receiving and evaluating such information were so deeply impressed with its significance and the growing tenseness of our relations with Japan, which pointed only to war and war almost immediately, that such officers approached the Chief of the War Plans Division (General Grew) and the Secretary of the General Staff (Colonel Smith) for the express purpose of having sent to the department commanders a true picture of the war atmosphere which, at that time, pervaded the War Department and which was uppermost in the thinking of these officers in close contact with it. The efforts of these subordinate officers to have such information sent to the field were unsuccessful. They were told that field commanders had been sufficiently informed. The Secretary to the General Staff declined to discuss the matter when told of the decisions of the War Plans Division.

Two officers when on duty in the War Department are mentioned for their interest and aggressiveness in attempting to have something done. They are Colonel R. S. Bratton and Colonel Otis K. Stadler.

The following handling of information reaching the War Department in the evening of 6 December and early Sunday morning 7 December is cited as illustrative of the apparent lack of appreciation by those in high places in the War Department of the seriousness of this information which was so clearly outlining the trends that were hastening us into war with Japan.

At approximately 10:00 o'clock p.m. on 6 December 1941, and more than 15 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, G-2 delivered to the office of the War Plans Division and to the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army information which indicated very emphatically that war with Japan was a certainty and that the beginning of such war was in the immediate future. The officers to

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whom this information was delivered were told of its importance and impressed with the necessity of getting it into the hands of those who could act, the Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of the War Plans Division.

On the following morning 7 December at about 8:30 a.m., other information reached the office of G-2, vital in its nature and indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan. Colonel Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section, G-2, attempted to reach the Chief of Staff of the Army in order that he might be informed of the receipt of this message. He discovered that the General was horseback riding. Finally and at approximately 11:25 a.m. the Chief of Staff reached his office and received this information. General Miles, then G-2 of the War Department, appeared at about the same time. A conference was held between these two officers and General Gerow of the War Plans Division who himself had come to the office of the Chief of Staff. Those hours when Bratton was attempting to reach someone who could take action in matters of this importance and the passing without effective action having been taken prevented this critical information from reaching General Short in time to be of value to him.

About noon a message was hastily dispatched to overseas department commanders including Short in the Hawaiian Department. This message which has been discussed elsewhere in this report, came into Short's possession after the attack had been completed.

D. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPAL HAWAIIAN DEFENSES IN 1941 AND THEIR STATE OF READINESS ON 6 DECEMBER 1941, OR THE REASONS FOR THEIR LACK OF READINESS.

1. Aircraft Warning Service and Interceptor Command. The Aircraft Warning Service on the morning of 7 December 1941, was in operative condition for all practical purposes. It had an information center and five mobile stations. It was sufficiently operative to successfully pick up the Japanese force 132 miles from Oahu. This was done by Private Lockard and Private Elliott, respectively radar operator and plotter, and reported by these privates on their own initiative to the information center, where the Sergeant in charge of the switchboard received the information and relayed it to Lieutenant Tyler, who was a pursuit officer of the Air Corps on temporary duty for training. The stations had been used from 0400 to 0700 hours each morning for the training personnel, and the personnel were reasonably trained by that time, with the exception of certain liaison officers

who were still getting their training, like Lieutenant Tyler. If the radar system and information center had been fully manned, as it could have been and as it was immediately upon the disaster at Pearl Harbor and thereafter without further physical additions, it could have been successfully operated on 7 December.

The Air Warning Service had been operating on tactical exercises and maneuvers prior to 7 December for some weeks.

On 7 December 1941 this service could have been a great asset to the defense of the islands had the Command and Staff understood its value and capabilities and had taken more interest in implementing the temporary setup instead of awaiting completion of the permanent installations.

The only mechanical difficulty that was being experienced was in connection with the stand-by motor generator sets, which were to be used to supplement commercial power in case the latter failed. There had been some minor difficulty with the pumps on the motor generator set for the internal combustion engines, but that was not of serious character.

The story of the delay in installing both the temporary, mobile sets and the permanent sets is as follows:

Army personnel had been receiving radar instructions on Navy surface ships and had gone to sea with the ships and had had the benefit of such practical training. Unfortunately the Navy had not detailed its liaison officers to the Information Center, and in that it failed. There also had not been brought about, due to the failure on the part of General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, a complete integration into a single system of Army and Navy defense including radar and particularly the Army, Navy and Marine fighters which were to pass to the jurisdiction of the Army to form a composite interceptor command, so that the three elements of the system would be working—the aircraft warning service, the interceptor command, and the antiaircraft artillery.

The only reason that the aircraft warning service was not on a full operating basis on the morning of 7 December was due to the type of alert put into effect but otherwise it should have been in full effect. It was a fully operating service and did so operate shortly after the attack.

Major Bergquist and Major Tindal had been sent to the Interceptor School at Mitchell Field in the early summer of 1941. At that time the AWS was new to the U. S. Army and its organization and development had just started in the United States. For the system to be operative required a considerable amount of highly technical electrical and radar equipment, the supply and manufacture

of which was critical.

The whole AWS project was new, novel, and somewhat revolutionary in practice. It took time to get the equipment through War Department priorities, and it took time to teach and train operating personnel, and to indoctrinate the whole Army as well as the public to its operation and value. This process had been going on since May and June, 1941.

Testimony before the Board has indicated that neither the Army, Navy, nor civilian population of the United States or Hawaii anticipated the necessity for immediate use of this service. There was, however, a small group directly in charge of the AWS development in Hawaii, including Major Bergquist, Major Tindal, Major Tetley, and Major Powell, all of the Army, and Lieutenant Taylor of the Navy, who were pushing the AWS project to the fullest extent that their level of authority would permit. As a result of their efforts it is believed that this service in the normal course of events would have been established and in operation in another two or three weeks, which in view of the lack of war-mindedness of the services would have

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been to the great credit of this group.

Since the No. 1 Alert was the decision due to the logic and judgment of the Department Commander, it is very doubtful had the AWS been 100 per cent completed that it would have been on a full-out operating basis on the 7th of December. General Short has stated in the Roberts report testimony, Volume 14, page 1642, that had he had the material and fully equipped radar stations he probably would have operated them just as he did.

Nevertheless, had General Short's judgment led him to have decided to go to Alert 2 or 3 on 27 November, or at any time prior to 7 December, the AWS could have functioned and the fighter airplanes could have been ready for active defense within a period of minutes. From the damage that was accomplished by the few fighters that did get into the air from the Haliwa Airdrome it can be assumed that the seventy or eighty fighters that could have been in the air under a nor-

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mally active alert system would have made the Jap attack a much more costly venture. This paragraph, however, is hypothesis.

2. Status of the Aircraft Warning Service on 7 December.

The aircraft warning service consisting of the Information Center and five mobile radar stations was in operation on the morning of 7 December and had been for several weeks prior to that date. The fact that the Information Center was not in its permanent location and the radar stations were not permanently built had no bearing upon the operation and effectiveness of the aircraft warning system. "It was set up and the men were being trained for, I would say, possibly a month prior to the attack on 7 December."

As testified by General Martin (R. 1825) the difficulty of putting the AWS into full operation as a practical matter was the insistence of General Short that he retain control for training purposes whereas the best training would have been to put the system into practical operation. Of this General Martin said:

"The Department commander would not turn those (the operating stations) over to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he (Short) had completed the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn them over unless he considered they were properly trained. So they were still training under those conditions and had not been turned over to the Air Force the morning of the attack on 7 December." (R. 1824)

Here again is another example of the whole organization of the Army in Hawaii being held in a training status instead of acquiring its training in or near combat positions, where it would have been ready for any eventuality. As General Martin said:

"They were capable of operating . . . the equipment used primarily in the training of personnel to take over the operation of the control area." (R. 1824)

General Martin is confirmed in this by Commander Taylor, loaned by the Navy for the purpose of getting this service into operation. Commander Taylor confirmed the fact that:

"On 7 December the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit Squadrons at Wheeler Field. . . . We had no liaison people to man any of the positions. . . . On 7 December all the communication lines were in; the radar stations; the Derax equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air warning and possibly to make interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equipment was not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough advance information could be given to pilots so that they could come back without being intercepted." (R. 1082)

However, the radio equipment that would have enabled control through interception a reasonable distance offshore had been given to the Ferry Command. This situation is treated elsewhere, but it should be pointed out, to avoid confusion, that on and before 7 December the aircraft warning center was able to pick up incoming planes and to give notification of that fact. It was not fully able to perform its other function, which was supplementary to the Information Center, that is, for full cooperation in conjunction with an Interceptor Command to intercept the incoming planes in the full sense of that arrangement.

So far advanced was the organization and apparatus that it would have been fully complete within ten days to two weeks at the time of the attack. As Commander Taylor said:

"The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting (a conference to wind up the details of organization) to bring the thing into operation at the end of two weeks was the manpower to operate it." (R. 1083)

Taylor, in turn, is confirmed in this by one of the most energetic officers who was working with Taylor in pressing this aircraft warning system to conclusion, Colonel Bergquist, then a Major. He endeavored to have 24-hour service by 24 November and stated that the mobile units could have stood it. There was some minor trouble with the stand-by power gas engines, but this was of little importance and the system could have run 24 hours a day. He had been running a school since October known as the "Air Defense School" in which he was training Army and Marine officers and as many pursuit officers of the Air Corps as he could get. The delay was from the Signal Corps. As Colonel Bergquist said:

"I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up and get them operating." (R. 1201)

Despite the efforts of General Martin with Department Headquarters, very few results were secured in making the Signal Corps let go their technical operation and allow the practical people who were going to operate it go to work. This is described by Colonel

Bergquist, who said:

"One of the big arguments was: we wanted to take over the radar stations and get them set up and operating. The Signal Corps said no, that was their job; they wanted to get them up and get them operating and then turn them over to us for our operational control. The Department headquarters decided in favor of the Signal Corps." (R. 1196)

This delayed the ultimate completion of the system by a month. (R. 1196)

He stated that:

"My opinion on that is that they (the enlisted men) were fairly well trained at that stage of the game." (R. 1197)

This state of training is further described by him as follows:

"Well, I think we had had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained. We had plotters and information center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which is one of the positions on the board—on the control platform, that is—by running a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in order to do two things: to both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control board and to acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better carry out instructions that they received from the board on flying missions. The only controllers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained sufficiently, were myself, Major Tindal—I mean Colonel Tindal; he was a Major at that time—and I did have with me at that time Commander William E. G. Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did have an antiaircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so that they were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to the bomber command liaison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian Department headquarters." (R. 1191-1192)

At this time the system had a maximum range of approximately 130 miles. (R. 1190)

On 24 November there was a conference of interested Army and Navy officers on this subject, and the consensus of opinion of these experts among the younger officers who were actually getting this Information Center into operation was expressed by Commander Taylor:

"It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks. (The conference was on 24 November 1941.) We found after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except for the air-to-ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep contact with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communication equipment we had at that time." (R. 1077)

This confirms the testimony of others that the only thing lacking was the IFF equipment on the planes to enable identification of the planes in the air by ground personnel. Considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for this purpose for the use of the Ferry Command. (R. 1079)

As to the operability of the aircraft warning service on the morning of 7 December, Commander Taylor testifying said:

"If we had had the Information Center completely manned there would have been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that (the Japanese) flight was." (R. 1085)

The Navy had not yet participated in the operation, although Commander Taylor said they had been requested to do so about a week before Pearl Harbor. (R. 1086)

This brings us to the question of why General Short or his staff did not take more vigorous action in putting this most important part of the defenses into operation, particularly in view of the fact that both the long-distance reconnaissance by the Navy and the inshore reconnaissance by the Army were, for all practical purposes, non-existent. Commander Taylor was asked, when he found these delays, whether he had ever seen General Short, to which Taylor replied in the negative by saying:

"I saw his chief of staff. I saw his operations officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff." (R. 1089)

"We saw every chief of staff, but we found that somebody else was always responsible." (R. 1088)

Colonel Powell, Hawaiian Department Signal Officer, said repeated efforts to get the Navy to cooperate by supplying naval officers to complete the working of the service were fruitless. They were not interested. (R. 3906)

It is significant that when Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, was asked if Short had tried to expedite these matters he professed ignorance (R. 1143), but it was Phillips, as Chief of Staff to Short, who Taylor and others said was principally responsible for acting on Short's behalf in this matter. (R. 1088)

Colonel Powell testified that the construction of permanent installations did not hold up the placing of the Information Center and the radar stations into operation because there was adequate equipment for this purpose that was actually installed in temporary buildings for the Information Center and that radar mobile stations were placed around the

Island.

As a consequence the Information Center and the radar stations were in operation some time prior to 7 December. The only reason they were not operated continuously 24 hours a day was the desire to conserve tubes, as they were short of tubes and other spare parts.

Two permanent radars, No. 271, were received on 3 June, and a third radar, No. 271-A, was also received on 3 June. On 1 August six mobile radar stations were received and shortly thereafter put into operation. They were complete and self-contained and only needed to be placed at some appropriate elevation.

Colonel Powell testified that the entire service was operative about the 1st of November 1941. The installations for the permanent radar and Information Center were held up by the Engineer construction and were not held up by any lack of information or drawings or equipment of the Signal Corps.

Colonel Powell testified that the location of the centers was made by a board from Washington. This board ordered the abandonment of Kaala at 4,000 feet on the theory that while the range would be extended to 150 miles from Hawaii yet there would be no detection of planes within the 20-mile radius close to shore. This does not sound logical because the great necessity was the locating of planes at a maximum distance from Hawaii. The other stations lower down were fully capable of picking up the close, inshore approach of aircraft.

Colonel Powell added the significant statement that the Navy took little interest in the radar system and "We were never able to get any liaison officer over from the Navy to take part in the exercises or carry on the work." (R. 3906) This is confirmed by the fact that Navy liaison officers never were supplied for the Information Center although it had been in operation for some weeks prior to 7 December and the Army had supplied a number of officers to be trained. (R. 3906)

General Short testified again as to the reason why he was interested in keeping the aircraft warning service in training. He said:

"We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the aircraft warning service would function those hours. In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained them from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4."

"Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too great a strain on this materiel, and later in the afternoon period we had three stations working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4, so that there was a little more chance for maintenance work and keeping them in shape. But that was the situation, and the Interceptor Command was working with them. We were trying to educate the Interceptor Command and the Aircraft Warning Service, and using this training period as an opportunity to give them work at what we considered the most dangerous time of the day. The Navy had a liaison officer functioning with this outfit." (R. 268)

Two explanations have been advanced as to the reason why the aircraft warning service was not put into operation fully. The first was that the signal equipment was not ready until very late; the testimony of Colonel Powell, in charge of this matter for the Signal Corps, plus what actually occurred as to its actually going into operation for nearly a month before the permanent construction was erected, is ample to overrule this objection. (R. 3896-3898)

The second explanation was that there were serious delays in construction. But such delays in permanent construction did not delay the aircraft warning service because it was using temporary housing for its Information Center, and its mobile radar stations were operative without any permanent housing. (R. 3885)

As to the Interceptor Command and the Information Center of the aircraft warning service, General Burgin, Commanding General of the antiaircraft artillery, said:

"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over." (R. 2604)

He explained how the Interceptor Command had been working during previous trials and exercises. While the Interceptor Command was not fully functioning due to the lack of IFF instruments on the planes, yet there was ample AWS means for defense and interception that it could have used to a material degree on the morning of 7 December 1941. The Interceptor Command was just being set up, but the nucleus of its operation was there, and it would have been an effective instrument had it been used when the attack came. This was not done.

3. Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses. General Burgin commanded the Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast artillery plus all antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade composed of the 64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment.

He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a temporary basis saying:

"We had constant training and maneuvers,

practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to Interceptor Command. . . . For at least six weeks or two months prior to 7 December, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadway, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to 7 December. . . . On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on 7 December. The fleet was in the harbor."

And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command:

"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it over to the Interceptor Command, is that the Interceptor Command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire." (R. 2602-2604)

This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the Interceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on the morning of 7 December, then it could have worked for the attack. He said in his opinion it would not have made any difference anyway, "because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually were." (R. 2604)

He said of his antiaircraft batteries:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition." (R. 2604)

A reference to the next section will show that it was General Short who supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue this ammunition to troops when they went out for exercises in the field.

Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not even put his guns into final positions because of the conditions now described.

General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions. He described the situation as follows:

"General Russell. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to 7 December 1941, so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?"

"General Burgin. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position they were to go in."

"General Frank. Was that because of this opposition of the people who owned the land?"

"General Burgin. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice." (R. 2628)

He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five.

As to this he said:

"General Russell. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results of Alert Number 3?"

"General Burgin. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world."

"General Russell. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert Number 3—and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity—if General Short had ordered Alert Number 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential civilian population here on the island?"

"General Burgin. I feel positive it would."

"General Grunert. Even though he might have explained that to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?"

"General Burgin. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time."

"General Grunert. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think might have voiced their objection?"

"General Burgin. Oh, my!"

"General Grunert. Is Dillingham one of them?"

"General Burgin. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker."

"General Frank. Which Walker?"

"General Burgin. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells." (R. 2629)

He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, pineapples, etc.

In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record that one of the things that may have influenced Short in selecting Alert Number 1 and not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposition that developed then and later from the large commercial interests on the island using Japanese labor, that they did not want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in their business if a substantial portion of it

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was either deported or interned. (R. 2654)
As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and Americans had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii they would have been locked up before the war started and not afterwards. (R. 2649)

4. Ammunition Issue: Short's and the Ordnance Department's Responsibility.

The Ordnance Department in the Hawaiian Department in its misdirected effort to safeguard and maintain ammunition in a serviceable condition objected to a full issue thereof to troops except in an emergency. Such issues in an emergency entailed delays which delayed troops in getting into position and action. (R. 2607)

General Burgin, who commanded the anti-aircraft artillery, stated that he and General Murray, who commanded one of the infantry divisions, personally went to the staff and to General Short, who turned them down and refused to allow the issue of the ammunition for the artillery and the infantry. Later there was some relaxation of the issue of infantry ammunition. Colonel Weddington testified that on the morning of 7 December he had insufficient ammunition, that there was none for his rifles and ground machine guns, and that the only extra supply of ammunition was belted ammunition for his aircraft machine guns. (R. 3026-3027)

The artillery ammunition situation is summed up by General Burgin as follows:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this anti-aircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the anti-aircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Allamano Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions." (R. 2604-2605)

He described the efforts of General Murray and himself to get the Ordnance Department to release this ammunition and how he was overruled by General Short's staff and General Short himself, in the following language:

"General Burgin. Yes, sir, we did. I would like to answer that a little more elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great difficulty in prying loose ammunition from our storehouses and from the ordnance during peacetime. It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was

extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the anti-aircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck.

"General Frank. Was that putting off made directly by the Commanding General or by a staff department?

"General Burgin. Both; staff departments first, then the Commanding General in person.

"General Frank. Supported them?

"General Burgin. In his own office, to General Murray and to me.

"General Frank. Well, what were the staff departments who opposed it?

"General Burgin. The Gs; G-4s, the Ordnance.

"General Frank. And their reasons were?

"General Burgin. Some old reason, that they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on and renovate it; and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise." (R. 2607-2608)

Apparently one of the reasons in General Short's mind was sabotage, if the ammunition was out with the guns. As General Burgin testified:

"As long as the ammunition could be left locked up in the magazines, it was pretty safely guarded and could not be tampered with to any great extent." (R. 2608)

He testified that without ammunition for

his guns it would take from a few minutes to six hours before he could get his guns into position and firing. He was never permitted to take live ammunition on any of his practices and as 50 per cent of the mobile guns were on private land he had been unable to even place half of his guns in position, and they were unable to take ammunition with them. (R. 2608-09-10)

Therefore on the morning of 7 December he was caught in this position with only ammunition adjacent his fixed gun batteries, but half of his guns were without ammunition.

As General Burgin summed it up,

"It was just impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance, the G-4s, or from General Short himself." (R. 2612)

General Maxwell Murray testified as to his difficulties in getting ammunition for both his field artillery and his infantry, as follows:

"General Grunert. . . First, I would like to talk to you about artillery ammunition, and ask you this question: Why was not sufficient ammunition at hand for the artillery, on 7 December?

"General Murray. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, but it had not been issued to troops.

"General Grunert. I mean 'at hand,' not 'on hand.'

"General Murray. I was not authorized to draw the artillery ammunition from the magazines. I requested authority from General Short to draw artillery ammunition and stack it; I suggested either in the gun parks on the division review field, in small stacks. The division review field, as you know, is a large area immediately adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as the dispersal area for the artillery." (R. 3075-

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"General Grunert. Now, we get back to the ammunition. You say that there was no ammunition immediately available to you for quick action; is that right?

"General Murray. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round of ammunition in the gun parks.

"General Grunert. And, in case you were turned out, to go on an alert which required ammunition, you would then have to draw it from somewhere?

"General Murray. We had to draw it.

"General Grunert. Where did it come from?

"General Murray. We drew it directly; the majority of it was drawn at Schofield Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth Field Artillery, which came directly to the positions in Honolulu and Hickam Field, immediately adjacent to it, were to draw ammunition at the Allamano Crater, which was down here near Pearl Harbor." (R. 3080)

General Murray had made arrangements to have separate entrances to get the ammunition out of the storage houses, but even with that effective arrangement, plus piling ammunition in the warehouses according to unit, it would take at least an hour to get the ammunition so the guns could go to the beaches to defend the island.

As General Murray said:

"I was not satisfied, myself, with the status of our ammunition for either the infantry or

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the artillery." (R. 3081)

He had a limited amount of machine gun ammunition and rifle ammunition. He had a large number of machine guns in each rifle company, extra guns, and

"It was obviously impossible—most of our ammunition was not belted—it was obviously impossible to get out the ammunition and belt it without serious delay." (R. 3081)

He had only two belt loading machines for each heavy weapon company, and it had taken three days to load up the belted ammunition on a previous trial. (R. 3081) After applying to General Short he had been authorized to draw and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw the necessary rifle ammunition, and store it in the parks. He was not allowed to have mortar ammunition or high-explosive grenades inside the barracks; that ordnance had to be left in the Ordnance Depot, as was the artillery ammunition. He testified (R. 3081) that it was General Short who was personally supporting his ordnance officer and G-4 in following the peacetime practice of holding ammunition in depots where it would take hours to get it out in the event of a raid.

He testified that his movement of ammunition into the barracks was in violation of the standing orders of the post, but he had made that movement of ammunition on the express authorization of General Short. (R. 3091)

It is to be recalled that when the War Department ordered General Herren, in 1940, into an alert in which he stayed for six weeks, he was able to draw his ammunition immediately and take it with him into the field.

The testimony of General Burgin as to his inability to get ammunition for use with his antiaircraft guns is borne out by the testimony of Colonel Weddington of the Air Corps that when he was in command of the Bellows Field base his efforts to get ammunition for his machine guns and rifles were met by a response from the Ordnance Department, on each request he made, that the ammunition was not available and was not authorized and that this was by General Short's order.

Lack of ammunition preparations was shown in the testimony of Colonel Weddington, who was in command of Bellows Field prior to and on 7 December. (R. 3026-3027) He testified that it was the custom for the ships (aircraft) that were at gunnery practice to be parked on the ramp on Saturday afternoon, close to one another. The guns were taken off the planes for cleaning; the planes were out of gas and were not to be refueled until Sunday, and the gas was brought over by truck from Honolulu and did not arrive until sometime later in the day. He also indicated that many of the pilots were away over the weekend.

It was in this condition that the attack was launched upon them and they were unable to defend themselves. He said they had 30,000 rounds of belted ammunition but no rifle ammunition for their guards and no machine-gun ammunition. When the attack came they were also without any 30-caliber machine-gun bullets. His repeated efforts to get ammunition from the Ordnance Department met with the statement that it was not available and not authorized, and its failure to be issued was on General Short's order.

5. Status of Aircraft Defenses: The difficulties with supply of both aircraft and parts to maintain aircraft, due to the conditions depicted in Chapter 2, Background, are no better illustrated than in the case of aircraft. The failure previous to 1941 to provide extended aircraft programs and the necessity for revising designs to meet modern combat conditions, as revealed by the European War, joined together to put the War Department in a difficult situation with respect to a sufficiency of aircraft.

On the deficiency of equipment in Hawaii, General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, testified he had written General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, personal letters as well as sent official communications with reference to his obsolete aircraft, the lack of spare parts for the modern craft that he had, and the necessity for placing his aircraft in combat condition with adequate weapons, et cetera. (R. 1858-A, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1874 to 1889, inclusive)

While correspondence shows a failure on the part of the Army Air Forces to supply the correct equipment, adequate equipment, spare parts, and enough of it to be effective, yet Hawaii was better off than other commands. As General Marshall expressed it:

"As to Hawaii, that had the largest troop concentration we possessed, it had the maximum of materiel that we possessed, and we were accumulating the first fighter planes, of the type that we possessed at that time, in the Hawaiian garrison.

"As to Panama: if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100, Panama was about 25 per cent, and the Philippines about 10 per cent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible."

As elsewhere stated, on 7 December 1941, General Martin had under his command 123 modern pursuit and bombardment planes, 15 observation planes, 2 transports, 5 observation amphibians, and 8 basic trainers. He had non-modern medium bombers to the number

of 39, 9 light bombers, and 62 non-modern pursuit ships.

General Martin testified:

"When I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands we had, you might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-26s, an old obsolete type of fighter which we then called a pursuit airplane. We had some old observation planes, some B-18 bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat at all. They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as fast as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always recognized as not being a combat ship. In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36s. They were obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later—as I remember it, about May—we received some P-40 fighters. These ships were brought in on carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived in Hawaii. About May we received 21 B-17s that were ferried over by air, 9 of these, about the 5th or 6th of September, were transferred to the Philippines by air. The 12 remaining were ordered to proceed to the Philippines; and upon our request that they be delayed, that we could continue the training of combat crews for that type of ship, as the two bombardment groups at Hickam Field would be equipped with that type of airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. . . . The types of ships which could have been used in combat, which is the P-40, B-17, and ten A-20s, were always possibly 50 per cent out of commission due to spare parts. In the beginning of our production program all monies, as possible, were placed into the producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements were neglected at the time. Therefore the new airplanes coming out were deficient to meet the requirements of spare parts.

We had sent cablegrams and letters on the subject of spare parts through proper channels to our supply agencies, and they were not in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be sure to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation as rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships we used what they call cannibalism to rob it of certain spare parts to repair other ships. . . . Therefore the training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters. We were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advance training at the time; that is, a limited advance training but not on any of the modern equipment. So they were put through a demonstration of their ability to handle the old, obsolescent P-26, then through the P-36 and on to the P-40, and considerable progress was being made in training these men to take over the P-40 equipment. . . . The bombers, as soon as we got B-17s, in I think it was sometime in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown the B-17s. They started training others, and as I remember there were one or two officers who remained with the first flight of bombers that came over, and helped train other additional crews. So they had to train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots, and all other members of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its engines or any of its equipment. . . . In other words, they had consumed some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the enlargement of the technical school facility. We were getting but a few technically trained men. . . . There were possibly 400 men in these schools, as I remember." (R. 1858-A to 1861)

It is to be remembered that the record shows that the Japanese carriers had over 400 modern aircraft which they brought against the Island, so that the superiority was overwhelming. Although General Short gave a high priority to airfield construction, there were many delays due in part to slowness in getting funds and to the inefficiency of contractors under the supervision of the District Engineer. Some elements of the Air Force in Hawaii had been used during 1941 primarily as a training force for officers and men who were being sent into the Philippines and into the outlying islands. The personnel of these elements, therefore, were largely untrained or partially trained personnel, as the more competent were constantly being forwarded into what was then advance theaters where the danger was deemed to be greater. Therefore, much of the Air Force was in a training status primarily. This has been pictured elsewhere in this report through the testimony of General Short, General Martin, Colonel Mollison, and others.

The great effort in the latter part of 1941 was to get B-17s, of which 180 had been allotted to Hawaii. As there were only 109 B-17s in the entire Army (R. 134) it was obviously impossible to comply with this request. General Marshall testified that he had sent General Arnold to the West Coast to see what he could do to get these B-17s to the Philippines via Hawaii, and that they had been held up by contrary winds and production delays for more than three or four weeks. (R. 167-168) General Arnold testified as follows:

"General Frank. Had anything held up B-17 production that in any way had any effect on this situation?"

"General Arnold. No; we did not have the facilities to get the numbers that we wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our

endeavor to get B-17s we had 90 in January, and by June the 90 was up to 100, and by November it had only gone up to 148. That was the total number of B-17s produced by the Boeing Company. We just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers required." (R. 180)

Due to this condition the planes had been flown out with their guns, but without their ammunition, to save weight, a factor that was interpreted by Short as indicating that no attack was expected on Hawaii. (R. 305)

However, the impression in Washington, as testified to by General Arnold, was that the Hawaiian Air Force was in good shape despite its heavy training mission. He testified:

"We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian Air Force was probably better trained than any of our air forces. That is the impression we had here in Washington as a result of our inspections and due to the fact that they were always carrying out some form of mission simulating what they would do in active combat." (R. 179)

In order to develop this further, the following question was put and answer gained:

"General Frank. What I was about to approach was this point, which your present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because of the fact that they were charged with training a lot of crews to fly B-17s from California to Honolulu and then conduct a lot of transition training in Honolulu, and do certain training work in preparation for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps they got themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of mind.

"General Arnold. I wrote to General Martin, as I said, from time to time, and the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was not done until we were assured that they would get more effective results by carrying this transition on in Hawaii than if it were done in the United States. In other words, we had no air force, as such, anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that training, it was going to disrupt something. Where could we put that training so it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force that we did have? And it looked to us as if they could carry on this transition in Hawaii and interfere less with the training than anywhere else because we would have the airplanes then available, in case of an emergency, where they would be most needed." (R. 179-180)

It will, therefore, be seen that the Hawaiian Air Force was handicapped by conducting a training program not only for itself but also for other theaters of action; its ships were mainly obsolete, its modern ships were few, and there was a marked deficiency of spare parts, and its airfield construction was lagging. Such was the status on 7 December 1941, of the Army Air Force installations.

E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING, 7 DECEMBER 1941.

1. Army Aircraft. On Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, the status of the island defenses was at the minimum.

As General Burgin testified:

"A peculiar thing attaches to that. For at least six weeks or two months prior to 7 December, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy.

"Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to 7 December.

"General Frank. On Sunday? "

"General Burgin. On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on 7 December. The fleet was in the harbor." (R. 2603)

On that morning, due to Alert No. 1, all planes, with some minor exceptions, were grouped together wing to wing. There were 80 pursuit planes in commission and 69 out of commission in various states of repair. There were 39 bombers in commission and 33 out of commission. Of the bombers in commission the only ones available for a real mission were 6 flying fortresses and 10 A-20s. The old B-18s were of minor value. There were a few fighter aircraft that morning that were at a remote field, apparently unknown to the Japanese, where a squadron was practicing short landings. It was out of this group that there came the brilliant performance of Major (then Lieutenant) Welch, who courageously got his ship off the ground, together with his wing man. Major Welch and his wing man shot down a number of Japanese aircraft.

The Navy had no PBVs in the air that morning, although they usually had four to six for doing reconnaissance. Perhaps this is explained by General Burgin's testimony that while every Sunday morning the anti-aircraft artillery had an exercise with the Navy when the Navy sent its carrier-based planes from ship to shore, and this continued up to the Sunday before 7 December, the Navy planes did not get into the air on this particular 7 December. (R. 2603) The fleet was also in the harbor that Sunday, the only vessels of material character that were out being the carriers Enterprise and Lexington. The Enterprise, with the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, was about 200 miles west of Oahu. Task Force No. 12 was approximately 425 miles southeast of

Midway, with the carrier Lexington (R. 441-445); therefore there was not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning. (R. 540)

2. Naval Long-Distance Reconnaissance. The situation as to the long-distance reconnaissance supposed to have been conducted by the Navy is admirably and frankly explained by Admiral DeLany, who was assistant chief of staff for operations on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, during this period: Admiral DeLany testified that there was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out by the Navy in the morning of 7 December, and no attempt to obtain information about the launching of an attack upon Oahu. He further testified, "There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities available to conduct and maintain such a continuous reconnaissance" as would be necessary in order to maintain a 360-degree reconnaissance around the island. They realized the danger but there was nothing that could be done about it. (R. 1728)

Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander of the Navy Base Defense Air Force, Commander, Patrol Wing 2, and Commander, Task Force 9, said that on the morning of 7 December he had a total of 81 PBVs in Patrol Wings 1 and 2, which included those at Midway, leaving a total of 69 on Oahu, with 9 out of commission. The reconnaissance work that was being conducted normally each morning at sunrise was merely to search the fleet operating areas for submarines so that the fleet could operate on exercises without molestation. He usually sent out three to six planes "to guard against submarine attack." He testified that the only patrolling being done as a defense against a surprise attack was in the vicinity of Midway. (R. 1600) He testified as follows:

"General Frank. You had no instructions from anybody to conduct any search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?"

"Admiral Bellinger. We had had no specific occasions, when there was some apparent reason for doing so. That instance had occurred for one or two different sectors over the periods during the year." (R. 1601)

Admiral Kimmel summarized the situation when he testified as follows:

"General Russell. You have testified, and it has been supported by a line of evidence here, that there was not available to the Army and Navy any means for distant reconnaissance to ascertain the location of a Japanese task force.

"Admiral Kimmel. That is correct." (R. 1805)

"General Grunert. Were there any planes on distant reconnaissance on that morning?"

"Admiral Bellinger. There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in the true sense of the term 'distant reconnaissance.'" (R. 1629-1630)

This failure to do distant reconnaissance cannot be excused for lack of planes under Navy control because the Navy had 50 PBVs available. The only excuse for not using them was, as stated by Admiral Kimmel:

"We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize." (R. 1811)

Admiral Bellinger testified that the relationship between the Navy and the Army for the use of Army planes from the fighter group of the Army was not in a functioning status. (R. 1622) He had 33 scout bombers, 7 fighters, and 9 scouts available on the morning of 7 December, but they were not being used. (R. 1623) As witnesses testified, they were accustomed to seeing PBVs go out each morning, but on Sunday morning, 7th December, they did not go out. (See General Rudolph's and Colonel Brooks' testimony, R. 903-994, 1232-1234)

3. Aircraft Warning System. The radar aircraft warning system had the information center completed and organized with five mobile radar stations which were operating. They had been in operation from four to seven o'clock each morning for training purposes but had not gone into regular operation. It was because of their being in operation that Lockard and Elliott picked up the Japanese attack force 132 miles from Oahu, and this organization functioned continually after the attack, so it can be assumed it was in operating condition. (R. 439-440-441) (See Lockard in other testimony.) As General Short said:

"I think that the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained to the point where they could do pretty well," as of 7 December 1941. (R. 508) They had three heavy radar sets complete and six mobile sets complete. (R. 509) The mobile sets were operating. (R. 510)

"General Frank. . . . The AWS system was operated with mobile sets up to a distance of about 130 miles. Is that correct?"

"General Short. That is correct." (R. 512) The Interceptor Command "was actually operating," according to General Short. He said, "It was actually operating daily." (R. 525) An order had not gone out to Burgin and Martin, but it was working.

4. Antiaircraft Defenses. As to the antiaircraft, much of it had never gone into position so far as mobile guns were concerned, and none of the mobile guns was in position on the morning of 7 December. Ammunition had not been issued because the Ordnance Department objected to having it out convenient to the guns because it might get dirty. As

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General Burgin said, "they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition . . . and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise." (R. 2608)

As it took about six hours to get the ammunition fully out, distributed, and broken open, the delay was a very difficult one. (R. 2608)

As General Burgin again testified:
"It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck." (R. 2607)

The two divisions were in their quarters so that it took them a number of hours to move out after the attack. One of the principal difficulties was the necessity of drawing their ammunition, as elsewhere discussed.

The status of the antiaircraft was this: The mobile guns had to secure their ammunition from Allamann Crater, between two and three miles from Port Shafter. The fixed guns had their ammunition in boxes adjacent to the guns. He had 60 mobile guns and 26 fixed guns and the usual complement of 50-caliber and 30-caliber. He testified as follows:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition." (R. 2604)

On the morning of 7 December he had not gone into operation with the Navy as on previous Sundays. (R. 2603) This was due to the fleet being in the harbor on that Sunday, and for some reason the Navy was not conducting its usual Sunday exercises with him. (R. 2603)

5. Summary. Therefore, the situation on 7 December can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBVs were not out; the antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with the fleet air arm; the naval carriers with their planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the fleet was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers Lexington and Enterprise. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the sabotage alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack. In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it.

F. THE ATTACK ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

1. Japanese Intelligence. The details of the attack have been already adequately described. To have a competent understanding of the attack and the perfection with which it was executed, we should remember that the

Japanese had had exceptional opportunities for securing the very latest information from a wide variety of sources in the islands as to the exact dispositions of the fleet and of our military forces. The maps that were found upon Japanese aircraft that were shot down or on Japanese aviators or upon Japanese submarine crewmen indicated a vast amount of meticulously accurate, up-to-date information. The fact that one or more submarines were in Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December and had circulated in the harbor and then gone out again showed a knowledge of what was going on in Pearl Harbor that was substantially complete.

It is interesting to contrast this activity of the Japanese Navy in gaining detailed information of our Fleet with the failure of our Navy to glean any information concerning the task force that attacked Pearl Harbor from the time that it left Japanese home waters, about 22 November 1941, and left Takan Bay about 28 November 1941, until the attack took place.

For instance, the map found on a Japanese aviator brought down at Fort Kamehameha on 7 December, Exhibit No. 22; Exhibits 23, 24, 25, and 26; and Exhibit No. 48, illustrate with what meticulous detail the entire operation was worked out, based upon adequate and complete intelligence by the Japanese. It is difficult to understand this attack and its perfection without first studying these maps. The Japanese came to the attack with full information of our dispositions and defenses; we met the attack with absolutely no information about the Japanese attacking force. The details of the securing of this information are set forth elsewhere in this report. The Japanese realized that this was the foundation of their war and that perfection of execution would have a profound effect politically upon their allies and upon the countries of the Far East in which they intended to operate.

2. Nature and Composition of the Attacking Force. The strength of the attacking force has already been stated in this report, based upon the extended testimony of Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. It was one of the most powerful naval attacking forces ever assembled up to that time, because of the large complement of carriers. Its aviators were of the highest quality of Japanese encountered during this war. After they were finally disposed of during the later days of the present Pacific war, the testimony is to the effect that no equal or superior Japanese aviators have been met.

Japan evidently brought to bear upon this attack the best brains, the best equipment, and the finest intelligence, with the most expert planning, which it had.

The first indication of the attack on the Island of Oahu was the detection by the USS Antares of a suspicious object in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a.m. This was found to be a small two-man submarine, which was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of the USS Ward and a naval patrol plane between 6:33 and 6:45 a.m. on 7 December. The Ward sent a report of this action to the Naval Base watch officer at 7:12 a.m., who immediately notified his chief of staff. A ready destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warning was issued based upon the report. This was one of the most important of a succession of mistakes made during this fateful morning. The Navy admits that it did not advise General Short as it should have done.

A second small two-man submarine was sunk inside the harbor between 8:35 and 8:43 a.m., and a third one was grounded in the Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There was

a total altogether of five such submarines equipped with two-man crews, one of which was captured. The remaining nine crew members were killed, as confirmed by a Japanese citation later given to these ten men raising them in rank. (R. 3638) These two-man submarines were launched from mother submarines a short distance from the Island of Oahu.

While Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net to prevent the entrance of submarines and this net was kept closed during the hours of darkness, being opened only when necessary for a vessel to pass through the net, it was kept open continuously during daylight hours, upon the assumption that the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels in the neighborhood, would detect any submarines. On the morning of 7 December, the net was opened at 4:58 a.m. for the entrance of two minesweepers and was left open until 8:40 a.m. when it was closed by order as a result of the attack. The net was not damaged and it was fully functioning. Apparently the submarine got into the harbor at 7 a.m. It will be recalled that prior to 7 December one or more Japanese submarines had already been in this harbor, passing through the net when it was opened at 4 a.m. to permit the garbage scow to go through.

The attacking planes from the six carriers of the attacking force numbered approximately 424. (R. 3048)

Of this number about 250 to 300 took part in the attack. They consisted of fighting, bombing and torpedo planes that simultaneously and successively attacked Pearl Harbor and the adjacent air bases and airfields on Oahu, starting at about 7:55 a.m. The attack was over by 11 a.m. On these fields the aircraft were carefully lined up, wing to wing, tip to tip, in the most perfect target position for both bombing and machine-gun strafing. This is true both of the Army and of the Navy. The PBVs of the Navy were substantially all destroyed, and a large number of the Army aircraft met a similar fate. The landing strips were substantially without damage, possibly indicating some subsequent intention on the part of the Japanese to employ those landing strips.

Immediately upon the attack being known to General Short he ordered Alert No. 3. This was executed with more than expected promptness.

As already related, this force of attacking Japanese planes was detected about 132 miles north of Oahu. The Japanese force came over the island as follows: One force came from the north directly across the island, over Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field, to Pearl Harbor, attacking Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor. Another force came in from the east attacking Kaneohe Field, Bellows Field, and Pearl Harbor, and a third force came in from the south attacking Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor. The torpedo planes devoted their attention to the ships in the harbor. A study of the bomb pattern of such places as Hickam Field shows that the attack was concentrated upon the aprons where the planes were parked and upon the hangars as well as upon the machine shops. All objectives were entered and carefully identified by legends placed upon the U. S. Geodetic Survey maps used by the Japanese.

It is significant as to maps secured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that there is an abbreviation of a code which takes care of every major contingency before, during and as a result of the attack. Nothing was left to chance. It is particularly noted that the information of construction was shown by the fact that as to Hickam Field the legend indi-

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If Susan's refusin' try usin'—

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ated, "All concrete structures — or in the process of construction."

G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK; THE EFFECT OF USING HAWAII AS A TRAINING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST.

1. Attack a Surprise. The Chief of Staff and all other witnesses, including Kimmel and Short, have without exception stated that the attack was a surprise. General Marshall testified that the Hawaiian commanders indicated their views that an air attack was their very serious concern. (R. 52) Yet he also testified: "We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack." (R. 9)

An analysis of the probabilities of success from the Japanese point of view shows that the Japanese took an extraordinary chance, if the facts as to their strength as we now know them are reasonably accurate. In race track parlance, it was a "long-shot" and an extraordinary risk because the consequences of failure to the Japanese might have been greater than those to the United States in the event of success. It was a bold and considered venture.

Japan knew with reasonable accuracy the movements and location of our fleet. It knew weekend conditions in Hawaii with the fleet in the harbor as well as we did. It apparently knew of our assumption that Japan would not dare attack the United States and that if it did, it would be in the remote islands of the Pacific, including the Philippines. It accurately gauged our belief that Japan had its eyes turned on Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and was proceeding southwardly with its conquest.

Based upon this shrewd estimate of our national psychology and our estimate of their intentions, Japan proceeded to the execution of the unexpected, the gain from which it estimated would be of incalculable value. In the daring attack Japan was compensated by the gain to her of immobilizing and substantially destroying the Pacific Fleet, which was a major threat to Japan's left flank in its southward move. The value of such a result was tremendous.

It gave both safety and freedom of action to Japan; and the ability to concentrate both on the Pacific Islands of the United States and the Philippines. By that time Japan believed it would be so entrenched that dislodgment would be substantially impossible.

Japan used in this attack from four to six carriers out of the total of eight available to its fleet. The failure of this mission, by the destruction of such carriers, would have been really fatal to its fleet, at least for long months to come. The daring, therefore, of this attack was out of all proportion to its value because had it not been successful and had its carriers been destroyed it would have been disastrous to the Japanese Navy.

But in making this estimate of Japan's risky action and its considered chances, we were doing so from the occidental point of view. We were completely ignoring the oriental attitude, the Japanese cheap price of life, and her willingness to conduct a suicide attempt without any foundation of occidental reasoning in order to gain an extraordinary advantage. Hull and Grew had warned of this psychology and her penchant for unexpected, reckless, and suicidal moves.

This national urge to take a desperate chance of a military nature has since then become well-known. It was our failure to take into consideration this extraordinary chance-taking characteristic, due to the violent and uncivilized reasoning of the Japanese mind, that would approve the making of such a long military and naval chance for the satisfaction of the first blow, and a disastrous one, that was so satisfactory to the oriental mind, which misled us.

2. Time Element—The Important Factor in All Estimates. This analysis is recited for the reason that apparently no one from the Chief of Staff down considered at the time the attack was made that any such attempt would be made.

This time element is important in understanding the state of mind of the responsible authorities of the United States. The military estimates of the situation from the War Department, the Navy Department, and in Hawaii, clearly show a reasoned and correctly stated analytical estimate of the situation. The missing link in our search for the reason why steps were not taken to carry out the logic of the military and psychological estimate of the situation seems to be in this belief that there was ample time to prepare Hawaii. It was generally thought that Japan would not attempt this attack, if at all, until some time later after it had made its attacks upon the Philippines and intermediate islands. In that, the United States' calculations went far astray for lack of understanding of the long-chance type of the military and naval minds of oriental Japan.

As a consequence a policy was followed that

was disastrous to the defense of Hawaii. They gambled upon having time for preparation that did not exist.

3. Expected Time to Continue Training. That assumption of time for preparation resulted in using a portion of the Hawaiian Army Air Force and the Navy as a training force for the training of green personnel followed by the removal of experienced personnel thereof, as they were trained, to other theaters. The Board, although it realizes the great need of organized air forces to serve as training units and that the Hawaiian Air Force was one of the few available, nevertheless it considers it a mistake to so utilize this outpost which should have been on a purely combat basis and not subject to the weakening process of a periodic turnover.

Let us look at the consequence of this. The Navy was either training ashore or constantly training at sea through its three task forces. Those operations in the areas were not, as Short thought, for the purpose of combat reconnaissance or defense duty, but they were training maneuvers for the constant training of new personnel to be used elsewhere.

The training problem, which had been frequently discussed with the War Department and was well known by it, had assumed a position of importance in Hawaii. This evidently strongly influenced Short's decision to adopt Alert No. 1.

He testified: "In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take every man, practically, so it would eliminate any training. Alert No. 2 would practically put every man of the harbor defense, the anti-aircraft, and the air on duties that would prohibit training. The situation in the air with regard to training was quite serious. We had been given the mission of ferrying B-17s to the Philippines. We had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12. We had also sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the Philippine Islands. We had only 6 flying fortresses in commission to train all of these crews. If you remember, at that time a flying fortress was relatively new and you could not just pick up a pilot here and there and say he could fly a flying fortress. He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of the old obsolete B-18 bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight, but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships. They were put on those. They were put on A-20s for a little time, and finally got to the B-17s. With the limited number of ships we had it took time to train these crews; not just the pilots. In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the gunners so they could protect themselves from the Japanese going over the Mandated Islands."

"General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferrying group. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews. "That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3. (R. 285-286) " . . . We felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the Philippines. Just as soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by transferring it to the Philippines." (R. 390)

And again he testified before the Roberts Commission: "Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about training rather than expecting something to happen at the time." (Roberts Record 1622) (See page 531 of the Grunert Record.)

General Martin, Chief of the Hawaiian Air Force, testified even more vigorously that the selection of Alert No. 1 was largely influenced by their desire to keep on training.

"General Frank. Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps training in any one of the three alerts? . . .

"General Martin. There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed to get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new organization. "General Frank. Could you do more technical training for the Air Force in No. 3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference?

"General Martin. Of course there was a difference. There would be more under Alert No. 1." (R. 1864-1865)

Admiral Kimmel said:

"The principal one that arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training personnel and shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly getting new personnel. That intensive training program was essential if we were not to have a fleet that was utterly impotent. I have been informed, and I believe firmly, that the Army had just as many troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots out there that needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all ratings, and in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic station, and they very greatly

depleted their staff." (R. 1764-1765)

It is therefore apparent that both services were placing great emphasis on training, possibly to the detriment of preparedness to meet an attack.

4. Short's Trust in Navy to Give Him Timely Notice. Time Element Again. General Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His instructions from the Chief of Staff to do this were not for the purpose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i.e., the top rank of the Navy; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own full information, the complete execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is not substantiated. General Short testified:

"The one thing that that letter (General Marshall's first letter of 7 February 1941) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else." (R. 355)

Apparently Short was afraid that if he went much beyond social contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good will of the Navy which he was charged with securing. That is evidenced by his following statement:

"I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I had tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out, and as I say, our relations were such that he gave me without any hesitancy any piece of information that he thought was of interest." (R. 363)

He testified that he relied for reconnaissance upon the task forces of the Navy, which employed carriers to search the ocean 300 miles to each side, giving each task force 600 miles of reconnaissance area, and with three forces that would have meant covering 1,800 miles. (R. 284, 384) Admiral Fye, commander of one of the three task forces of the Pacific Fleet, testified that:

"The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically all the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period normally of about eight days and about fourteen days in port." (R. 1036)

Kimmel testified the task forces were in training and not out for reconnaissance. (R. 1773, 1794-1795; Cf. Fye 1037, Burgin 2673) He said that this was well known and undoubtedly Short knew about it. (R. 1771-1773; Cf. Short 359) The Short and Kimmel testimony is in conflict on this point.

Again, Short said he was dependent on the Navy, and particularly the 14th Naval District, or the War Department for securing information as to the movement of Japanese ships. (R. 291) He said that the combination of the continuous flow of information that the Navy Department had as to the location of Jap ships and the Navy task forces doing long-distance reconnaissance with their carrier-borne planes, led him to the position that "it was a natural thing that I should accept the opinion of the Navy on that particular subject. It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was in the vicinity." (R. 300-301) It was for that reason that he accepted the Captain McMorris statement, when visiting with Admiral Kimmel and his staff, that there would be no Japanese attack in early December. (R. 299-301)

He said he was further strengthened in his opinion, during the period of the 27th of November to the 6th of December, that the Navy either knew "where the Japanese carriers were, or had enough information that they were not uneasy, and with the task forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they could handle the situation." (R. 303)

Short evidently believed that he was getting full information from the Navy that was available to them. There does not seem to have occurred anything that led him to think he was not being told all the pertinent official naval information there was available. He relied upon complete official interchange which was not in practice.

An examination of the facts showed that the naval forces were insufficient for long-distance patrol, and General Short frankly confesses this situation. (R. 375); General Short further points out that the Army had insufficient planes for reconnaissance. (R. 377-378) Although General Short "looked on task forces as the best means of reconnaissance" (R. 384), he did not know nor try to find out their routes. (R. 350-360, 475) Short could easily have learned that the task forces conducted only incidental reconnaissance (R. 1773, 1794-1795) and that the Navy was devoting itself to the submarine menace in the areas in which they had their exercises. (R. 1040, 1737, 3041) Short knew that his inshore patrol was of limited value. (R. 473); that Admiral Bloch did not have the planes to carry out the agreement (R. 375); and that all that Admiral Beiler had was a limited number of PBV reconnaissance planes (R. 456, 1598, 1810); that Bloch had none (R. 1493, 1526, 1532,

1751) and the carrier-borne planes were normally used for antisubmarine reconnaissance. (R. 1039-1040)

General Short's knowledge of the situation at the time of these events in 1941 is shown in the testimony of General Martin, who said:

"I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain extent by the fact that the Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had no knowledge. Now, as to what areas they were covering, we did not know, but it did affect a decision as to the paramount danger coming from within rather than from without." (R. 1856)

General Martin said emphatically the fact that the Navy had task forces out influenced his decision, saying:

" . . . I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me; . . ." (R. 1873)

This was despite the fact, as he said: " . . . we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your reconnaissance from the air would extend over a larger territory in the limited amount of time, and that was the thing I was complaining to Admiral Beiler about." (R. 1857)

As an indication that Short was not getting the information is his own admission: "General Frank. Another thing: Do you now feel that the Navy withheld from you certain information that they had available that would have been invaluable to you?"

"General Short. I don't believe that they purposely withheld anything from me that they thought really concerned me."

"General Frank. Don't you think that that information about the naval task force with carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jalt would have vitally affected you?"

"General Short. Yes, possibly."

"General Grunert. Did the Navy understand your mission and your responsibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should be passed to you or what shouldn't be passed to you?"

"General Short. Oh, I think they did, definitely." (R. 409-410)

He did not learn of the early visit on the morning of 7 December of the Japanese submarine. He did not learn of it until the 8th, when Admiral Kimmel himself told him about it. (R. 364-365) By his implicit trust in the Navy he let them not only get the information but to evaluate it. In connection with the information about the Japanese submarine sunk by the Navy early 7 December, he said this as to the Navy action:

"They did not connect it (the submarine which was sunk by the Navy) with the general raid, they thought it was separate." (R. 365)

But the point is that Short should have been given this information and have made his own evaluation. As he now testifies, if he had known of this submarine information it "might have worked out to our very great advantage if they (the Navy) had been handled differently." (R. 310) In this connection he said, "It was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he (Bloch) could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong. . . ." (R. 311)

Again, he was not advised of the Japanese task force in the Marshalla, between the 25th and the 30th of November. (R. 361) He said he was not advised of the naval dispatch of 3 December 1941, and never saw that message. That was the message that showed that the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were destroying certain codes and ciphers, and burning certain documents. He said that he did not receive the naval messages of 3 December, 4 December, and 6 December from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, regarding the destruction of confidential documents.

He said: "General Grunert. You had none of the information that was disclosed in those three messages?"

"General Short. No, sir." (R. 425)

He expressed his relationship with the Navy in this wise: "I felt that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely given me anything they thought had any bearing on my job; that if they were sure it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that did not concern me in any way they might not have given it (the information) to me." (R. 358)

This situation was summed up as follows: "General Frank. The question as to whether or not you got the information was placed upon a trust that you had that they would have given it to you?"

"General Short. Absolutely."

"General Frank. Do you feel that you were secure in that?"

"General Short. I do not know what other basis you could work on. I had no right to demand that they give me all information they had." (R. 358)

As to naval task forces on which he so thoroughly relied for reconnaissance, he did not

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have any regular means of knowing where they were or what they were doing, "except as we (Admirals Kimmel, Bloch and Bellinger) happened to talk about in a personal kind of way." (R. 359)

This brings us to the further observation that Short in dealing with the Navy was trying to do the job himself (R. 1248-1249), which resulted in that he neither got the information completely, accurately, nor consistently, instead of delegating it to his trained staff officers dealing with equally trained staff officers of the Navy so a professional, systematic job could be done. He relied on confidence and natural trust rather than certainty of information; and on personal visits and informal conferences instead of the definiteness of an established organization smoothly operating on an effective end.

H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK?

1. Reason For Analysis of Action Taken After 7 December 1941. The question of insufficient means with which to adequately defend Oahu has been raised. General Short's energy was admirable and well directed towards improving the defense of Oahu. As a consequence, we have examined the situation as to what he did before the attack and what he did after the attack with what he had. The first part of the examination has already been related in the previous portions of the report. We now propose to examine two questions: How effectively was Short able to use this very same materiel, personnel, and available facilities after the attack; and what did Washington do after the attack in giving help to Hawaii that might have been done before?

2. Hawaii and Washington Action: Upon learning of the attack General Short immediately ordered the Number 3 Alert. (R. 1118) The 24th Division was in all battle positions by 1600 hours 7 December 1941. The 25th Division was in all battle positions by 1700 hours 7 December 1941. The Division Artillery drew its ammunition and secured its issue of a unit of fire to take to beaches within one to two hours. It is significant that the war garrison was increased by Washington from 59,000 to 71,500 after 7 December to defend Kaneohe Bay, "back door to the island," and that increases in air strength and in engineers for aviation purposes were granted. (R. 325) Harbor troops had ammunition "immediately at hand." The antiaircraft had their some-time later. The first of the sixteen surgical teams reported to the hospital at 0600. At noon there was started evacuation of women and children from Hickam and Wheeler Fields and harbor defense positions. The Ordnance Depot went into two underground rooms. Silt trenches were then dug. (R. 316-317)

The Department Engineer, under the Department Commander, was put by Washington in complete control of building of field fortifications. The troops started on field fortifications. The silt trenches were not completed on 8 December. (R. 321) The outlying islands were further garrisoned. (R. 332) Orders were issued in connection with the defense against chemical air attack, air raid instructions were issued, klaxon horns were distributed for the aircraft warning service and old gas masks were exchanged for new. (R.

529-531) The Interceptor Command, inactive before 7 December and still in the training stage (R. 1825), was activated 17 December. (R. 4138-4137) After 7 December "the Navy took us over body and soul... we did exactly as they ordered us to. We were a part of their Naval Air Force, so to speak," said General Rudolph. (R. 1223) Washington gave unity of command. Directives came from the War and Navy Departments to establish a joint operating center for a joint staff of Army and Navy. This was done in tunnels in the Allamann Crater and put into use in February 1942. (R. 1534)

Daily reconnaissance was made after 7 December, using Army B-17s and Navy PRYs and "anything they had," even the B-18s. Navy planes were sent from the mainland by Washington after 7 December; many B-17s came out almost immediately. Additional PRYs were received and those damaged on 7 December were repaired. If the planes that were available by Washington after 7 December had been available before 7 December, distance reconnaissance could have been made, according to the testimony of Admiral Bloch. (R. 1532-1534) However, the necessity for the ferrying of bombers to the Philippines ceased since they, too, were under attack.

The Interceptor Command was activated immediately after 7 December. (R. 2604)

The status of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery was as follows. After 7 December the ammunition was issued for use with the guns in the field. (R. 2005) The skeleton crews were replaced with full crews on the fixed coastal guns. (R. 2611) Only 40 per cent of the allowance of automatic weapons existed before 7 December, which was rectified after that date. (R. 2613) The whole command was put on a five-minute alert and old Alerts Number 1, 2, and 3 became obsolete, the men in camp after 7 December remaining right at their guns. (R. 2639) The radar and Interceptor Command installations, formerly under the control of the Signal Corps, were taken away from the Signal Corps immediately after 7 December and placed under the Interceptor Command. (R. 2644)

The aircraft warning system was started full time on 7 December as it could have been weeks before, had the order been given. (R. 4133) After 7 December the aircraft warning system personnel continued to operate efficiently. They did so in conjunction with the 24-hour duty of the Interceptor Command. As Colonel Bergquist said, in contrasting his efforts to get the aircraft warning service and the Interceptor Command cooperating before 7 December, after 7 December "I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted." (R. 1205-1206) The AWS work moved much faster after 7 December. (R. 1218) After 7 December the controversy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, which contributed to the delay in the activation of the Interceptor Command, disappeared. (R. 1216-1217)

After 7 December the fighter planes were kept ready to take off instantly (R. 3911) and the antiaircraft warning service was put on a 24-hour basis, as it could have been before, said Colonel Powell, Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department Corps. (R. 3913) The aircraft warning sets were in continuous operation after 7 December with three groups operating four hours each. (R. 1029)

Tillman, an Engineer Corps civilian em-

ployee, testified that he as a trouble shooter took charge of construction pertaining to the aircraft warning service after Colonel Wyman was relieved because progress was unsatisfactory. (R. 2135) He found he was able to complete certain construction projects at aircraft warning stations by scouting around for parts. Prior to 7 December the crews on those projects were not working because they said they had nothing to work with. (R. 2149-2151)

The most remarkable change between 6 December and 7 December was the change in construction activities under the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman.

A new field was begun at Kahuku on 7 December. Bunkers were built at Hickam Field; the field at Halewa was expanded; construction of a new field at Kipapa was started; a temporary field was put on the Schofield golf course. The troops started on field fortifications. (R. 321) Authority was requested to build ten airfields. Bombers were put on the outlying islands. "We were able to go ahead and do a lot without funds." Barracks were built with WPA money. (R. 325) A pool of lumber was authorized for the Quartermaster. (R. 328)

All the material and contractors with their machinery were taken over and put to work. Priorities were established on jobs to get more work accomplished, according to Benson, President of the Hawaiian Contracting Company. (R. 3737) A job at Wheeler Field had not been completed for a long time, due to the delay of plans from the Engineers. (R. 2542) Barking Sands airport and Kokee radar station jobs had been delayed for many weeks with the material on the ground awaiting someone to act. The Hawaiian Constructors had not put it up. After 7 December the witness Bartlett went to the site, erected the tower in five days and had the station operating.

On 7 December the runways under construction at Bellows Field were incomplete. On the Wednesday after 7 December the work began on a 24-hour-a-day basis. The second runway was completed in seven days, that is, by the following Thursday, said Colonel Weddington, base commander at Bellows Field. (R. 3020) After 7 December antiaircraft emplacements were constructed at Bellows

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Field. When the attack struck, the planes were concentrated practically wing to wing, but after the attack they were dispersed on the field, 50 to 75 feet apart. (R. 3014)

The Corps of Engineers also evidenced an appreciation of the situation by raising the contracting authority of the District Engineer from \$50,000 before 7 December to \$5,000,000 after 7 December. The Corps of Engineers' red tape of sending all contracts and changes to Washington to the Chief of Engineers was then eliminated by Washington; testimony of Colonel Wyman. (R. 3435, 3874) The Robert E. McKee Company, which had been discarded by Wyman when he went to the islands in the middle of 1940, was invited by him after 7 December to join the Hawaiian Constructors. (R. 2405-2407)

Silt trenches had not been built until the day of Pearl Harbor (R. 1916), but they were built extensively, together with air raid shelters, after 7 December. (R. 838)

After 7 December Admiral Pye testified the Navy kept its forces out of the harbor fairly continuously except for the time necessary in port to overhaul materiel and receive supplies. (R. 1045)

We, therefore, find that after 7 December an active and vigorous employment of facilities, materiel and personnel was made, and full support and supplies were furnished by Washington some of which might have been done before 7 December. The support from the mainland was vastly different after 7 December than before, and the record so reflects this condition. For instance, before 7 December G-2 did not submit to General Short any strategic estimates but after 7 December they submitted such a statement weekly. After 7 December the suspected aliens were rounded up and interned, the Japanese consul and his 200 agents were put out of business and all necessary steps were taken to monitor both telephone and radio communication, all of which might have been done without stirring up the civilian population or the Japanese prior to 7 December 1941.

1. General: The preceding chapter has dealt

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
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primarily with Hawaii and the actions of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian Department. It has to some degree and to a lesser extent, by reason of the chronological sequence, dealt with what was done in Washington both with respect to the internal activities in Washington and what Washington sent to Short. This chapter, therefore, will be devoted primarily to the activities in Washington and only secondarily in Hawaii.

2. War Council: The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, has discussed the activities of the group in the War Department known as the War Council. He also described the group consisting of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Navy, Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, who were also called colloquially the "War Council." The third group was that which included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and occasionally Commanding General, Air Force, General Arnold.

All three of these bodies were informal and constituted simply a group of men exchanging ideas and attempting to determine policies without regularity of record of what they did, as far as this Board has been able to determine. It was a sort of clearing house for information, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time also somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the group.

3. Secretary of State: The responsibility apparently assumed by the Secretary of State (and we have no other proof that anyone else assumed the responsibility finally and definitely) was to determine when the United States would reach the impasse with Japan. It was the Secretary of State who was in charge of the negotiations with the Japanese; it was the Secretary of State who had long and numerous conferences with the Japanese. He was the contact man and the responsible negotiator.

He was doubtless aware of the fact that no action taken by him should be tantamount to a declaration of war. That responsibility rests with Congress. It is important to observe that the President of the United States had been very careful, according to the testimony of the Secretary of War, to be sure that the United States did nothing that could be considered an overt act or an act of war against the Japanese.

For, as Mr. Stimson testified in the phrasing of the message of 27 November, he was particularly concerned with so phrasing it so as to carry out the President's directive which was in accordance with our constitutional method of doing business. Mr. Stimson said:

"I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally would do: to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts." (R. 4057)

Mr. Stimson was referring to the status of the negotiations of the previous day on 26 November, when the Ten Points were handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese, and to the fact that the President, as of the 27th of November, 1941, was still desirous that no overt act be committed by the United States.

With this clear understanding, let us see how these serious responsibilities were discharged: In making this statement we are deeply sympathetic with the state of mind, the irritation, the exasperation, the chicanery, trickery and deception of the Japanese ambassadors with whom the Secretary of State had so long and manfully struggled. What he did was human, but the results are the things with which we are concerned.

Undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been frequently advised through the meetings of the War Council of the inadequate status of the defenses of the United States. Our Army and Navy were not ready for war, and undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been fully advised of that fact. So serious was this situation that General Marshall and Admiral Stark drafted a joint memorandum under date of 27 November on this subject.

This memorandum was addressed directly to the President, according to the testimony of General Marshall. It contained two things: first, a statement that the most essential thing then from the United States viewpoint was to gain time and to avoid precipitating military action so long as this could be done consistent with the National Policy because of the fact that the Army and Navy were not ready for war; and second, attention was called to the desirability of counter military action against Japan in event she engaged in specific acts of aggression (described in the memorandum). The memorandum then recommended among other things that "steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of warnings to the Japanese against taking such aggressive action." (R. 9-10-11) The situation was delicate.

Now let us turn back to Mr. Stimson's testimony. The War Council met with Mr. Hull on the 25th of November 1941. The tentative U. S. proposals to the Japanese were so drastic and harsh that Mr. Stimson testifies that when he read it his diary shows this was his contemporaneous impression of it:

"Hull showed me the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, secured it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic."

Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to this government, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues:

"We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall."

Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty.

Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the White House. His diary describes it:

"Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem."

Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and the entire matter was left for further consideration.

On the following day, 26 November 1941, the Stimson diary continues:

"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that he had no other proposal at all."

Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the "Three Months' Truce."

Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the "Ten Points" which they took as an ultimatum.

It was the document that touched the button that started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it.

Again Mr. Stimson's diary relates "The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it." (R. 4051-2-3)

Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised by the Secretary of State that he had handed this so-called ultimatum to the Japanese. The diary of the Secretary of War and his actions indicate that to be a fact.

Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November 1941:

"The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.'"

His diary continues:

"I then called up the President and talked with him about it."

He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General Marshall, which became radio No. 472. Also, as he says, "A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of need for further time was discussed." (R. 4054)

The advice from the Army and Navy to delay matters and get more time for defense preparations and not precipitate the issue evidently did not reach the President or the Secretary of State in time to be considered before the memorandum of the 26th was delivered to the Japanese. It seems well established that the sending of this "Ten Point" memorandum by the Secretary of State was used by the Japanese as the signal for starting the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attacking force departed from Tanaka Bay on the 27-28 November for its attack on Hawaii. It also appears that the delivery of the 14-point reply of the Japanese to this memorandum was contemporaneous with the attack.

4. War Department: The intentions of the War Department not to precipitate war, as far as the War Department was concerned, are clear and unmistakable. The messages sent to the Hawaiian Department show this to be a fact. The Navy apparently had the same idea

because many of their messages likewise so indicate the situation and the Hawaiian Department was given the benefit of those messages.

To be concrete: the Navy message of 16 October concluded with the sentence, "In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose previous intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan"; the message of 24 November from the Navy Department to Hawaii said in conclusion: "Inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation nor precipitate Japanese action"; the message of 27 November, No. 472 from the Chief of Staff to General Short says, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act . . . these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population nor disclose intent"; the message from G-2 on the same day warns against an incident with the Japanese population by saying, "Axis sabotage and espionage probable." All this had an effect upon Short because his reply to the message of the 27th was "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy."

In order to prevent an untoward action by Short the message of the 27th as originally drafted started with the opening words, "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated" (R. 4270) were changed by the Secretary of War after consultation with the Secretary of State to the softer caution contained in the Stimson-drafted sentences: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue Japanese future action unpredictable. Hostile action possible at any moment." Then followed the caution not to commit the first overt act.

In continuing on beyond 27 November, was the message from G-2 on 28 November, No. 484, sent by General Arnold which was devoted to sabotage and defensive measures. On the same day the War Department sent message No. 482 to Short with similar tone and tenor. Short replied to No. 482 on the 28th with a very long message all dealing with sabotage and espionage. This ends the communications with Short by the Army until the final message of 7 December, which arrived too late.

Short was never informed of the Secretary of State's action in delivering the "Ten Points" counter proposals. He testified he first saw or heard of that document after the White Papers were published. General Short said, "I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out."

The message of 27 November did not convey to Short what it was meant to convey by the people who drafted it. While confusing, it contained information and instructions the significance of which should have been appreciated by Short and his staff.

The two Navy messages of 16 and 24 October, both of which cautioned against precipitation of an incident, could have added to Short's confusion in interpreting the message.

The impression that the avoidance of war was paramount was heightened by the messages immediately following the one of the 27th. In the first place, Short had no reaction from the War Department to his reply that he was acting only to prevent sabotage and to keep contact with the Navy. He felt confirmed in this action by the message on the 27th, from G-2, saying, "Actions of sabotage and espionage probable." Immediately following that the next day were two additional messages dealing with sabotage and espionage.

From that time on, 28 November, until the message that was received after the attack, Short received no other word by courier, letter, radio, or otherwise. The only claim that he received any additional information was that he was told of messages of 3, 4, and 6 December, about the Japanese destroying their codes and the Navy being instructed to destroy some of its codes. Short denies receiving this information.

These acts of omission and commission on the part of the War Department undoubtedly played their part in the failure to put the Hawaiian Department in a proper state of defense.

The record shows that from informers and other sources the War Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese intentions. Information of the evident Japanese intention to go to war in the very near future was well known to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question of fact; it was only a question of time. The next few days would see the end of peace and the beginning of war.

If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was a responsibility of the War Department to give orders to Short what to do, and tell him to go on an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert.

As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of 6 December reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock the evening of 6 December, it was placed in the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen. Smith, with a warning

from Colonel Bratton, Chief of Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a vitally important message. In fact the message implied war and soon. Whatever was the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not conveying this message to General Marshall on the night of 6 December, it was an unfortunate one. And further, with the top War Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of this situation, standing operating procedure should have required delivery of this vital information to General Marshall at once. He, himself, was responsible for the organization and operation of his own immediate office.

This information could have been sent to Short on the afternoon (Honolulu time) of 6 December. Additionally, this same information was given to General Gerow's Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, and there is no evidence of action taken by that Division.

The responsibility of the War Department is clearly defined and plain. Action by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the Hawaiian Department. It was in possession of the information which was the last clear chance to use the means available to meet an attack. It had the background of the full development of the Japanese preparation for war and its probable date.

Again, the equally important and vital information of 7 December, the day of the attack, was in the possession of the War Department at 0900 on the morning of 7 December. Colonel Bratton made an immediate effort to get the Chief of Staff at that hour. It was not until nearly three hours later that any action was taken by the War Department, when time was of the greatest importance.

Under the circumstances of the clear and explicit revelation of Japanese intentions, arrangements should have been made for immediate action to further warn Hawaii and not leave the situation to be acted upon when the Chief of Staff could not immediately be reached. The responsibility is the Chief of Staff's for not providing an arrangement by which another could act in so critical a situation when he could not readily be reached.

Strange as it may appear, the War Department did not know the actual state of readiness of Short's command from 27 November to 7 December 1941, though this information was contained in Short's report of action taken on 27 November.

5. Conflict between the Army and Navy Messages: The practice of having General Short secure through the Navy in Hawaii copies of the naval messages tended towards confusion. We have taken occasion to compare the messages of the Navy and the messages of the Army delivered to General Short from 16 October to 7 December. We find:

a. That they were conflicting.
b. That the Navy messages were predominant with warnings of a conflict and the Army messages predominant with the idea of avoiding a conflict and taking precautions against sabotage and espionage. Short naturally took his choice between the two types of messages and followed that of the War Department. Examination of the Navy messages of 16, 24, October, 27 November, 3, 4, and 6 December will show that their tenor was predominantly war. One Army message of 27 November and two of 28 November predominated in antisabotage warnings.

Furthermore, the Navy message of 27 November and the Army message of 27 November from the Chief of Staff were conflicting: the Navy message flatly stated, "This is a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended." Now, contrast the opening sentences of the Army message which indicates that negotiations may still continue, where it says: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes. Only barest possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue."

The Navy message contained no warning to Hawaii to take precautions against sabotage or overt acts, and no precautions as to the civilian population. To the contrary, the Army message gave explicit directions on this subject. This was followed on the same day by a G-2 message, which said, "It appears that the conference of the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable." The Navy war warning was further diluted in its effect upon Short by the Arnold-AG sabotage message on the 28th of November; and the additional G-2 message on sabotage on the 28th. These 28 November sabotage messages undoubtedly influenced Short to continue on his sabotage alert.

Thereafter Short had only silence from Washington. Short was given no further clarification of this conflict amongst the messages.

There is no explanation why Short was not told of the so-called ultimatum. It was known to the Japanese because it was handed to them.

6. Military Intelligence Division. Within the scope of its activities, this division performed well. It gathered much valuable and vital data. Through Colonel Bratton it insisted on the dissemination of this information to Field Commanders.

There was a broad field for investigation, however, which was not touched by it or any intelligence agency of the American Government, either military or civil. In this field

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were the mandated islands, the home land and the home waters of the Japanese empire, and the areas in which the Japanese Navy and Army were operating.

In these fields, reliance was placed upon sources of information which were inadequate. The Japanese Navy was lost to us for considerable periods in those months prior to the outbreak of war. The task force which made the attack on 7 December 1941, left home ports, assembled at Takan Bay, and notwithstanding that it was a relatively large convoy, sailed for thousands of miles without being discovered. Part of its aircraft was in flight for the targets at Pearl Harbor and on Oahu before we knew of its existence. Its detection was primarily a naval job, but obviously the army was intensely interested. Elsewhere in this report, the mass of detailed information which the Japanese had assembled relating to American activities has been discussed and is not repeated here.

Discussing this subject before the Board, General Miles, G-2 in 1941, testified as follows:

"But to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and knew where it was going. That was beyond our terms of efficiency." (R. 107)

The disadvantages accruing from this situation could have been calamitous. The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them. This was a problem of all our Intelligence agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world affairs.

We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Our intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M.I.D. It is a national problem.

In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these.

7. War Plans Division: The War Plans Division, the supervising agency for the War Department for Overseas Departments, was charged with directing the preparation of and coordinating the war plans for Hawaii. It had the responsibility and duty to insure the implementing of such plans.

Aside from the letters and telegrams sent throughout 1941 to General Short (and there were no letters from General Marshall to General Short after the first of November 1941,) no action after 1 November 1941, appears to have been taken by way of communications or inspections, or full report of any sort, to reveal whether General Short was doing anything, whether he was doing it correctly, what his problems were, and what help could have been given him.

The War Plans Division took no action when Short put the Alert Number 1 into operation and so reported. It took no steps to stop the use of the Hawaiian Department as a training station and put it on a combat basis, such as an outpost should have been, with threatened war. It took no steps to find out if the Hawaiian defenses were being implemented and built according to schedule and the right priorities. It took no steps to put the control of the building of its defenses on the Department Commander so that he could coordinate the building of defenses with his other defense preparations.

General Gerow's own testimony clearly pictures the lack of organization and management of the War Plans Division of the Overseas Departments, such as the Hawaiian Department. The War Plans Division was responsible for the Overseas Department, said General Gerow. (R. 4334-4335) The War Plans Division was familiar with the equipment situation in Hawaii, such as lack of parts for radar. (R. 3425) It was their duty to do all they could to correct the deficiencies but there is no proof that any action was taken. (R. 4325-4326) The War Plans Division was responsible for drafting the operational messages to the Hawaiian Department. Gerow was responsible for drafting the message of the 27th and managed the drafting and final sending of that message. He admitted that he failed to follow up to see if the message of the 27th was being carried out and that was the War Plans Division's responsibility. He said:

"Admiral Standley. Then who would have been interested in following up that message to see whether those instructions were obeyed or not?"

"General Gerow. The War Plans Division, Sir, should have been—"

"Admiral Standley. War Plans Division. General Gerow. Should have been responsible for following it up, sir."

"Admiral Standley. That was not done then?"

"General Gerow. No, sir, it was not."

"Admiral Standley. Then those instructions went by the board; nobody followed

them up, then?"

"General Gerow. That is correct, sir; that is, between the 27th and the 7th." (Roberts Report 1857-1858)

And he again admitted that he made an error in not realizing that the reply of Short, which referred to Message No. 472 by number, referred to that message. He thought it referred to a G-2 message. (Roberts Report 1857-1858)

He also testified as follows:

"General Grunert. Without such coordination, there was liable to be confusion and misunderstanding as to the intent of each one of the messages. Was that the War Plans Division? Was it the Chief of Staff?"

"General Gerow. It was done, usually, General, I believe by a matter of getting concurrence between the various divisions of the General Staff, on something that was going to be sent out." (R. 4336)

"General Gerow. The coordination of concurrences, and then most of these important messages, I believe, went through the Secretary of the General Staff."

"General Grunert. Then it appears to be the Secretary of the General Staff?"

"General Gerow. No."

"General Grunert. It appears you do not know just who does it, do you?"

"General Gerow. Well, no, sir." (R. 4337)

He testified that it was not his particular duty in 1941 to coordinate all messages of the War Department that went to our overseas possessions. (R. 4338)

Therefore the War Plans Division under General Gerow failed as follows:

a. General Gerow failed to take action on Short's reply showing that he was taking precautions against sabotage only. He again failed to take action in that he assumed liaison with the Navy meant Short was taking the correct steps. The documents in the War Plans Division show that the Navy's responsibilities did not start until war was imminent or had taken place and that some formal action by Washington or the Hawaiian Department putting the agreements into effect was necessary.

b. He was responsible for drafting the confusing message of 27 November.

c. He took no steps to deliver to Short additional available information. As Gerow testified as to Short's reactions to the message of the 27th: "No one knows what he would have done had he been in that position and not having perhaps all information we had here." (R. 1851)

d. He did not check on the Hawaiian Department's activities to determine its state of readiness from 28 November through 7 December. (R. 4306)

e. He relied upon the message of 27 November to give Short all the information he needed for full preparation for war, but did not check to find out if that was a fact. (R. 4256)

f. The Joint air estimate of General Martin and Admiral Bellinger under the Joint agreement of General Short and Admiral Bloch as approved by Admiral Kimmel, stated that air attack was the prime threat against Hawaii; and when General Gerow was advised in a conference with the Secretary of War and the report to the Secretary of War from the Secretary of State, in addition to the intelligence information with which he was provided as to the status of the international situation, it was incumbent upon him to do two things which he failed to do:

(1) To correct Short's mistake in going to Alert Number 1 instead of to Alerts Number 2 or 3; and

(2) To direct immediately the activation of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Defense Plan to put the Army in conjunction with the Navy, on a complete war footing, ready for any eventuality.

8. Navy Department: The Navy Department undertook by a signed agreement to provide long-distance reconnaissance in Hawaii. It assumed this responsibility admittedly without means of carrying it out in Hawaii.

The Navy in Hawaii failed to advise Short of the sinking of enemy submarines in the outer harbor between six and seven a.m. the morning of 7 December. The Navy failed to advise Short of the Jaluit task force so that he could evaluate the information for himself.

9. Chief of Staff: The responsibility for the conditions in the military component of the War Department as depicted in this chapter rests with the Chief of Staff.

At about this time, 25 November-7 December 1941, there seemed to have been in the War Department a firm conviction that war was imminent but also there seems to have been the conviction that it would start in the Southwest Pacific and evidently nobody had any belief that Hawaii was immediately in danger. There was the belief both in Hawaii and in Washington that war was on our doorstep but not on Hawaii's doorstep. This resulted in the main consideration being given to General MacArthur and the Philippine Islands and the resulting second consideration during this critical time to Hawaii. The unfortunate thing was that the Japanese "crossed us up" with a daring surprise attack. When the famous 27 November message was being prepared, consideration first was given to send it only to MacArthur and then it was decided to include Panama, Hawaii and the Western Defense Command. This shows the trend.

As a result of the message of 27 November

Short ordered only a sabotage alert and so reported to the War Department as of the same day. The import of Short's reply was little noticed in the War Department by either General Marshall or General Gerow. Just as General Short failed to interpret the full seriousness of the 27 November message, likewise the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division failed to interpret the limited defense that Short's reply indicated in the face of known impending war.

There was failure of understanding at both ends of the line. The Washington officials had full knowledge of impending events, which full knowledge was not available to Short.

A cardinal principle in good management is the necessity to "follow up" on directions. The War Department had nine days in which to check up on the state of defense in Hawaii, which it did not do.

Repeatedly, since General Short took command in Hawaii in February 1941, General Marshall during this peacetime had written to him at length, advising him on details of operation and here, late in November, with war expected almost daily, he communicated none of those personal messages containing needed inside information.

The evidence indicates that the manner in which authority to act was delegated or not delegated had its influence on this situation.

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Army Pearl Harbor Board (Continued from Preceding Page)

been sent, Hawaii could have been ready to have met the attack with what it had. What resulted was failure at both ends of the line. Responsibility laid both in Washington and in Hawaii. Hawaiian responsibility has been treated in Chapter III.

To summarize: insofar as the Chief of Staff is related to these events there are specific things which appear in the record with which he was personally concerned. The following are of this nature:

a. Failure to advise his Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Bryden, Arnold, and Moore, of the critical situation in the Pacific so that they might act intelligently for him in his absence.

b. Failure to keep General Short fully informed as to the international situation and the probable outbreak of war at any time.

c. The delay in getting to General Short the important information reaching Washington on the evening of 6 December and the morning of 7 December.

d. Noting without taking action the sabotage message of Short which presumptively was on his desk on the morning of 28 November 1941.

e. His admitted lack of knowledge of the condition of readiness of the Hawaiian Command during the period of 8 November to 7 December 1941.

The Board is impressed with the absolute necessity of considering the conduct of all responsible officers in the light of the situation as it existed in November and early December, 1941.

It was a case of intelligent men arriving at the best decision possible with all the facts that were before them. This is the basis for successful procedure in either military or civil affairs. In both of these fields occasional mistakes are made notwithstanding that such principles are followed. Such was the case at Pearl Harbor.

This recital is in explanation, not justification. The thinking in the War Department and the Hawaiian Department was faulty in that it emphasized probabilities to the exclusion of capabilities.

10. Summary: In summarizing the "Responsibilities in Washington" it appears that the issue between the United States and Japan was precipitated before the Army and Navy could prepare themselves to follow through on the consequences thereof and that coordination and cooperation between the State, War and Navy Departments lacked effectiveness, at least in this respect.

As to the War Department's responsibilities there was:

a. A lack of organization for war.

b. A lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the Hawaiian Department and to control its actions.

c. A lack of instructions to the Hawaiian Department based upon full knowledge of its actions and full knowledge of the international situation.

d. Failures on 26-27 November, 28 November, during the period from 28 November to 7 December, and on 6 and 7 December, to take adequate and prompt action on vital information then at hand.

These responsibilities in no way mitigate those of General Short as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. However, they do add others to the list of those responsible.

(Chapters VI and VII, conclusions and recommendations, were printed on pages 10 and 11 of the ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL of 1 Sept. 1945.)

Development of Atomic Bomb

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carried out by R. L. Doan as Laboratory Director.

6.6. We have chosen to confine this chapter to the work of 1942 because a self-sustaining chain reaction was first achieved on 2nd December of that year, at a time when the whole Chicago project was being appraised by a reviewing committee with the members particularly selected for their engineering background.* That was a dramatic coincidence and also a convenient one for purposes of this report since either incident might be considered to mark the end of an epoch at the Metallurgical Laboratory. Furthermore, in preparation for the reviewing committee's visit a comprehensive report had been prepared. That report was generally known as the "Feasibility Report" and has been used extensively in preparing this chapter.

Plan of this Chapter

6.7. In this chapter we shall present the material in the order of the objectives given above. In Part I we shall discuss progress towards the initial objectives, including (a) procurement of materials, (b) the experimental proof of the chain reaction, (c) the chemistry of plutonium and some of the problems of separation, (d) some of the types of auxiliary experiments that were performed, and finally (e) the "fast neutron" work. Nec-

*This committee was composed of W. K. Lewis, C. H. Greenewalt, T. C. Gary, and Roger Williams. E. V. Murphree was also a member but due to illness was unable to participate.

essarily the work described in detail is only a sampling of the large amount of theoretical and experimental work actually performed. In Part II we shall discuss the possibilities that were considered for production piles and separation methods, and the specific proposals made in November 1942.

Part I Progress toward the Initial Objectives Procurement of Materials

6.8. It has been made clear in earlier chapters of this report that the procurement of materials of sufficient purity was a major part of the problem. As far as uranium was concerned, it seemed likely that it would be needed in highly purified metallic form or at least as highly purified uranium oxide. The other materials which were going to be needed were either graphite, heavy water, or possibly beryllium. It was clear at this time that, however advantageous heavy water might be as a moderator, no large quantities of it would be available for months or years. Beryllium seemed less advantageous and almost as difficult to get. Therefore the procurement efforts for a moderator were centered on graphite. As has been explained in Chapter V, procurement of uranium and graphite was not primarily the responsibility of the Metallurgical Laboratory but was handled through E. V. Murphree and others on the "planning board." In fact, the obvious interest of the Metallurgical Laboratory in the problem led to continual intervention by its representatives. A great deal of the credit for the eventual success in obtaining materials is due to N. Hilberry and later R. L. Doan, always supported by A. H. Compton.

Uranium Ore

6.9. Obviously there would be no point in undertaking this whole project if it were not going to be possible to find enough uranium for producing the bombs. Early indications were favorable, and a careful survey made in November 1942 showed that immediate delivery could be made of adequate tonnages of uranium ores.

Uranium Oxide and Uranium Metal

6.10. At the end of 1941 the only uranium metal in existence was a few grams of good material made on an experimental basis by the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company and others and a few pounds of highly impure pyrophoric powder made by Metal Hydrides Company. The only considerable amount of raw material then available in this country was in the form of a commercial grade of black uranium oxide, which could be obtained in limited quantities from the Canadian Radium and Uranium Co. It contained 2 to 5 per cent of impurities and was the material which gave a neutron multiplication factor of only about 0.87 when used in an exponential pile.

6.11. By May 1942, deliveries averaging 15 tons a month of black oxide of higher purity and more uniform grade started coming in. Total impurities were less than 1 per cent, boron comprised a few parts per million, and the neutron multiplication factor (k) was about 0.98. (It is to be remembered that the multiplication factor depends also on the purity of the graphite.) Deliveries of this material reached a ton a day in September 1942.

6.12. Experiments at the National Bureau of Standards by J. I. Hoffman demonstrated that, by the use of an ether extraction method, all the impurities are removed by a single extraction of uranyl nitrate. The use of this method removed the great bulk of the difficulties in securing pure oxide and pure materials for the production of metal. Early in May 1942, arrangements were completed with the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works in St. Louis to put the new grade of oxide through an ether extraction process on a production basis for a further reduction in impurity content and to deliver the final product as brown dioxide. Deliveries started in July 1942 at a rate of 30 tons a month. This oxide is now used as a starting point for all metal production, and no higher degree of purity can be expected on a commercial scale. In fact, it was a remarkable achievement to have developed and put into production on a scale of the order of one ton per day a process for transforming grossly impure commercial oxide to oxide of a degree of purity seldom achieved even on a laboratory scale.

6.13. The process which Westinghouse had been using to produce the metal was the electrolysis of KUF₄ at a cost of about \$1,000 a pound. Since the KUF₄ was produced photochemically under the action of sunlight this method constituted a potential bottleneck in production. It was found that uranium tetrafluoride could be used instead of KUF₄, and steps were taken to have this salt produced at the Harshaw Chemical Company in Cleveland and at the du Pont plant in Penns Grove, New Jersey. Production started in August 1942 and by October 1942 was up to 700 pounds per day at Harshaw and 300 pounds per day at du Pont, the method of manufacture in both cases being the hydrofluorination of Mallinckrodt-purified dioxide.

6.14. As the result of this supply of raw materials to Westinghouse, and as a result of plant expansion, deliveries from Westinghouse had accumulated to a total of more than 6,000 pounds by November 1942 and were expected to be at the rate of 500 pounds per day by January 1943. The purity of the metal was good, and the cost had dropped to \$22

per pound.

6.15. Deliveries of acceptable metal from Metal Hydrides Co. were delayed for various reasons and were just beginning in November 1942. This company's production was supposed to reach a thousand pounds per week thereafter.

6.16. Neither the Westinghouse process nor the Metal Hydrides Process was entirely satisfactory. Intensive activity designed to accelerate metal production, and carried out independently by F. H. Spedding and his associates at Iowa State College at Ames, Iowa, and by C. J. Rodden at the National Bureau of Standards, resulted in the development of a satisfactory method. Production facilities were set up at Ames in the fall of 1942 and had already produced more than one ton by the end of November. The process was extremely simple, rapid and low cost.

6.17. Further research indicated additional changes that could be made to advantage, and by the middle of 1943 Spedding at Iowa and other producers who entered the picture were using the final production method adopted.

6.18. By the end of 1942 arrangements had been made by the Manhattan District to increase metal production by making greater use of the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, the Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, and the du Pont Company.

6.19. To summarize, almost no metal was available during most of 1942, a fact that seriously delayed progress as we shall see, but the production problems had been nearly solved by the end of 1942 and some 6 tons of metal were incorporated in the pile built in November 1942. The whole problem of procurement of metal was taken over by the Manhattan District at the end of the year, under the general direction of Colonel Ruhoff, formerly with the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. From the point of view of the Metallurgical Project no further serious delays or difficulties have occurred because of metal shortages.

Graphite Procurement

6.20. At the beginning of 1942 graphite production was still unsatisfactory but it was, of course, in quite a different condition from the metal production since the industrial production of graphite had already been very large. The problem was merely one of purity and priority. Largely through the efforts of N. Hilberry, the National Carbon Company and the Speer Carbon Company were both drawn into the picture. Following suggestions made by the experts of the National Bureau of Standards, these companies were able to produce highly purified graphite with a neutron absorption some 20 per cent less than the standard commercial materials previously used. Although efforts further to reduce the impurities have had some success, the purity problem was essentially solved by the middle of 1942 and large orders were placed with the cooperation of the War Production Board. As in the case of the metal, the graphite procurement problem was taken over by the Manhattan District.

The Chain Reaction

Further Intermediate Experiments

6.21. At the time that the Metallurgical Project was organized, most of the physicists familiar with the problem believed that a chain-reacting pile probably could be built if sufficiently pure graphite and pure uranium metal could be obtained. Enough work had been done on resonance absorption, on the theory of absorption and diffusion of neutrons in a pile, and on intermediate experiments to make it possible to design a lattice structure that had a very good chance of maintaining a chain reaction. Nevertheless, there were uncertainties in the experimental data and in the approximations that had to be made in the theoretical calculations. There were two alternatives: (1) to build a pile according to the best possible design; (2) to make more accurate determinations of the pertinent nuclear constants, to perform intermediate experiments, and to improve the calculations. There is little doubt that the first alternative was the one likely to lead most rapidly to the production of plutonium. There were many important questions which could have been answered more rapidly by such an operating pile than by a series of small-scale experiments. Unfortunately, the necessary amounts of materials were not available and did not become available for nearly nine months. Consequently, it was necessary to choose the second alternative, that is, to accumulate all relevant or possibly relevant information by whatever means were available.

6.22. The major line of investigation was a series of intermediate experiments. The particular set-up for each intermediate experiment could be used to test calculations based on separate auxiliary experiments. For example, the proportion of uranium oxide to graphite was varied, oxides of different purities were used, oxide was used in lumps of various sizes and shapes and degrees of compression, the lattice spacing was varied, the effect of surrounding the uranium oxide units with beryllium and with paraffin was tried, and, finally, piles of identical lattice type but of different total size were tried to see whether the values of the multiplication factor k (for infinite size) calculated from the different sets of results were identical. In general, E. Fermi had direct charge of investigations of effects of impurities, and S. K. Allison had charge of tests involving different lattice dimensions. All these experiments strengthened

the confidence of the group in the calculated value of k and in the belief that a pile could be built with k greater than unity. In July enough purified uranium oxide from Mallinckrodt was available to permit building intermediate pile No. 9. As in previous experiments, a radium-beryllium neutron source was placed at the bottom of the lattice structure and the neutron density measured along the vertical axis of the pile. By this time it was known that the neutron density decreased exponentially with increasing distance from the neutron source, (hence the name often used for experiments of this type, "exponential pile") and that, from such rates of decrease, the multiplication constant k for an infinitely large pile of the same lattice proportions could be calculated. For the first time the multiplication constant k so calculated from experimental results came out greater than one. (The actual value was 1.007.) Even before this experiment Compton predicted in his report of July 1st that a k -value somewhere between 1.04 and 1.05 could be obtained in a pile containing highly purified uranium oxide and graphite, provided that the air was removed from the pile to avoid neutron absorption by nitrogen.

An Auxiliary Experiment: Delayed Neutrons

6.23. We shall not mention a majority of the various auxiliary experiments done during this period. There was one, however,—the study of delayed neutrons—that we shall discuss because it is a good example of the kind of experiment that had to be performed and because it concerned one effect, not heretofore mentioned, that is of great importance in controlling a chain-reacting pile.

6.24. From previous investigations, some of which were already published, it was known that about 1 per cent of the neutrons emitted in fission processes were not ejected immediately but were given off in decreasing quantity over a period of time, a fact reminiscent of the emission of beta rays from short-lived radioactive substances. Several half-lives had been observed, the longest being of the order of a minute.

6.25. It was realized early that this time delay gave a sort of inertia to the chain reaction that should greatly facilitate control. If the effective multiplication factor of a pile became slightly greater than one, the neutron density would not rise to harmfully large values almost instantly but would rise gradually so that there would be a chance for controls to operate. (Other time intervals involved, such as those between collisions, are too small to be useful.)

6.26. Because of the importance of this effect of delayed neutrons for control it was decided to repeat and improve the earlier measurements. (The fact that this was a repetition rather than a new measurement is also typical of much of the work in physics at this period.) A description of the experiment is given in Appendix 3. The results indicated that 1.0 per cent of the neutrons emitted in uranium fission are delayed by at least 0.01 second and that about 0.07 per cent are delayed by as much as a minute. By designing a pile such that the effective value of k , the multiplication factor, is only 1.01 the number of delayed neutrons is sufficient to allow easy control.

The First Self-Sustaining Chain-Reacting Pile

6.27. By the fall of 1942 enough graphite, uranium oxide, and uranium metal were available at Chicago to justify an attempt to build an actual self-sustaining chain-reacting pile. But the amount of metal available was small—only about 6 tons—and other materials were none too plentiful and of varying quality. These conditions rather than optimum efficiency controlled the design.

6.28. The pile was constructed on the lattice principle with graphite as a moderator and lumps of metal or oxide as the reacting units regularly spaced through the graphite to form the lattice. Instruments situated at various points in the pile or near it indicated the neutron intensity, and movable strips of absorbing material served as controls. (For a more complete description of the pile, see Appendix 4.) Since there were bound to be some neutrons present from spontaneous fission or other sources, it was anticipated that the reaction would start as soon as the structure had reached critical size if the control strips were not set in "retard" position. Consequently, the control strips were placed in a suitable "retard" position from the start and the neutron intensity was measured frequently. This was fortunate since the approach to critical condition was found to occur at an earlier stage of assembly than had been anticipated.

6.29. The pile was first operated as a self-sustaining system on 2 December 1942. So far as we know, this was the first time that human beings ever initiated a self-maintaining nuclear chain reaction. Initially the pile was operated at a power level of one-half watt, but on 12th December the power level was raised to 200 watts.

Energy Developed by the Pile

6.30. In these experiments no direct measurements of energy release were made. The number of neutrons per second emitted by the pile was estimated in terms of the activity of standardized indium foils. Then, from a knowledge of the number of neutrons produced per fission, the resultant rate of energy

(Please turn to Next Page)

Development of Atomic Bomb (Continued from Preceding Page)

release (wattage) was calculated.

Conclusion

6.31. Evidently this experiment, performed on 2nd December just as a reviewing committee was appraising the Chicago project, answered beyond all shadow of doubt the first question before the Metallurgical Laboratory; a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction had been produced in a system using normal uranium. This experiment had been performed under the general direction of E. Fermi, assisted principally by the groups headed by W. H. Zinn and H. L. Anderson. V. C. Willson and his group had been largely responsible for developing the instruments and controls, and a great many others in the laboratory had contributed to the success of the enterprise.

Relation between Power and Production of Plutonium

6.32. The immediate object of building a uranium-graphite pile was to prove that there were conditions under which a chain reaction would occur, but the ultimate objective of the laboratory was to produce plutonium by a chain reaction. Therefore we are interested in the relation between the power at which a pile operates and the rate at which it produces plutonium. The relation may be evaluated to a first approximation rather easily. A pile running stably must be producing as many neutrons as it is losing. For every thermal neutron absorbed in U-235 a certain number of neutrons, η , is emitted. One of these neutrons is required to maintain the chain. Therefore, assuming the extra neutrons all are absorbed by U-238 to form plutonium, there will be $\eta - 1$ atoms of Pu²³⁹ formed for every fission. Every fission releases roughly 200 Mev of energy. Therefore the formation of $\eta - 1$ atoms of plutonium accompanies the release of about 200 Mev. Since $\eta - 1$ is a small number, we can guess that to produce a kilogram a day of plutonium a chain-reacting pile must be releasing energy at the rate of 500,000 to 1,500,000 kilowatts. The first chain-reacting pile that we have just described operated at a maximum of 200 watts. Assuming that a single bomb will require the order of one to 100 kilograms of plutonium, the pile that has been described would have to be kept going at least 70,000 years to produce a single bomb. Evidently the problem of quantity production of plutonium was not yet solved.

The Chemistry of Plutonium

6.33. The second specific objective of the Metallurgical Laboratory was to show that, if a chain reaction did occur, it would be feasible to separate the plutonium chemically from the other material with which it is found. Progress towards this objective was

necessarily slower than toward the attainment of a chain reaction. Initially little was done at the Metallurgical Laboratory on chemical problems although the extraction problem was discussed in a conference soon after the project was organized and the work of Seaborg's group at the University of California on plutonium was encouraged. On 22-23 April, 1942, a general conference on chemistry was held at Chicago, attended by F. H. Spedding, E. W. Thiele, G. T. Seaborg, J. W. Kennedy, H. C. Urey, E. Wigner, N. Hilberry, G. E. Boyd, I. B. Johns, H. A. Wilhelm, I. Perlman, A. C. Wahl, and J. A. Wheeler. Spedding, in opening the meeting, pointed out that there were two main tasks for the chemists: first, to separate plutonium in the amounts and purity required for war purposes; second, to obtain a good understanding of the chemistry necessary for the construction and maintenance of the pile. The separation problem was to be studied by a new group at Chicago under the direction of Seaborg, by Johns and Wilhelm at Ames, and by Wahl and Kennedy continuing the work at California. Other closely related groups at Chicago were to be C. D. Coryell's, working on the fission products, and Boyd's on analytical problems. The chemistry group at Chicago has grown speedily since that time. A new building had to be constructed to house it late in 1942, and this building was enlarged subsequently. Altogether, the solving of many of the chemical problems has been one of the most remarkable achievements of the Metallurgical Laboratory.

6.34. The first isotope of plutonium discovered and studied was not the 239 isotope but the 238 isotope, which is an alpha-ray emitter with a half-life of about 50 years. U-238 bombarded with deuterons gives ²³⁸Np which disintegrates to ²³⁸Pu by beta emission. The first evidence of the actual existence of these new elements, (ruling out the original erroneous interpretation of the splitting of uranium as evidence for their existence) was obtained by E. McMillan and P. H. Abelson who isolated 93-238 from uranium bombarded with deuterons in the Berkeley cyclotron. This new element was identified as a beta emitter but the sample was too small for isolation of the daughter product 94-238. Later enough Pu-238 was prepared to permit Seaborg, Kennedy and Wahl to begin the study of its chemical properties in the winter of 1940-1941 by using tracer chemistry with carriers according to practice usual in radiochemistry. By such studies many chemical properties of plutonium were determined, and several possible chemical processes were evolved by which Pu-239 might be removed from the chain-reacting pile. The success of experiments on a tracer scale led to plans

(Please turn to Page 115)

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OR TIPPED

THE CIGARETTE WITH QUALITY TO BURN!

Victory With MacArthur

(Continued from First Page)

only a few highlights of the interview. MacArthur knows what he wants for them, for America, and he hopes and prays with millions of others that the sacrifices made by the flower of our youth will not have been in vain.

His memory is remarkable. His eloquent use of the English language, his diction, his own presentation of what he tries to bring home to his listener can be matched with the best I have ever read or heard.

When he talks about war and the suffering that it brought about, you detect a sad emotion. You notice when he talks of the enemy that his expression becomes grim and resolute. It is the only time he resorts to rough language. He knows what Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Corregidor and Ste. Tomas meant to America, and as I sat there I realized what it meant to MacArthur himself.

While, as may be expected, he discusses the important strategy of the war with equal brilliance as concerns Army, Navy or Air Corps activities, it was refreshing to see that he was not only equally well posted but also something of an expert on the economic, political, international and cultural consequences of the war. He sees with great clarity what is needed in addition to the United Nations Charter to make peace an everlasting one, with a powerful strong and free America guaranteeing that our generation will return to its own form of living and pursuit of happiness.

As he perused my report my eyes strayed round the walls and rested on a framed inscription. Reading it I was struck by the key it gave me to the General's life and actions—I took out my pen and wrote them down, as MacArthur read on.

"I do the best I know how, the very best I can and I mean to keep on doing so until the end. If the end brings me out alright what is said against me won't amount to anything; if it brings me out wrong, all the angels swearing that I was right would make no difference.

Abraham Lincoln."

I had taken down these words, which I hope I have rendered correctly, without knowing that the General had observed me. Looking up, he said, "I noticed that you were copying Mr. Lincoln's words. I shall remember them always for they give me courage, and often in dark hours I look to that wall and feel comforted."

I wanted to say how much I wished some of those who had hampered and detracted from the General could be there to hear him speak. His patience and courage during the years of side-tracked discouragement were very like the black war-days of '61-'64 when Lincoln fought back-biters and Copperheads to his own immortal glory.

Inevitably also, I thought of General Pershing, old "Black Jack," resisting with all his might the inclusion of the young AEF under any but an American Commander. His insistence on an integrated American force was fully justified by the triumph of our arms, just as MacArthur's embracing courage and brilliant conviction forced recognition of the cause of the Philippines as our necessary springboard to victory in the Pacific. Opposition, neglect, apathy, none of these stayed him.

My thoughts turned to the words of Lt. General Robert L. Elcheberger as I heard them a few weeks ago at his Eighth Army Headquarters. The man who led the assault on Bona and Blak, and hurled the Eighth Army like an avenging bolt through the Visayas and Mindanao, had said to me:

"His military achievements are triumphs of courage and ability over limited materials. It was General MacArthur who insisted that the Philippines must be taken as rapidly as possible to divide the Jap Empire, re-establish our prestige in the East, and most important, provide a base for the concentration of overwhelming force for the final blows against Japan. Not only did his great heart go out to the people, but he knew that without the Philippines we would have no comparable place where the

great supply bases and staging areas, so necessary for our concluding campaign, might be built. So unshakable and so firm was his conviction that this would shorten the war that he had to express his willingness to advance with what was already available, or not advance at all. His brilliant leadership, statesmanship and strategy were merely the superb tools which he used unsparringly."

"His real claim to greatness in history," concluded General Elcheberger, "lies in the strength of his conviction of the soundness of his daring concept, and in his unparalleled moral courage in beating down all obstacles through years of scarcity, meager troop support, frustration and criticism."

Typical of the loyalty and esteem in which he is held by his able leaders is the statement made to me by Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, jr., logistical and tactical genius, some time ago. "Klein," he said, "I hope and pray that MacArthur will be our Commander-in-Chief. He is the only man whom we can follow with confidence wherever he goes—the only man, moreover, whose concern for the success of his mission is touched by his consideration for the safety of his men. He will do great things at a minimum cost."

At the other end of the ladder was the G.I. whom I passed on the way back to my tent. His heavy pack seemed to hang from his shoulders as lightly as a cloud, and a smile was on his face. I asked, "Soldier, why so happy?" "Colonel," he said, "I'm off to Uncle Sugar." "Whom were you with?" I inquired. "Why, I was with MacArthur, Colonel!"

And that will be their proudest boast, until the last soldier of World War II has heard the notes of taps. "We fought with MacArthur" they will say, just as their forefathers used to boast that they were with Lee, with Grant at Richmond, with Washington at Valley Forge.

There was another inscription on the wall—an essay on youth written by a close friend of the General's, to which he directed my attention. It read, in part:

"Youth is not a time of life—it is a state of mind....nobody grows old by merely living a number of years; people grow old only by deserting their ideals. Years wrinkle the skin, but to give up enthusiasm wrinkles the soul. Worry, doubt, self-distrust, fear and despair—these are the long, long years that bow the head and turn the growing spirit back to dust.... You are as young as your faith, as old as your doubt, as young as your self-confidence, as old as your fear, as young as your hope, as old as your despair."

It explained the erectness of his carriage, the firmness of his handshake, and the stamina that makes his youthful secretaries and staff officers gasp in wonderment.

This insight is carried into the selection of his able lieutenants—the iron-willed Sutherland, Blamey, the swash-buckling Australian; Kenney, daring and forceful; Krueger, a general's general, cool and calculating; Elcheberger, brilliant tactician, fearless and intrepid; Richardson, a logistical and tactical genius, wise, farseeing and intensely loyal.

Bataan is more than just an historic battleground to MacArthur. His love for that sacred spot goes deeper than his personal devotion for the heroes that lie there in glory. For him whose intense patriotism knows no equal it stood as a bastion of democracy, of freedom, and of human decency, a symbol of the American way of life. It had fallen only after every last ounce of energy had been expended, only after every sacrifice had been made, only after such a courage as the world had never known had been displayed. Its fall was a blow to the dignity of man, a treacherous stab at the heart of humanity, a thrust at his beloved country that had to be avenged. And so in the shining hour of Victory, when General MacArthur as Supreme Allied Commander directed the Japanese Emperor to send his emissaries to Manila to accept the surrender terms, he erased forever that blot upon America's history by demanding that on approaching the city they flash the symbolic identification signal—"Bataan."

The conversation swung into easier channels. One is held spellbound by the eloquence of MacArthur. His keen eyes, calm dignity and extraordinary command of speech makes one feel that his presence is not only that of a great mili-

tary leader but of a great scholar and teacher. One might think that a man in his position would be all-engrossed in the immediate task at hand—in maps and charts and figures—but his thoughts rise far above and beyond all these. Free from all illusions, he is alive to all the economic, political, and cultural consequences of war, and to the need for a free and powerful America which will guarantee future generations the right to live in peace and to devote their energies towards the benefit of man and the glory of God. A diplomat to the core, his phenomenal memory reaches out to each unit and individual under his command. He spoke with feeling of the citizen-soldier, that unique product of our democracy. These national guard units have fought long and well, often under the most difficult conditions. The general was especially pleased with the 33rd Division whose gallant action at Bagnio was highly regarded. My heart welled with pride at this, and at my own memories of my old outfit.

As we returned to our chairs my reporter's curiosity got the upper hand and I couldn't help asking a few questions. "General," I said, "I have read many speculations as to what you will do after the war is over. What really are your plans?" He smiled at this. "Klein, I'm going to get myself a great big rocker and put it on my porch before a small, beautiful garden where I can finally spend life as the average American husband with his family in peace and contentment—that is, if the Nips don't get me first."

I remarked that I doubted the American people would let him do that, but he waved the thought aside. "Why think of it now. There is so much to do and like every other G. I. my thoughts are of home and rest. I want my rocking chair, my garden and my family to look after."

I glanced at my watch and was amazed to find that more than two hours had elapsed since I had reported to him. From the moment I had saluted him he had put me at perfect ease and the time had slipped by without my knowledge. I apologized for taking up so much of the General's time, but in his smile I read that he had welcomed the relaxation. I asked him permission to leave, and he rose and with a firm handshake escorted me to the door like a neighbor and a good friend.

My colleagues among professional newsmen have told me he seldom makes radio broadcasts, has held few press conferences and when he does see the press, individually or in small groups, it is at their request and not his. The American people have demanded that copy be made of their hero. History has not made him, he has made history.

It was after eight when I left, but several staff officers were still on hand waiting to see him. I repeated my apology to General Fellers, Military Secretary of the CinC, and asked him when the General ever got time to eat. He smiled and told me that he never got through before nine, and then never left without taking papers to his quarters, yet he was always at his desk by 0800. During campaigns, he catches a nap at odd hours whenever he can. "We youngsters (General Fellers is a little over 40) have a tough time keeping up with him, but his vitality and personal consideration inspire us to work twice as hard for him," he said.

It was dark when I entered the bomb shattered streets of Manila. An endless stream of trucks rolled by bearing supplies for the front. Thousands of cranes and winches strained at their task of unloading cargo from the myriad of ships that dotted the harbor. Everywhere was the scene of antlike activity. My thoughts turned to the "main streets" of America and I thanked God that they had been spared the horrors of war.

Whatever the peace will bring there are men whose passage through time is marked with meteoric brilliance. Such men are history. Many days have passed since the interview which gave birth to this story. Were they years, they could never eradicate the memory of the emotions it roused, nor that swift fulfillment of the General's words of prophecy. His slogans, "I shall return!" and "On to Tokyo" were words made living truth.

He has ever kept his faith with America and with God; let faith be kept with him.

The Locators

(Army—Address: The Locators, P. O. Box 537, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.)

THE Locators have requests for the addresses of the following army officers' wives. We should appreciate your sending any you know to Box 537, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Mrs. Jewel Alexander (Florence), Lt. Col. MC; Mrs. Elijah G. Arnold (Mildred), Col. Inf.; Rose Bullard Bullinger, daughter of Gen. R. E. L. Bullard; Mrs. Theodore Bogart (Eleanor), Col.; Mrs. W. H. Brunke (Helen), Col.; Mrs. John C. McCormack, daughter of Col. Charles Ferrin; Mrs. Donald E. Hardy (Betty Kerr), Lt. AC; Mrs. Herbert D. Johnston (Betty), Capt., AC; Mrs. William Otto Payne, Jr. (Marty), Lt., AC; Mrs. John Pugh (Louise), Col., Cav.; Mrs. B. C. Rose (Irene), Col., AC, West Point '27; Mrs. Frank Sharpless (Zola), Col.; Mrs. Floyd P. Swails (Maudie), Maj., FA.

Awards and Decorations

Medal of Honor

Capt. James M. Burt, Armored Regt.—Directed fire of combined tanks and infantry and by his intrepidity in action caused the victory which closed the Aachen Gap.

1st Lt. Turney W. Leonard, TD Platoon—Wounded for three days led his command in a pitched battle in which 6 German tanks were destroyed.

T.Sgt. Nicholas Cresko, Inf.—Although suffering a serious hip wound faced the direct fire of enemy weapons with courage and intrepidity.

S.Sgt. John C. Sjogren, Inf.—Single-handedly rushed and slaughtered waiting Japanese and with his bare hands wrenched a spitting machine-gun from the firing slot of a pill-box.

Sgt. Christos H. Karaberis, Inf.—Charged into the fire of five German machine-guns and eliminated them from a ridge his company had been assigned to capture.

Distinguished Service Cross

Col. S. C. Wotten, Inf., in the capture of Steyr, Austria.

T.Sgt. C. T. Borelli—Assault against enemy attacks near Lampaden.

*Pfc. E. J. Proccacini, Inf.

Navy Cross

Lt. Col. Justin M. Chambers, USMC, Command of an assault battalion on Iwo Jima.

Distinguished Service Medal

Maj. Gen. T. E. Watson, USMC (GS), Vice Adm. J. B. Oldendorf, USN, Maj. Gen. L. D. Gasser, (OLC), Maj. Gen. R. R. Allen, USA, Maj. Gen. Clift Andrus, USA, Maj. Gen. H. E. Dager, USA, Maj. Gen. E. F. Reinhardt, USA, Brig. Gen. D. E. Carleton, USA, Brig. Gen. J. W. Coffey, USA, Brig. Gen. W. H. Maris, USA, Brig. Gen. Urban Niblo, USA, Col. T. A. Lane, CE, Col. E. J. O'Neill, Inf., and Col. W. C. Chanler.

Legion of Merit

R. Adm. R. W. Hayler, USN, Maj. Gen. H. F. Kramer, USA, Capt. Lebbens Curtis, USNR, GS; Capt. P. D. Gold, USN, Capt. J. B. Goode, USN, Capt. G. A. McLean, USN, Capt. K. W. Palmer, USN, Capt. C. W. Wieber, USN, Comdr. E. W. Yancey, USN, Brig. Gen. C. E. Brown, USA, Maj. Gen. L. D. Gasser, Col. W. C. Chanler, Brig. Gen. M. R. Nelson, AAF, Col. W. E. Shallene, USA, Brig. Gen. R. C. Hefebower, USA, Col. O. A. Eastwood, CWS, Col. A. H. Schwichtenberg, MC, Lt. Col. G. H. Krieger, GSC, Lt. Col. S. I. Parker, Inf., Col. William Campbell, AAF (OLC), Col. T. J. DuBose, AAF, Col. F. W. Gillespie, AAF, Col. D. J. Keirn, AAF, Col. R. M. Love, AAF, Col. G. V. McPike, AAF, Col. E. H. Nelson, AAF, Col. W. O. Senter, AAF, Col. E. H. Underhill, AAF, Col. J. W. Warren, AAF, Col. W. C. White, AAF, Lt. Col. W. R. Corey, AAF, Lt. Col. R. C. Richardson, III, AAF, Lt. Col. F. L. Schuermann, AAF, Maj. C. D. Fairchild, AAF, Capt. C. Y. Glock, AAF, Brig. Gen. J. H. Gardner, USA (OLC), Maj. Gen. C. H. Bonesteel, USA, Maj. Gen. C. H. Danielson, USA, Maj. Gen. T. A. Terry, USA, Brig. Gen. H. C. Allen, USA, Brig. Gen. T. B. Catron, USA, Brig. Gen. W. E. Gunther, USA, Brig. Gen. C. E. Loucks, USA, Brig. Gen. G. H. Olmstead, USA, Brig. Gen. T. C. Rives, USA, Brig. Gen. W. N. Schulz, USA, Col. C. B. Allsopp, SC, Col. H. J. Amy, TC, Col. F. E. Barr, Inf., Col. C. P. Bellican, QMC, Col. R. A. Case, GSC, Col. L. B. Clapham, AGD, Col. F. J. Dau, GSC, Col. F. W. Drury, Cav., Col. I. A. Duffy, Ord., Col. G. K. Englehart, MP, Col. R. T. Evans, Jr., QMC, Col. R. M. Hare, Ord., Col. R. L. Hart, SC, Col. J. H. Hills, AGD, Col. G. K. Howard, Ord., Col. Bernard Lentz, TC, Col. O. C. Maier, SC, Col. A. H. Martin, AUS, Col. D. J. Martin, Ord., Col. Otis McCormick, Inf., Col. E. J. McGrew, Jr., CE, Col. G. W. Outland, Ord., Col. O. R. Rand, JAGD, Col. M. R. Scharff, CE, Col. S. G. Schwartz, AGD, Col. H. B. Sheets, Ord., Col. John Slezak, Ord., Col. C. R. Smith, CE, Col. E. S. Smith, GSC, Col. B. H. Weisbrod, IGD, Col. A. B. Welsh, MC, Lt. Col. T. F. Astrella, CE, Lt. Col. R. Robert Cohen, MC, Lt. Col. C. B. Drennon, Jr., CWS, Lt. Col. C. L. Jones, GSC, Lt. Col. A. J. McGrail, SC, Lt. Col. K. G. Merriam, CAC, Lt. Col. F. N. Schwartz, MC, Lt. Col. Whitney Stone, Ord., Maj. J. H. Bowman, GSC, and M.Sgt. R. M. Peterson, Inf.

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Awards and Decorations (Continued from Preceding Page)

Silver Star

Lt. Col. J. K. Waters, Cav., (OLC)—Carried a flag of truce between opposing forces while a German prisoner of war.

Capt. W. H. Stutler, Inf.—Carried a flag of truce between opposing forces while a German prisoner of war.

Lt. Col. A. A. Vandegrift, Jr., USMC—Exhorting men of his Infantry Battalion on Iwo Jima.

Sgt. C. T. Borelli—Bravery near Artene, Italy.

Bronze Star

Commodore H. J. Ray, USN, Com. Officer of a warship.

Capt. R. B. McCoy, Asst. Com. Of. for Op. Com. of US Pac. Fleet.

Pfc. J. R. Copskey, Jr., USMC—Going to aid of ambushed Marines on Iwo Jima.

Soldier's Medal

Letters of Commendation

Capt. L. N. Miller, USN, Director of Planning and Central Div., Office of Planning and Control, Bu. Naval Personnel.

Lt. H. C. Schadeberg, (ChC) USNR; Services aboard the USS Louisville.

1st Lt. H. L. Rivers, CAC, Cadet P. R. Burn, Jr., USMA, S.Sgt. W. R. Hicks, MP, Sgt. R. G. McGinnis, Inf., Sgt. Kenny Outlaw, TC, T4 H. F. Bates, FA, and T4 Frank V. Scarpa, MD.

Foreign Decorations

Commodore R. E. Nelson, USN, awarded the Croix de Guerre with the Bronze Star by the Government of France.

Lt. Col. D. M. McConnell, awarded the Order of the Golden Banner (Yan Wul) by the President of the National Government of China.

Brig. Gen. E. A. Marks, USA, Appointed Commander in the Order of Orange Nassau, from the Netherlands Government.

Col. J. S. Gorlinski, USA, Col. L. D. Mark, USA and Col. J. V. Sollohub, USA, all appointed Officers in the Order of Orange Nassau, from the Netherlands Government.

1st Sgt. C. C. Fowler, USA; Presented Medal of Honor in Gold of the Order of Orange Nassau, by the Netherlands Government.

* Posthumous award.

† Missing in action.

Sino-American Group

A united effort, responsible in large part for the smashing blows of the Pacific Fleet against the Jap-held islands,

was revealed by the Navy Department this week.

Because of the rapidity of Japanese surrenders in China, the Navy declared that it was now possible to disclose details of the "Friendship Project" carried forward between U. S. Naval group and Chinese units all over China. Aided by the Chinese Government, the Fleet was getting regular weather reports from many occupied areas in the Far East as early as 1942.

According to the Navy, China assigned substantial under-cover forces to protect American observers. Cooperation in Friendship Project grew closer and its scope became more broad. As each good turn done by one side opened new opportunities to the other, the informal Chinese-American organization soon found the United States Fleet and Chinese military organizations relying on its continued efforts.

As the war in the Pacific progressed the joint activities of the group had so expanded that it became necessary to record substantial and dependable logistic support. The group was headed by General Tai Li and Rear Admiral M. E. Miles, USN. Their proposals found approval in both Governments and early in 1943 were incorporated in a formal agreement which was negotiated by the then Foreign Minister T. V. Soong and the late Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.

The agreement created the Sino-American Cooperative Organization or SACO, which ever since has integrated the common interests of the Chinese Central Government and the U. S. Navy in the war against Japan.

Emergency Air Transportation

Military and naval personnel on emergency leave or furlough granted because of illness or death, or other situation of comparable urgency, may apply to the nearest Air Transport Command, for transportation, it was learned this week.

In addition, and under the same circumstances application may also be made to Regional Air Priority Control Offices, for priority on the domestic commercial airlines.

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THE Secretary of the Navy and Mrs. Forrestal were among the guests at the Marine Barracks, when last Friday evening the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Mrs. Alexander A. Vandegrift entertained at dinner at their quarters. The Secretary of the Treasury and Mrs. Vinson were also present as were Senator Saltonstall, Representative Luce, Admiral and Mrs. Marc Mitscher, Admiral and Mrs. J. O. Richardson, Mr. and Mrs. Jouett Shouse and Maj. Gen. and Mrs. A. H. Turnage. Mrs. Forrestal and her son, Peter, were in New York for a brief visit last week.

Miss Mary Ann Ramsey went up to New York from her school in Philadelphia to join her father, Capt. Logan C. Ramsey, skipper of the U.S.S. Lake Champlain, the big airplane carrier which was docked in the Hudson most of last week, and was open to sight-seers, some seventy thousand of whom availed themselves of the privilege of going over the mammoth Navy craft, purchased by Bond money supplied by the New York state folk. The carrier is now in Boston.

Miss Nancy Brown, daughter of Maj. Gen. and Mrs. Phillip Brown spent the week-end at West Point. Also at the Point were Miss Frances Case, daughter of Col. and Mrs. Robert Case and Miss Virginia Steele, chaperoned by Mrs. Case. Miss Jane Glenn, daughter of Mr. John Carter Glenn and Mrs. Elizabeth Glenn of Long Island was another visitor at the Academy. She returned to St. Mary's Academy, St. Mary's City, Maryland, Tuesday, for the school year.

Mrs. Martin Vogel entertained the other evening for Col. Jefferson Davis, in Washington from Los Angeles, and for Capt. John Adams, AUS, son of Gen. Clayton Adams.

Another guest was Col. Matthew Baird, nephew of the hostess, who is being mustered out of the army and is on his way to his ranch in Arizona to join his wife.

Admirals Edward C. Kalbfus, Joseph K. Taussig, Adolphus E. Watson and Claude C. Bloch, classmates of Admiral Clark Woodward, were among the guests Mrs. Woodward invited to the anniversary party she gave last week to observe

SERVICE SOCIAL NEWS



MRS. RICHARD CONCKLIN SNYDER

who before her recent marriage to Lt. Snyder, AAF, son of Maj. Gen. and Mrs. Howard McC. Snyder, USA, was Miss Mary Frances Peck of Washington, D. C., and Short Hills, N. J.

the fifty years service the Admiral has had in the Navy. Others who were on hand to congratulate him with the wives of the afore-mentioned officers, were Admiral and Mrs. C. W. Bunker, Admiral Joseph Richardson, Admiral and Mrs. Lee Noyes, Capt. and Mrs. Francis G. Ulen, with Mrs. James Doolittle, Mrs. William H. Blandy, whose husband is shortly returning from Navy duty, and scores of others.

Among those celebrating fiftieth anniversaries were Gen. and Mrs. Charles Kutz who were roundly feted this summer because of their golden wedding anniversary. This past week, General Kutz resigned from his post as Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia. He and Mrs. Kutz attended the luncheon and bestowal of medals Monday when General Reybold, Chief of Engineers, was host at Ft. Belvoir, and their son-in-law, Gen. L. T. Ross, Deputy Commander, was honored with the D.S.M. General Ross was formerly on General Eisenhower's staff. Mrs. Betsy S. Kutz, wife of Col. C. R. Kutz, a WAC in New Guinea, is anti-

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Weddings and Engagements

COL. Samuel White, FA, USA, and Mrs. White, announce the engagement of their daughter, Margaret Wirt, to 1st Lt. Billy Neill Banister, AC, AUS, son of Col. and Mrs. John R. Banister of Austin, Tex.

Miss White, a member of Kappa Kappa Gamma Sorority, attended Incarnate Word College, San Antonio, Texas, the University of Texas, the University of Utah, and was recently graduated from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Lt. Banister was attending Texas A. & M. at the time he joined the Army Air Corps. He has recently returned from a year with the 15th Air Force in Italy and is at present on duty at Kelly Field, San Antonio, Texas.

The wedding will take place 20 Oct. at St. Paul's Episcopal Church, San Antonio, Texas.

Col. and Mrs. George S. Warren, announce the engagement of Mrs. Warren's daughter, Miss Elizabeth Jeannette Clark, to Lt. James F. Gessner, son of Mr. Egbert J. Gessner and the late Mrs. Gessner, of Dunellen, N. J.

Miss Clark is the daughter of Mrs. Warren and the late Capt. Charles Palmer Clark of the Air Corps. She is the granddaughter of the late Brig. Gen. and Mrs. William T. Littebrant and of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Asa Clark of St. Paul, Minn., and Manila, P. I.

Miss Clark, her mother and her sister, Miss Marian Littebrant Clark, are making their home in St. Louis, Mo., while Colonel Warren is serving overseas with the Air Force.

Miss Clark attended Washington University in St. Louis and is now a student at the Commerce and Finance School of St. Louis University.

Lt. Gessner was stationed in St. Louis before he was ordered overseas.

His brothers, Lt. Col. Gerard R. Gessner, MC; Lt. Richard R. Gessner, SC; and Cpl. Roger E. Gessner, FA; are also serving overseas. Another brother, Pvt. John C. Gessner, CW, was killed in action on the Anzio beachhead.

Miss Dorothy C. Pirisky, daughter of Lt. Col. and Mrs. Joseph Pirisky, and Capt. Stanley E. Martin, son of Mr. and Mrs. Paul H. Martin of Corvallis, Ore., were married at a Nuptial Mass at St. James' Catholic Church by the Rev. Edward A. Breen on Thursday, 6 September.

The bride wore a gown of white slipper satin, and her full length veil fell from a tiara of pearls. Her bouquet was of white roses, gardenias and stephanotis. She was given in marriage by her father who just returned from overseas. Miss Virginia J. Pirisky was her sister's maid of honor. Her gown was of Nile green moire, her bouquet of Tallman roses. Lt. Frank B. Pagliuso was best man.

A wedding breakfast was served for the bridal party, families and close friends, at the Argonaut Hotel after the ceremony.

Afterwards, the young couple left for an extended honeymoon in the Northwest where they will visit the bridegroom's

parents.

The bride's brother, CPO James M. Pirisky, was able to attend his sister's wedding; two other brothers were not—Capt. Arthur J. and Sgt. Robert J., both on duty overseas.

The bridegroom just returned from over two years' service overseas in the Pacific. He is awaiting re-assignment orders to a new station in the States.

Mr. and Mrs. DeWitt Balch of Hope-well Road, Montgomery, Ohio, announce the marriage of their daughter Barbara Ann, to 2d Lt. Archibald Vincent Arnold, jr., USA, on Monday afternoon, 3 Sept. in the chapel of St. Gertrude in Montgomery.

Mrs. Arnold is a graduate of Miss Walkers School and attended Smith College. Lieutenant Arnold is the son of Maj. Gen. and Mrs. Archibald V. Arnold, USA, grandson of Maj. Gen. Charles G. Treat, USA, deceased, and graduated in the class of 1945 at the United States Military Academy. He has recently completed the Officers' Basic Course, Field Artillery School, Ft. Sill, Okla.

Miss Jean Balch was maid of honor for her sister and attendants were Mrs. Henry Hobson and Miss Margot Balch, sisters of the bride, Mrs. Warner Peck and Miss Joan Arnold, sister of the bridegroom. Mr. Treat Arnold served as best man for his brother and ushers were Lts. Smith and Haley, classmates of the groom, Pfc. Warner Peck and Mr. Daniel Le Blond.

The bridegroom's mother and his married sister, Mrs. George Ball also were present for the wedding. General Arnold was unable to attend, having returned earlier to the 7th Division on Okinawa. Lieutenant and Mrs. Arnold will motor west to Camp Beale, Calif., where Lt. Arnold will report for overseas service.

Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Milo Batcheller of Minneapolis announce the marriage of their daughter, Constance Pauline, to Ensign William Bernard Huckenpoehler, U. S. Naval Academy Class of 1944.

The double ring ceremony was performed on the evening of 4 Aug. at the Salem English Lutheran Church of Minneapolis by the Rev. Paul L. Wetzler. The bride wore a gown of ivory satin trimmed with seed pearls and her veil hung from a halo of pearls. Her bouquet was of white roses, stephanotis and gardenias. The bride's attendants were Mrs. Fred Pollard (Grace Batcheller), matron of honor, Mrs. James Garberg, jr., and Mrs. Kenneth Batcheller and Miss Barbara Pollard, flower girl. Mr. Dale Schwabe was best man and the ushers were Mr. William Phillips and Mr. Kenneth Batcheller.

After the wedding reception Ensign and Mrs. Huckenpoehler left for a wedding trip to northern Minnesota. They are now making their home in Dallas, Texas, where Ensign Huckenpoehler has been assigned to the Naval Air Station as a flight student.

Col. and Mrs. Charles W. West, JAGD, announce the engagement of their daughter, Hortense Marie, to Cadet Eleazar Parmly, IV, Class of 1946, United States Military Academy, son of Col. and Mrs. Eleazar Parmly, III, General Staff Corps.

(Please Turn to Next Page)

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Posts and Stations

ANNAPOLIS, MD.

10 September 1945

Mrs. D. W. Hogan, wife of Captain Hogan, USN, and her sons, Bart and Tom, have returned to their home on Prince George St., after spending the summer in New England. Captain Hogan is at present senior medical officer on the hospital ship, USS Tranquility.

Maj. William J. King, USMC, and Mrs. King have returned to Camp Lejeune, N.C., after visiting Major King's mother, Mrs. William J. King of Prince George St. Mrs. King's daughter, Mrs. Ogden, wife of Comdr. J. R. Ogden, USN, and her two children, have arrived from the West Coast to be here for an indefinite time.

Mrs. Haugen, wife of Capt. Laurence Haugen, USN, was the guest for several days last week of Mrs. Archer Allen at Carvel Hall.

Comdr. John Meigs, USN-Ret., and Mrs. Meigs of Slon Hill, Havre de Grace, are spending several days here aboard their yacht "Killdeer."

General Pedro del Valle, USMC, and Mrs. del Valle of Alexandria, Va., were guests last week of Mrs. Gordon H. Claude at her home on State Circle.

Lt. and Mrs. Nicholas Bodman who have been visiting Mrs. Bodman's mother, Mrs. Wainwright, widow of Comdr. Richard Wainwright, USN, of Wardour, will leave soon for New Haven, Conn.

Lt. George Koolage, USAAF, has been spending a short leave with his mother, Mrs. Harry N. Koolage at her home on Duke of Gloucester St.

Capt. and Mrs. Charles T. Singleton entertained at a sailing party last week aboard the schooner Freedom, in honor of their guests, Mr. and Mrs. William H. Ogle and Ensign Gerald Ogle, USN, and Miss Harriet Hamlet, all of Seattle, Wash.

Mrs. Warren, wife of Comdr. Hugh Warren, Mrs. Conner, wife of Comdr. J. F. Conner, and Mrs. Weaver, wife of Lt. W. A. Weaver, left last week for San Francisco, by automobile, to meet their husbands who are aboard the USS Tranquility, which is scheduled to arrive in the United States soon with prisoners of war.

Comdr. and Mrs. G. M. Dushinberre returned last week after a weeks' vacation in New Hampshire.

NORFOLK, VA.

13 Sept. 1945

Capt. and Mrs. Leslie Ray Wilson, and Lt. and Mrs. Morris Geltz, two popular newly-married couples, were guests of honor this week at a buffet supper given by Mr. and Mrs. Garfield Shafer, Jr., at their home, "Green Acres", in Portsmouth. The guests numbered twenty. Mrs. Watson, before her marriage, was Miss Ruth Butt, and Mrs. Geltz was Miss Betty Borie.

The formal dance for junior officers last Friday evening in the auditorium of the Larchmont school building marked the third anniversary of these dances, sponsored by the Federation of Garden Clubs of Norfolk cooperating with the Recreation Bureau of the city of Norfolk. In the three years of their existence, approximately sixty dances have been given and attended by an estimated 18,000 young officers.

These delightful affairs were started at the request of the Fifth Naval District and the recreation officers of the District requests that they be continued as long as Norfolk remains an active military area.

The engagement of Miss Mary Virginia Norris to Lt. (jg) William Marshall Peoples, USNR, son of William James Peoples of Coatesville, Pa., and the late Mrs. Peoples, has just been announced by Mrs. Nellie Whitehurst Norris of this city. The wedding is being planned for 1st October.

Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Lipkin of Norfolk announce the engagement of their daughter, Miss Adele Frances Lipkin, to Lt. Henry J. Trolin, USNR, son of Mr. and Mrs. Barnett Trolin of New York City. Miss Lipkin attended the Drama Dept. of the College of Fine Arts of Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pa., and is a member of Alpha Epsilon Phi sorority.

Lt. Trolin received his B.S. degree from New York University and his M.B.A. degree from the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard University. He also at-

tended the New York State College of Forestry, Syracuse University. No date has been set for the wedding.

Service Social Notes

(Continued from Preceding Page)

patting returning home shortly.

In the younger set, the season's first debutante, Miss Helen Shreve Fletcher, was introduced to society by her parents, Col. Robert H. Fletcher, USA-Ret., and Mrs. Fletcher at a reception at their summer home, Belgrove, near Leesburg, Va., Saturday last.

Their distinguished neighbors, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall and Mrs. Marshall were guests as were friends from Washington, including Gen. and Mrs. Jacob Devers, Gen. and Mrs. John Greely, Gen. and Mrs. Omar Bradley, Admiral and Mrs. David Foote Sellers, Col. and Mrs. Charles Beatty, Comdr. and Mrs. Keith Merrill, Gen. and Mrs. Lorenzo Gasser, Gen. and Mrs. Wade Haislip, Col. and Mrs. Albert Peake and Col. and Mrs. Truman Smith.

Gen. and Mrs. Omar Bradley will be the guests in whose honor Mrs. Edward Beale McLean will entertain at dinner on the 7th of October. They were guests of Mrs. McLean at the first large dinner party she has given lately which was Sunday last, most of her entertaining having been recently for service men.

Among others in the company were Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson with Lady Wilson, Maj. Gen. and Mrs. Myron C. Cramer, Gen. Allan W. Gullion, who made his first appearance at a large party since the War began; also Col. and Mrs. C. B. Hanson, Maj. and Mrs. J. G. Lockhart, Maj. Gen. and Mrs. Shelley Marietta, Maj. Gen. and Mrs. Russell Maxwell, Col. and Mrs. Arthur C. Purvis, Col. Warren Rusk, Capt. and Mrs. William Murphy, Comdr. Fred Spencer, and a host of civilian friends.

The familiar pentagon and the blue and white colors of V Corps furnished the motif for the decorations of the Officers' Club at Fort Jackson, S. C., 6 Sept., when officers of Headquarters V Corps and Corps Artillery held a farewell party for their commanding officer, Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner.

A buffet supper served at 8 o'clock to approximately 200 guests was followed by an evening of dancing. General and Mrs. Huebner and their daughter, Juliette, received the guests from 7:30 to 7:45.

With General and Mrs. Huebner at their table were Maj. Gen. F. Q. C. Gardner, from 12th Detachment, Second Army; Brig. Gen. D. G. Richart, post commander, and Mrs. Richart; Brig. Gen. F. W. MacKelvie, commanding general of V Corps Artillery, and Mrs. MacKelvie; Col. C. F. Williams of Headquarters, First Army, and Mrs. Williams; Col. Stanhope B. Mason, chief of staff of V Corps, and Mrs. Mason, and Col. John G. Hill, deputy chief of staff of V Corps, and Mrs. Hill.

Each of the ladies at the General's table received an orchid corsage, a gift of the V Corps officers. Music for dancing and for the supper was furnished by the 80th AGF band.

The Huebners left by plane from Columbia Army Air Base for Washington, where the General will take over his new duties with the Army Ground Forces.

Air transport is now being used to repatriate Greek displaced persons in Western Europe.

Weddings and Engagements

(Continued from Preceding Page)

The wedding will take place at West Point in June. Miss West attended Immaculata Seminary and Junior College in Washington, D. C. Colonel West is Professor of Law at the Military Academy and Colonel Parmlly is now serving overseas in the Pacific Theater.

Mr. and Mrs. Charles Craig, of Washington, D. C., announce the engagement of their daughter, Bettina Margaret, to Capt. James Ross Garvey, AAF, son of Mr. and Mrs. Joseph J. Garvey of Cleveland, Ohio.

Miss Craig attended the University of Virginia, and is a graduate of Wilson Teachers College.

Captain Garvey is a graduate mining engineer of the Ohio State University at Columbus, Ohio, and recently returned from two years duty in Africa with the Air Transport Command.

The wedding will take place at 4:00 P. M. on Saturday, 27 Oct. 1945, in the Walter Reed Chapel.

Ensign Deborah Kirk, USNR, daughter of Vice Admiral Alan Goodrich Kirk, USN, and Mrs. Kirk was married Saturday, 8 Sept., to Lt. Peter Solbert, USNR, son of Brig. Gen. Oscar Solbert and Mrs. Solbert of Rochester, who has recently returned from three years duty in the Pacific and is temporarily assigned to the Navy Department in Washington.

The wedding was in old Christ Church in Georgetown with the rector, the Rev. John R. Anschutz assisted by the Rev. Richard H. Wilmer, Jr., performing the ceremony, and a reception followed in the newly acquired home of the bride's parents, near by, the old Ninian Beale mansion, said to be the oldest in this old "faubourg St. Germain" of Washington.

The bride wore the ivory satin wedding gown of her grandmother, the late Mrs. Frederic Chapin, who with the late Mr. Chapin was a resident of many years in Washington. She was attended by her sister, Mrs. John Appel, as matron of honor, and the other attendants were Mrs. George Hall and the Misses Joan Perkins and Ronnie Solbert, sister of the bridegroom.

Mr. Thomas Taylor was best man and ushers included Major E. C. Trimble, Lts. Alexander Hargrave, William Billings, Charles R. Stevenson, Ralph R. Davidson and Messrs. Lawrence Tighe, Robert Leary and Roger Kirk, the bride's brother.

The bride attended Vassar, and was presented at the Court of St. James. She has served with the Waves since its formation in '42. Lt. Solbert was graduated from Groton and from Yale in '41. He is a member of DKE and Skull and Bones of Yale.

The engagement is announced of Miss (Please turn to Next Page)

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Calendar Of Legislation

ACTION ON LEGISLATION

H. R. 3951. To stimulate volunteer enlistments in the Regular Army and Navy. Reported by House Military Committee.

H. R. 3644. To provide additional rates of compensation or pension and remedy inequalities as to specific service-incurred disabilities in excess of total disability. Senate amendments agreed to by the House. To President.

S. 1354. To authorize the permanent appointment in the grades of General of the Army and Fleet Admiral of the United States Navy, respectively, of certain individuals who have served in such grades during the Second World War. Reported by Senate Military Committee.

BILLS INTRODUCED

S. 1355. Sen. Thomas, Utah. To provide for the speedy return of veterans to civilian life, for the immediate military needs of the United States.

S. 1356. Sen. Hill, Ala. To continue veteran benefits previously granted by Acts of the Congress to temporary members of the AUS, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including men inducted under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.

S. 1357. Sen. Maybank, S. C. To increase the pay of certain personnel of the military and naval forces while on sea duty or duty beyond the continental limits of the United States or in Alaska.

H. R. 3958. Rep. Morrison, La. To continue in effect the reemployment rights of veterans after the termination of other provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.

H. R. 3960. Rep. Rankin, Miss. To adopt Sept. 16, 1940, date of enactment of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as the beginning date of World War II for the purposes of all benefits under laws administered by the Veterans' Administration.

S. 1363. Sen. Walsh, Mass. To reimburse Navy and Marine Corps personnel for personal property lost or destroyed by water at the Marine Corps air station, Cherry Point, N. C., on 20 Feb. 1944, and at the amphibious training base, Okracoke, N. C., 14 Sept. 1944.

H. J. Res. 233. Rep. Randolph, West Va. For acquisition of British islands in the Caribbean and British Honduras.

H. J. Res. 234. Rep. Randolph, West Va. For the acquisition of French islands in the Caribbean and the North Atlantic Ocean.

H. Con. Res. 80. Rep. Vinson, Ga., and S. Con. Res. 30. Sen. Walsh, Mass. Providing for the size of the post-war Navy.

S. Res. 173. Sen. Maybank, S. C. Requesting the Secretary of War to establish a separation center in each State.

H. R. 3943. Rep. Larcade, La. Authorizes the President to award a Congressional Medal of Honor to General MacArthur.

H. R. 3944. Rep. Larcade, La. Authorizes the President to award a special Congressional Medal of Honor to General Pershing.

H. R. 3945. Rep. Larcade, La. Authorizes the President to award a special Congressional Medal of Honor to General MacArthur.

H. R. 3946. Rep. Larcade, La. Authorizes the President to award a special Congressional Medal of Honor to General Eisenhower.

H. R. 3947. Rep. Luce, Conn. Authorizes the President to award the Congressional Medal of Honor to Jonathan M. Wainwright.

H. R. 3977. Rep. Luce, Conn. To give retired noncommissioned officers of the Army and Navy preference in appointments to civil-service positions.

H. R. 3980. Rep. Rizley, Okla. To amend the Selective Service and Training Act, as amended, by reducing liability for service and training in the land or naval forces of the United States.

H. R. 3981. Rep. Rogers, Mass. To provide more liberal rates of increased pension for single amputations due to service.

S. J. Res. 91. Senators Brewster, Me.; Hill, Ala.; Cordon, Oreg. To provide for a proper ceremony commemorating the flag which flew over the Capitol on declaration of war against Japan, Germany, and Italy, and which has now been flown in those surrendered countries, and for the creation of a commission to provide a proper celebration of such flag and to perpetuate war flags and symbols and all the records pertaining thereto.

S. 1377. Sen. Magnuson, Wash. Authorizes the President to appoint Ensign Raymond J. McMahon, USNR, to the rank of Lt. (jg) USNR, and place him on the retired list of the Navy with three-fourths of his active-duty pay as Lt. (jg).

S. 1378. Sen. Walsh, Mass. Authorizes the President, at his discretion, to promote Commander Warren S. Parr, USN, to the temporary rank of Captain and the permanent rank of Commander.

S. 1378. Sen. Revercomb, West Va. To amend the World War Veterans' Act of 1924 to provide for additional compensation of \$25 a month to be paid to persons who, as the result of an injury received in active service in line of duty between 6 April 1917 and 2 July 1921, suffered the loss of a creative organ or one or more feet or hands.

H. R. 3990. Rep. Sikes, Fla. To provide for the retirement of commissioned officers,

commissioned warrant officers, chief warrant officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard who have completed not less than 20 Years' active service, with 65 per cent of active-duty pay, and after 30 years' service with 75 per cent active-duty pay per month.

H. R. 4008. Rep. Isaac, Calif. To amend existing law in order to provide more effectively for the national defense by increasing and equalizing retirement and retirement benefits for enlisted men of the Regular Navy, thereby encouraging a higher type of young men to make the Regular Navy a career.

Weddings and Engagements

(Continued from Preceding Page)

Barbara Jeanne Stanton, daughter of the Rev. and Mrs. John Hubert Stanton and Lt. David DuBose Gaillard, 2nd, AUS, son of Lt. Col. and Mrs. David St. Pierre Gaillard and grandson of the late Col. and Mrs. David DuBose Gaillard, the former, the man for whom the Gaillard Cut (formerly Culebra Cut) was named, he being a member of the commission building the Panama Canal.

The bride, whose home is in Johnstown, Pa., is a student at Westminster College, New Wilmington, Pa., and her fiancé graduated from St. Alban's School, Washington, and was attending MIT when he entered the army. He recently left for duty in the Pacific. No date has been set for the wedding.

Navy Demobilization Plan

(Continued from First Page)

Inactive duty during demobilization:

One-half point for each month of service on active duty since 1 September 1939.

One-half point for each year of age (computed to nearest birthday).

Ten points for a state of dependency existing as of 15 August 1945.

Effective 15 September 1945, an additional factor is to be allowed of one-fourth point for each month of active duty outside the United States since 1 September 1939. This ALNAV is authority for the addition of this credit.

PARA 4 (b). The term "active duty" as used in this formula shall include all active duty in an enlisted, officer candidate, warrant, or commissioned status in the U. S. Army, U. S. Army, U. S. Marine Corps, U. S. Coast Guard, U. S. Public Health Service (while serving with and under military control of U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (while serving with and under military control of U. S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), or in the American Field Service while serving with the Armed Forces of any of the following countries, or in the Armed Forces of any of the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Commonwealth, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

PARA 4 (c). Existence of a state of dependency shall be determined for enlisted personnel by authorization as of 15 August 1945 for payment of money allowances for dependency or money allowances in lieu of quarters for dependents; and for commissioned personnel by authorization as of 15 August 1945 for the payment of a subsistence allowance for dependents, provided that, enlisted and commissioned personnel having wives serving in the armed forces of any of the United Nations shall be deemed to have a state of dependency even if no money allowance or subsistence allowance is currently authorized therefor. All marriages taking place before 2400 E.W.T. 15 August 1945 shall create a state of dependency if payment of money allowance or subsistence allowance is subsequently authorized. Otherwise dependency status is frozen as of 2400 E.W.T. 15 August 1945.

PARA 4 (d). In order to compute the point credit for active duty outside of continental U. S., each command shall prepare for each person a statement of active duty outside of continental U. S. utilizing service records, orders, interrogations and affidavits of the person based upon his best knowledge and belief and other available evidence. From all evidence available if an agreement as to service outside the continental U. S. can be reached by the person and commanding officer or his representative, then a statement based upon information and belief will be prepared to that effect and signed by both parties and entered in the service record or qualifications jacket. In the event an agreement cannot be reached, the commanding officer or his representative is directed finally to decide any question arising in connection with the computation based upon all available evidence

and shall insert a statement signed by the commanding officer or his representative in the person's service record or qualifications jacket. The computation of time for any period of duty outside of the continental U. S. shall begin with the date of last detachment or transfer from a continental U. S. shore station or continental U. S. shore based fleet activity for duty, temporary duty, or temporary additional duty with:

(1) Any ship in commission

(2) Any of the following if based outside the continental U. S.: ship in service, fleet activity, or shore establishment.

(3) Any of the following if operating outside the continental U. S.: Armed Guard crews, communication groups, convoy groups, amphibious forces, fleet marine forces, mobile hospital units, or other units.

Such computation of time shall end with the date of reporting for duty in a continental U. S. shore activity or at a shore based fleet activity within the continental U. S. In addition to the above, credit for active duty outside the United States shall be allowed for service performed by personnel of aircraft units attached to fleet, sea frontier, or local defense units, or Naval Air Transport Service, if their duties required regular flights beyond the continental limits of the U. S., and for service outside the continental limits of the U. S. in any organization listed in Paragraph 4 (b).

PARA 4 (e). In any computation of total duty time under this formula, any end fractions of a month will not be counted as a month.

PARA 5. Precedence of release for all Naval personnel is to be determined by the accumulated score of each individual as computed by the above formula. The critical scores required for discharge or release to inactive duty are as follows:

Male enlisted personnel	49
Female enlisted personnel	41
Male commissioned and warrant officers	49
Female officers	35

Naval aviators of the Naval Reserve in a flight status

PARA 6 (a). Except as noted below and subject to the conditions prescribe herein, authorization is hereby granted and Commanding Officers are hereby directed to transfer for discharge or release to inactive duty as indicated below enlisted personnel of the following categories whose scores as computed on the above formula, equal or exceed or hereafter accumulate repeat or hereafter accumulate to equal or exceed the critical scores:

USNR if enlistment has expired and USNR (SV) if enlistment has expired, transfer for discharge by reason of expiration of enlistment.

USNR if enlistment has not expired and USNR (SV) if enlistment has not expired, transfer for discharge for the convenience of the Government.

USNR (V-10) transfer for discharge for the convenience of the Government.

USN if period of enlistment and any voluntary extension thereof has expired and USN (SV) if period of enlistment and any voluntary extension thereof has expired, transfer for discharge by reason of expiration of enlistment.

USN (I) transfer for discharge for the convenience of the Government.

Fleet Reserve (if transferred to Fleet Reserve prior to 15 August 1945), transfer for release to inactive duty.

PARA 6 (b). Enlisted personnel of the Regular Navy are not eligible for discharge under this ALNAV if the period of their enlistment (or any voluntary extension thereof) has not expired. Enlisted personnel of the Regular Navy who are eligible for discharge and who volunteer to extend their enlistments or reenlist shall be granted such privilege by Commanding Officers without prior reference to BuPers. Enlisted male personnel of the Naval Reserve and inductees who are eligible for separation and who submit or have submitted applications for enlistment or reenlistment in the Regular Navy shall be retained on duty pending final action on such applications. Enlisted personnel of the Fleet Reserve are not eligible for release to inactive duty under the provisions of this ALNAV if transfer to the Fleet Reserve was effected subsequent to 15 August 1945.

PARA 6 (c). Except as noted below and subject to the conditions prescribed herein, authorization is hereby granted and Commanding Officers are directed to recommend to appropriate commands as defined in ALNAV 198-45 the transfer for release to inactive duty of all commissioned and warrant officers of the Naval Reserve whose scores equal or exceed or hereafter accumulate repeat hereafter accumulate to equal or exceed the critical scores. Enlisted personnel (USN, USNR, Fleet Reserve, or Retired) serving as temporary officers are to be regarded only as officers for the purpose of this ALNAV. USN officers with permanent or temporary appointments and including retired officers are not eligible for separation under this ALNAV. All retired officers of the Naval Reserve shall be deemed to have point scores equal to the critical score regardless of their actual point scores, and their transfer for release to inactive duty shall be recommended unless they fall within classifications excluded in paragraphs 13 (a) and 13 (b) or

have requested retention on active duty as provided in paragraphs 6 (d) and 6 (f).

PARA 6 (d). All personnel eligible for separation hereunder may request in writing that they be retained on active duty. Requests by officer or enlisted personnel for retention on active duty shall state the period for which retention is requested, and such personnel shall be transferred for separation (or recommended for transfer in the case of officers) not later than the expiration of such period. However, the making of such requests shall not be construed to shorten the period for which personnel may be retained for reason of military necessity under paragraph 17 of this ALNAV, nor shall there be any retention for military necessity at the expiration of the stipulated period of retention.

PARA 6 (e). Requests of enlisted personnel for retention shall be addressed to BuPers for purpose of record, and forwarding endorsements shall state the action taken by the Commanding Officer, Commanding Officer (in case of officers) not later than the expiration without prior reference to BuPers, and they are also authorized, at their discretion, to transfer such personnel for separation before the expiration of the stipulated period if such personnel are not performing useful and essential duty.

PARA 6 (f). Requests of officers for retention shall be addressed to BuPers via official channels. Commanding Officers should indicate in their endorsements whether retention on active duty in the Naval Reserve is recommended and whether there are billets within their commands in which retention is recommended.

Pending action by BuPers, such officers shall continue on active duty. If the requests are disapproved, Commanding Officers will recommend the transfer of such officers for release. When requests are approved for a stipulated period, Commanding Officers may, at any time during such period, inform BuPers that the officers are no longer performing useful or essential duty in their assignments, and BuPers shall reassign the officers or order their release. Officers who contemplate making application for transfer to the Regular Navy shall file a request for retention as set forth in paragraph 6 (d) and this paragraph stating that they are contemplating such transfer. Commanding Officers will endorse and forward such requests in accordance with this paragraph. Pending action by BuPers, such officers shall continue on duty. Officers who have made application for transfer to the Regular Navy shall be kept on active duty until action is taken thereon and are not required to file a written request for retention.

PARA 7. BuPers Circular Letter 113-45 of 25 April 1945 is hereby cancelled. Regardless of their precedence for release under this ALNAV, retired enlisted personnel, USN or USNR, now serving on active duty shall be transferred for release to inactive duty subject to their right to request retention under the provisions of paragraphs 6 (d) and 6 (e). Commanding Officers are hereby authorized to transfer such personnel for release to inactive duty without prior reference to BuPers for approval.

PARA 8. Officers of the Naval Reserve who are permanently limited by medical survey to shore duty as a result of service incurred disabilities shall be deemed to have point scores equal to the release scores, regardless of their actual point scores. Such officers, other than those in classifications excluded from the release provisions of this ALNAV under paragraphs 13 (a) and 13 (b), shall be recommended for release, subject to their right to request retention on active duty as provided in paragraphs 6 (d) and 6 (f). For provisions applying to enlisted personnel see BuMed-BuPers joint letters of 30 April 1945.

PARA 9. Regardless of their point scores, USNR officers and all enlisted personnel (except USN enlisted personnel whose period of enlistment or any voluntary extension thereof has not expired) who have been awarded any of the following medals and awards shall be transferred for separation or recommended for transfer in the case of officers, subject to their right to request retention on active duty as provided in paragraphs 6 (d), 6 (e) and 6 (f). Only those decorations conferred since 1 September 1939 shall be considered.

Medal of Honor,
Navy Cross,
Distinguished Service Cross (Army),
Legion of Merit (if for combat)
Silver Star Medal,
Distinguished Flying Cross (if for combat).

PARA 10. All releases to inactive duty or discharges shall be effected in accordance with plans and procedures established for the demobilization of the Navy.

PARA 11. The immediate needs of the Naval service do not permit the discharge or release, under this ALNAV, of certain classifications of enlisted personnel for the present. Enlisted personnel of the following classifications are hereby excluded from the release provisions under this ALNAV until further notice:

Specialist (C) Classification
Specialist (S) Shore Patrol
Specialist (I) Panch Card Accounting Machine Operator

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ARCHER—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 23 Aug. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Phillip Raymond Archer, a daughter, Jean Elizabeth Archer.

AUCHINCLOSS—Born in New York City, 27 Aug. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Reginald Auchincloss, a daughter.

AYLWARD—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 3 Sept. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. John Vincent Aylward, a son, Philip John Aylward.

BAMBER—Born at Lawrence Hospital, Bronxville, N. Y., 29 Aug. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Frederick B. Bamber, a son, Andrew Corlett Bamber.

BELON—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 10 Sept. 1945, to Maj. and Mrs. Ralph G. Belon, SC, a daughter.

BRAIDY—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 1 Sept. 1945, to 2nd Lt. and Mrs. Timothy J. Braidy, a daughter.

BREEN—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 11 Sept. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Joseph M. Breen, FD, a son.

BROWN—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 30 Aug. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Dewitt Wilcox Brown, a daughter, Mary Johnston Brown.

BROWN—Born at Bay Ridge Hospital, Brooklyn, N. Y., 9 Sept. 1945, to Maj. and Mrs. Warren Brown, AUS, their second daughter, Nancy May Brown.

BYRNE—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 27 Aug. 1945, to 2nd Lt. and Mrs. Joseph John Byrne, sr., a son, Joseph John Byrne, jr.

CARMACK—Born in Washington, D. C., 30 Aug. 1945, to Maj. and Mrs. Craig S. Carmack, a son. Major Carmack is on duty in the Pacific area.

CODER—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 31 Aug. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Harry Frederick Coder, a daughter, Janice Mary Coder.

COLEMAN—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 5 Sept. 1945, to M.Sgt. and Mrs. Amos L. Coleman, DEML, a daughter.

CONNORS—Born at Maynard Hospital, Seattle, Washington, 3 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Alfred F. Connors, USNR, a daughter, Kathleen Mary.

CORDER—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 25 Aug. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Robert Lee Corder, sr., a son, Robert Lee Corder, jr.

DAILEY—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 30 Aug. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. John Thomas Dailey, a daughter, Victoria Ann Dailey.

DAVIS—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 7 Sept. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Lawrence D. Davis, CE, a daughter.

DENSFORD—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 4 Sept. 1945, to Col. and Mrs. Charles David Densford, a son, Daniel David Densford.

De SANTIS—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 5 Sept. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Orazio J. De Santis, MD, a daughter.

DIXON—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 27 Aug. 1945, to M.Sgt. (Ret.) and Mrs. Byron Karle Dixon, sr., a son, Byron Karle Dixon, jr.

DONAHUE—Born at DePaul Hospital, Norfolk, Va., 1 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Omar Donahue, a daughter.

DUNLEAVY—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 29 Aug. 1945, to CWO and Mrs. Phillip H. Dunleavy, a son.

ELLISON—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 5 Sept. 1945, to Maj. and Mrs. Harold A. Ellison, Ord, a son.

FOWLER—Born in the New York Hospital, New York City, 1 Sept. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Benjamin Prince Fowler, AAF, a son, Paul Denham.

FRANCIS—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 3 Sept. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Kenneth V. Francis, a son.

GALLERY—Born at Army Base Hospital, Eglin Field, Fla., 26 Aug. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. W. O. Gallery, USN, their third daughter, Maureen Louise.

GILL—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 24 Aug. 1945, to 2nd Lt. and Mrs. John Lawrence Gill, a daughter, Patricia Ann Gill.

GOSTACH—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 31 Aug. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Henry Carl Gostach, a son, Robert Chesley Gostach.

HALL—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 11 Sept. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Robert P. Hall, Ord, a daughter.

HANSON—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 10 Sept. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Harold A. Hanson, CE, a son.

HAYS—Born at Georgetown University Hospital, Washington, D. C., 18 June 1945, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Lawrence C. Hays, jr. USMC, a daughter, Mary Elizabeth, granddaughter of

Births • Marriages • Deaths

(No charge for service announcements. Please notify promptly.)

Admiral and Mrs. Jonas Ingram, USN, and of Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence C. Hays, of Atlanta, Ga.

HILL—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 3 Sept. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Garold Ivan Hill, a daughter, Carol Ann Hill.

HIRSHON—Born at Harkness Pavilion, Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, New York, N. Y., 7 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Walter Hirschon, AAF, a daughter.

HOYT—Born in Chillicothe, Ohio, 2 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Charles Wilson Hoyt, (MC), USNR, their second child, Marcella. Lt. Hoyt is on duty at the US Naval Hospital, Oakland, Calif.

HUST—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 10 Sept. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Albert Hust, CE, a son.

INGERSOLL—Born in Chicago, Ill., 8 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Jeremiah C. Ingersoll, AUS, a daughter, Barbara Perry.

IRELAND—Born at Mt. Shasta, Calif., 2 Sept. 1945, to Maj. and Mrs. Russell F. Ireland, AC, their second son, Terry Russell. Maj. Ireland is overseas with a B-29 Group.

JACKA—Born at Nassau Hospital, Mineola, Long Island, N. Y., 7 Sept. 1945, to Lt. (jg) and Mrs. Thomas Adams Jacka, USNR, a son, Thomas Robert.

KIMBALL—Born at Harkness Pavilion, Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, New York, N. Y., 2 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Frederick M. Kimball, USNR, twin daughters.

KRAUT—Born at Lying-In Hospital, New York City, 28 Aug. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Paul Kraut, AUS, a son, James.

LANGHENRY—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 7 Sept. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Burton M. Langhenry, MAC, a daughter.

LINDSAY—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 4 Sept. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Sidney Afton Lindsey, a daughter, Marian Nordan Lindsay.

LOVELACE—Born in the Hospital for the Women of Maryland, Baltimore, Md., 2 Sept. 1945, to Ens. and Mrs. Clarence Shriver Lovelace, USNR, a son, Jeffrey Campbell Lovelace.

LYNCH—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 26 Aug. 1945, to M.Sgt. and Mrs. John William Lynch, a daughter, Sara Jane Lynch.

MacDONALD—Born at Midwood Hospital, Brooklyn, N. Y., 4 Sept. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Alfred Boylan MacDonald, AAF, their second daughter, Susan Eileen.

MALL—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 26 Aug. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. Paul Charles Mall, a son, Michael Paul Mall.

MARTIN—Born at Moore County Hospital, Pinehurst, N. C., 6 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Alfred J. Martin, CAC (AA), a son, Tommy Grantham Martin. Mrs. Martin is the former Mrs. Gordon Bilat.

MAY—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 27 Aug. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. John Bernard May, a daughter, Kathleen Diane May.

McDORMAN—Born in Union Memorial Hospital, Baltimore, Md., 1 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Marshall D. McDorman, USNR, a daughter, named for her mother, Anne Graeme Turnbull McDorman.

McGOVERN—Born at AAF Hospital, Hunter Field, Ga., 28 Aug. 1945, to T.Sgt. and Mrs. William B. McGovern, a daughter, Mary Ayn.

MITCHELL—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 8 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Bradford Mitchell, CE, a daughter.

MYHRE—Born at Bethesda (Md.) Suburban Hospital, 16 Aug. 1945, to Comdr. and Mrs. Floyd B. Myhre, USN (USNA '31), a daughter, Jan Jewell, granddaughter of Mrs. Frank C. Jewell and the late Col. Jewell, and of Mr. A. J. Myhre of El Cerrita, Calif., and the late Mrs. Myhre.

NEWMAN—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 23 Aug. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Richard King Newman, jr., a son, Jeffrey Creighton Newman.

NICKLESS—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 5 Sept. 1945, to 2nd Lt. and Mrs. Arthur Howard Nickless, a daughter, Joan Ann Nickless.

NORDEEN—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 29 Aug. 1945, to 2nd Lt. and Mrs. William A. Nordeen, a son.

PELLS—Born in Washington, D. C., 11 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Claiborne Pell, USCGR, a son, Herbert Claiborne.

PICKETT—Born at Annapolis, Md., 29 Aug. 1945, to Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. Ben R. Pickett, a son.

POWELL—Born at Station Hospital, West Point, N. Y., 19 Aug. 1945, to Col. and Mrs. Charner W. Powell, USA, a son, John Randolph Powell.

ROBISON—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 10 Sept. 1945, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Henry E. Robison, CMP, a daughter.

SANDERS—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 28 Aug. 1945, to T.Sgt. and Mrs. Cecil Bernard Sanders, a son, Gerald Bernard Sanders.

TAUL—Born at Station Hospital, West Point, N. Y., 10 Sept. 1945, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. H. Wayne Taul, USA (USMA '31), a daughter, Wendy Virginia Taul.

TENNEY—Born at Doctors Hospital, New York, N. Y., 4 Sept. 1945, to Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. Charles H. Tenney, USNR, a daughter, Marguerite Sedgwick.

TOWNSEND—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 27 Aug. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Marvin Louis Townsend, a daughter, Patricia Anne Townsend.

TREE—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 1 Sept. 1945, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Edward W. Tree, a son.

VOGEL—Born at Georgetown Hospital, Washington, D. C., 7 Sept. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. John Joseph Vogel, jr., USNR, a daughter.

WALTERS—Born at Station Hospital, Fort Sill, Okla., 26 Aug. 1945, to Col. and Mrs. Paul R. Walters, USA, a son, Michael James Walters, grandson of Col. Stanley L. James, USA, released Japanese prisoner of war, and Mrs. James of San Antonio, Texas.

WARD—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 27 Aug. 1945, to Capt. and Mrs. William Wilson Ward, a daughter, Karyn Lyn Ward. (Member of the staff Central Dental Laboratory, Eighth Service Command, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.)

WELLANDER—Born at U. S. Naval Hospital, Brooklyn, N. Y., 25 Aug. 1945, to Lt. and Mrs. Harold R. Wellander, USNR, a son, Charles Robert. Lieutenant Wellander is on duty at Guam.

WEST—Born at LeRoy Sanitarium, New York City, 5 Sept. 1945, to Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. James W. West, jr., USNR, their second daughter.

WOLF—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 3 Sept. 1945, to FO. and Mrs. Leland H. Wolf, a daughter.

Married

ALLEN-HARVEY—Married in Ninth Street Christian Church, Washington, D.C., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Alice Margaret Harvey to Lt. Andrew Wallace Allen, jr., AUS.

ANDERSON-MCCULLY—Married in Christ Church, Babylon, Long Island, N. Y., 8 Sept. 1945, Lt. (jg) Kathleen W. McCully, USNR, to Lt. Thomas W. Anderson, USNR.

ARNOLD-BALCH—Married in the chapel of St. Gertrude, Montgomery, Ohio, 3 September 1945, Miss Barbara Ann Balch to 2nd Lt. Archibald Vincent Arnold, jr., USA (USMA '45), son of Maj. Gen. and Mrs. Archibald V. Arnold, USA, and grandson of the late Maj. Gen. Charles G. Treat, USA.

ATKINSON-WHITTIER—Married in Trinity Church, Princeton, N. J., 9 Sept. 1945, Miss Nancy Ellen Whittier to Ens. Ralph Massie Atkinson, USNR.

BECKMAN-SPINLER—Married in St. Clare's Church, Rosedale, N. Y., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Mary Jane Spinler to 1st Lt. Frank Beckman, AUS.

BELL-GABLEMAN—Married in All Soul's Memorial Church, Washington, D. C., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Barbara Gableman to Maj. Gordon Flint Bell, AUS.

BRAINERD-DIETZ—Married in Washington, D. C., 31 Aug. 1945, Mrs. Frances Theobald Dietz, daughter of Rear Adm. Robert Alfred Theobald, USN-Ret., to Lt. James Lamb Brainerd, USNR.

CARR-JARRETT—Married in St. John's Episcopal Church, Washington, D. C., 8 Sept. 1945, Mrs. Elizabeth Harvey Jarrett to Lt. Charles Stuart Carr, jr., USNR.

CLAGETT-HARDY—Married in the chapel of Christ Church, Methodist, New York City, 7 September 1945, Miss Micheline Hardy to Maj. William B. Clagett, AUS.

CLINEDINST-MARTIN—Married in Baltimore, Md., 1 September 1945, Sp. Y. Virginia Catherine Martin, USNR, to Lt. Clinton R. Clinedinst, AAF.

COLE-AIKEN—Married in Lafayette Presbyterian Church, Norfolk, Va., 4 Sept. 1945, Miss Marion Carolyn Aiken to Ens. Alvah Newman Cole, jr., USNR.

CREAMER-McCUNE—Married at Reformed Dutch Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., 8 September 1945, Mrs. Janet Waters McCune to Lt. Thomas Fishback Creamer, USNR.

DAY-SQUIRES—Married in the chapel of St. Bartholomew's Church, New York City, 8 September 1945, Miss Mary Warrick Squires to Ens. David Allen Day, USNR, son of Dr. Edmund Ezra Day, president of Cornell University.

DUNN-MEACHAM—Married in Trinity Church, Newport, R. I., 4 Sept. 1945, Miss Marjorie Meacham to Ens. Eric Warne Dunn, USNR.

EDMONS-CLARK—Married in Bethlehem Chapel, Washington Cathedral, Washington, D. C., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Caroline Clark to Lt. James William Edmons, USN.

FAY-BURKE—Married in St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, Plainfield, N. J., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Jean Marie Burke to Lt. William M. Fay, jr., USNR.

FISHER-SEELEY—Married in the Little Chapel of the Roses, Chula Vista, Calif., 30 Aug. 1945, Miss Ruth A. Seeley to Lt. Comdr. Robert L. Fisher, (MC) USNR.

FRANZ-STEDING—Married in First Evangelical Lutheran Church, Galveston, Texas, 14 Aug. 1945, Miss Dorothy Mae Steding to Lt. Donald F. Franz, AAF.

FROST-CATLIN—Married in Bethany Presbyterian Church, Seattle, Wash., recently, Ens. Caroline Catlin, USNR, sister of Maj. John Crocker Catlin, USA, to Lt. John Elliott Frost, AAF.

GAGAN-MACADAM—Married in the rectory of St. Anthony's Church, Walkuk, Maui, T. H., 1 Sept. 1945, Miss Errol Jean MacAdam to Lt. William Dale Gagan, jr., USMCR.

GEORGE-HARI—Married in Mt. Union College, Alliance, Ohio, 17 Aug. 1945, Miss Maxine Hari to Ens. Harry George, USNR.

GNAEDINGER-MAYNARD—Married in the First Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., 8 September 1945, Miss Barbara Maynard to Lt. Arthur B. Gnaedinger, USNR.

GORDON-HOUSEKEEPER—Married in Christ Episcopal Church, Newton, N. J., Miss Elizabeth Housekeeper to Lt. Benjamin Douglas Gordon, Cav., AUS.

HALL-TERHUNE—Married in St. Mark's Episcopal Church, New Canaan, Conn., 8 September 1945, Miss Jane Elizabeth Terhune to Capt. Eban Clarke Hall, AUS.

HARDIN-EVANS—Married in the chapel at Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash., 8 September 1945, Lt. Elizabeth Jeannette Evans, USNR, to Mr. Bristow Hardin, jr.

HARTMAN-EMERSON—Married in Mountain Grove Memorial Church, Hulet's Landing, N. Y., 9 September 1945, Ens. Helena L. Emerson, USNR, daughter of Dr. Alfred Edwards Emerson of the University of Chicago and Mrs. Emerson, to Ens. Ralph Joseph Hartman, USNR.

HOLMES-GARCIA—Married in the Church of The Master, Steubenville, Ohio, 29 Aug. 1945, Miss Eunice Josephine Garcia to Lt. (jg) Blackwell Holmes, USNR.

HUCKENFUEHLER - BATCHELLER—Married in Salem English Lutheran Church, Minneapolis, Minn., 4 Aug. 1945, Miss Constance Pauline Batcheller to Ens. William Bernard Huckenfuehler, USN (USNA '44).

HUGHES-WALKER—Married in Christ Church, Coronado, Calif., 1 Sept. 1945, PM 1c Dorothy Walker, USNR, to Capt. John A. Hughes, AAF, recently returned from duty in Europe.

HUMPHRIES-JOYNER—Married in Holy Trinity Episcopal Church, Gainesville, Fla., 4 September 1945, Miss Virginia Claire Joyner, daughter of Col. and Mrs. Ralph Leslie Joyner, USA-Ret., to Capt. Julian Maxwell Humphries, AUS.

HUNTER-CLARK—Married in the Episcopal Church of the Holy Innocents, West Orange, N. J., 8 September 1945, 2nd Lt. Meredith Clark, WAC to 1st Lt. John Platt Hunter, AUS.

JACOBSEN - MILLS—Married in St. Thomas Episcopal Church, Washington, D. C., 6 September 1945, Miss Julia Adelaide Mills to Lt. Lawrence Jacobsen, USNR.

KAUFMANN-SMITH—Married in St. Paul's Lutheran Church, West Englewood, N. J., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Mary Barbara Smith to Lt. Edward A. Kaufmann, AUS.

KLINGEL-RIDDELL—Married in Gunton Temple Memorial Presbyterian Church, Washington, D. C., 3 September 1945, Miss Joy Janice Klingel to Lt. James Alexander Ridgell, AAF.

LIVINGSTON-BLAKE—Married in Christ Church, Glen Ridge, N. J., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Marjorie Blake to Capt. Robert H. Livingston, of Binghamton, N. Y.

MACY-KOHLER—Married in Washington, D. C., 10 September 1945, Mrs. Elene Aldcroft Kohler to Col. J. Noel Macy, AUS.

MARION-WEBER—Married in Hitchcock Memorial Church, Scarsdale, N. Y., 7 September 1945, Miss Virginia Weber, to Lt. Comdr. James Preston Marion, jr., USN.

MARTIN-HOLLOMON—Married at Aulander, N. C., 2 Sept. 1945, Miss Lula Jean Hollomon to Lt. James W. Martin, AUS.

MARTIN-PIRSKY—Married in St. James' Catholic Church, Denver, Colo., 6 Sept. 1945, Miss Dorothy C. Pirsky, daughter of Lt. Col. and Mrs. Joseph Pirsky, to Capt. Stanley E. Martin, just returned from two and one-half years' service in the Pacific. Two of the bride's brothers, Capt. Arthur J. and Sgt. Robert J.,

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Births, Marriages, Deaths

(Continued from Preceding Page)

are on duty overseas. Her other brother, CPO James M., and her father, who recently returned from overseas, were present for the wedding.

McCAMBRIDGE-MARTIN—Married in Holy Family Church, New Rochelle, N. Y., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Joan Marie Martin to Ens. James McCambridge, jr., USNR.

McLEAN-KIRWIN—Married in the rectory of the Church of St. Ignatius Loyola, New York City, 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Ruth Ann Kirwin of New York to Lt. William Shawen McLean, USNR, of Baltimore, Md.

McNALLY-CARLEY—Married in Our Lady Chapel of St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York City, 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Nella Carley to Lt. George P. McNally, USNR.

McNALLY-THOMAS—Married at the post chapel, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, 1 Sept. 1945, Miss Edna M. Thomas to Maj. James S. McNally, AAF on duty at Wright Field.

OAKLEAF-LOOMIS—Married in Christ Church, Greenwich, Conn., 8 September 1945, Miss Elizabeth Mason Loomis to 1st Lt. Robert B. Oakleaf, AUS.

PAINE-COLLYER—Married in the Church of the Transfiguration, New York City, 4 Sept. 1945, Miss Mary Louise Collyer to 1st Lt. Richmond Shepard Paine, AUS.

PARKER-ROPER—Married in Reading, England, 11 Aug. 1945, Miss Cynthia Joan Roper to Capt. Nicholson Parker, USA, (USMA '43), son of Maj. Gen. and Mrs. Edwin P. Parker, USA.

PIERSON-WILCOX—Married in Mt. Vernon Place Methodist Church, Baltimore, Md., 9 Sept. 1945, Miss Elizabeth Ives Wilcox to Ens. John A. Pierson, USNR.

RATTAN-PRATT—Married at the home of her cousin, Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) George F. Rixey, USA, Washington, D. C., 7 Sept. 1945, Miss Jane Sedgwick Pratt daughter of Mrs. Selby Harney Frank, wife of General Frank, USA, to Lt. Donald Volney Rattan, USA, son of Col. and Mrs. Donald William Rattan.

REBERKENNY-GORHAM—Married in Christ the King Church, Haddonfield, N. J., 6 September 1945, Miss Elizabeth Barbara Gorham to Ens. Clarence Patrick Reberkenny, (SC) USNR.

REINHOLD-HAWKINS—Married in the chapel of Christ Church, Greenwich, Conn., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Kathryn Lockwood Hawkins to Ens. Charles Elliott Reinhold, USNR.

REVELLE-CURRAN—Married in Chicago, Ill., 15 Aug. 1945, Miss Alleen Jane Curran to Lt. (jg) Gilbert Cecil Revelle, jr., USNR.

REYNOLDS-PAINE—Married in Asbury Methodist Church, Watertown, N. Y., 25 Aug. 1945, Miss Dorothy Elizabeth Paine to Lt. Charles L. Reynolds, AUS.

ROBINSON-LEES—Married in Glen Ridge Congregational Church, Bloomfield, N. J., 1 September 1945, Lt. Bette Mae Lees, WAC, to Capt. Herbert A. Robinson, USMCR.

ROCHE-D'OILLIAMSON—Married in the Church of the Madeleine, Paris, France, 28 Aug. 1945, Miss Yolande D'Oilliamson, daughter of Comte and Comtesse Tomas D'Oilliamson of Paris, to Capt. Thomas K. Roche, AUS, son of Dr. and Mrs. Thomas J. Roche of Bridgeport, Conn.

SHARP-NORTON—Married in the rectory of St. Peter's Roman Catholic Church, Great Barrington, Mass., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Katherine Eileen Norton of Great Barrington, to Mr. Charles Longstreth Sharp, son of Col. and Mrs. Frederick Dent Sharp of Fairfield, Conn.

SOLBERT-KIRK—Married in Christ Episcopal Church, Georgetown, Washington, D. C., 8 September 1945, Ens. Deborah Kirk, USNR, daughter of Vice Adm. and Mrs. Alan Goodrich Kirk, USN, to Lt. Peter Solbert, USNR.

STAMPLEY-DAVEY—Married in Crescent Avenue Presbyterian Church, Plainfield, N. J., 8 September 1945, Ens. Margaret Lucie Davey, USNR, to Lt. Robert Maurice Stampley, USNR.

SULLIVAN-McCARROLL—Married in Our Lady of Angels Roman Catholic Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Elizabeth Ann McCarroll to Lt. (jg) William A. Sullivan, USNR.

THIERIOT-POTTER—Married in the home of the bride's parents in New York City, 11 Sept. 1945, Mrs. Julia K. Macy Potter to Lt. Charles H. Thieriot, jr., AAF.

TIERNEY-CHASE—Married in St. Ambrose Church, Chicago, Ill., 1 September 1945, Miss Jerry Chase, daughter of Comdr. Volney O. Chase, 2nd, USNR, to Ens. John B. Tierney, USNR.

TURNER-PERSICANO—Married in Washington, D. C., 6 Sept. 1945, Miss Josephine Persicano to Lt. John McCullough Turner, USNR.

WHITE-CLAY—Married in Ghent Methodist Church, Norfolk, Va., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Evelyn W. Clay to Lt. Corbin B. White, USNR.

WIELAND-LEWIS—Married in St. John's Roman Catholic Church, Leesburg, Va., 8 Sept. 1945, Miss Emily Armstrong Lewis to Maj. Robert Wieland, AUS.

WILLIAMS-CANHAM—Married in Asbury Methodist Church, Crestwood, N. Y., 1 Sept. 1945, Miss Janet Canham to Capt. John E. Williams, jr., USMCR.

WOLGAMOT-BRYANT—Married in Selden Chapel of Christ and St. Luke's Episcopal Church, Norfolk, Va., 1 Sept. 1945, Miss Frances Paige Bryant to Lt. John W. Wolgamot, MC, AUS.

YOUNG-SENN—Married in St. Stephen's Church, Port Washington, Long Island, N. Y., 9 September 1945, Miss Ise Marie Senn to Capt. Jack Richardson Young, Army Ski Troops, recently returned from overseas.

Died

AMES—Died at Cambridge, Mass., 11 Sept. 1945, Col. Thales L. Ames, USA-Ret., (USMA '05).

CLAPP—Drowned at Lake George, N. Y., 23 Aug. 1945, Mrs. Marie Titus Clapp, wife of Lt. Col. Wadsworth P. Clapp, USA (USMA '41), who was killed in action in Germany 22 February 1945. Mrs. Clapp leaves her father, Mr. David M. Titus of Maplewood, N. J.

COLLINS—Died at his home at 211 Alta Avenue, San Antonio, Tex., 14 Aug. 1945, Lt. Col. Thomas K. Collins, USA-Ret. Survived by his wife, Mrs. Anna MacGregor Collins, a sister, Mrs. Della Collins Williams, ARC, U. S. Naval Hospital, San Diego, Calif., and a nephew O/C Henry R. Williams, Fort Benning, Ga.

CONZELMAN—Died a prisoner of war of the Japanese government, 14 Jan. 1945, Lt. Col. Clair M. Conzelman, CAC, USA (USMA '26). Survived by his widow, Mrs. Marjorie Smith Conzelman, and two children, Peter Smith and Patricia Jane, of Barre, Vt. Also survived by three brothers, Joseph H. Conzelman of Birmingham, Ala.; Lewis C. Conzelman of Forestville, Conn., and John H. Hull of Danbury, Conn.

DALY—Died on board a Japanese prison ship, 21 January 1945, Lt. Col. Maurice F. Daly, USA, former West Point football star and coach for ten years. Survived by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Michael F. Daly of Hartford, Conn.; two brothers, Col. James M. Daly, USMC, and Mr. John Daly, and a sister, Mrs. Cornelia B. Prior of Plainville, Conn.

DEAN—Killed in airplane crash near San Diego, Calif., 7 Sept. 1945, Lt. Frank Home-wood Dean, jr., USN, (USNA '43), son of Capt. F. H. Dean, USN, and Mrs. Dean of 6342 32nd St., N. W., Washington, D. C.

GREELEY—Died on board a Japanese prison ship en route from the Philippines to Japan, in January 1945, Maj. Horace Greeley, USA (USMA '37), son of the late Col. Michael N. Greeley, USA. Survived by his widow, Mrs. Jeanne Cooley Greeley of Apt. 202, Arlington Village, Arlington, Va., by his mother, Mrs. Horace Greeley, sr., of New York City, by four brothers, Col. Leonard Greeley, USA, Col. Brendon Greeley, USA, Comdr. Quentin Greeley and Mr. Godfrey Greeley and one sister, Miss Elizabeth Greeley.

GRIMES—Died at Cebu, P. I., 15 April 1942, Lt. Col. Arthur J. Grimes, Inf., USA. Survived by his widow, Mrs. Marie Moorman Grimes, of 1723 Beverly Drive, Charlotte, N. C. Mrs. Grimes is the sister of Col. Thomas Moorman, AAF.

HARTMAN—Died at the Annapolis Hotel, Washington, D. C., 9 Sept. 1945, Capt. Robert J. Hartman, AAF.

HUMBER—Died aboard a Japanese prison ship, 22 Jan. 1945, Col. Charles I. Humber, jr., USA (USMA '31), former captain of U. S. Military Academy football team. Colonel Humber was captured after the surrender of Corregidor in 1942.

JOHNSON—Killed in commercial airplane crash near Florence, S. C., 7 Sept. 1945, Capt. Crawford D. Johnson, USMC. Surviving are his widow, Mrs. Joan Johnson, and two daughters, Mary Miles, 10 years, and Rod-leanne, 8 months, of 131 Varnum St., NW, Washington, D. C.

KALAKUKA—Died in Luzon, P. I., of cerebral malaria, 30 Oct. 1944, Lt. Col. Theodore Kalakuka, USA, (USMA '27). Surviving are his widow, Mrs. Marion Ross Kalakuka and two daughters, Page and Christine.

KING—Died at Cape May, N. J., 6 Sept. 1945, Lt. Col. Harry Lazelle King, USA-Ret., a member of General John J. Pershing's Headquarters staff in France during World War I. He was visiting relatives at the time of his death.

KOTZSCHMAR—Died in Portland, Me., after a long illness, 3 Sept. 1945, Rear Adm. Hermann Kotzschmar, USCG-Ret. Survived by his widow, Mrs. Ann Kotzschmar, of Portland, Me. Burial was held in Arlington National Cemetery 6 September.

LATIMER—Died aboard a Japanese prison ship en route from Manila, P. I., to Japan, 23 Jan. 1945, Maj. William J. Latimer, jr., USA (USMA '29). Survived by his widow, Mrs. Elizabeth Perot Latimer and five children of Paoli, Pa.

LORD—Died at Bath, Me., 9 Sept. 1945, Lt. John A. Lord, USN-Ret., aged 72, the Navy's wooden ship expert who reconstructed the famous old frigate Constitution.

MCCAIN—Died at his home in Coronado, Calif., of a heart attack, 6 Sept. 1945, Vice Adm. John Sidney McCain, USN, former commander of Task Force No. 38. Survived by his widow, Mrs. Katherine Vaulx McCain; two sons, Comdr. J. S. McCain, jr., USN, and Mr. Gordon McCain, and a daughter, Miss Katherine Vaulx McCain. Buried in Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Va., on 10 September.

McGEE—Died in Garfield Hospital, Washington, D. C., 6 Sept. 1945, Mrs. Mary R. McGee, mother of Lt. Hugh J. McGee, jr., AAF.

MULFORD—Died at his home in Montour Falls, N. Y., 23 Aug. 1945, Mr. Edwin H. Mulford, the father of Mrs. Harold W. Churchill, wife of Col. Churchill, Ord, USA.

NELSON—Killed in action in the Pacific Area, 15 Dec. 1944, while being transported in a Japanese prison ship, Lt. Col. Russell J. Nelson, Inf., USA (USMA '21). Survived by his widow, Mrs. Mary Guitler Nelson, of 846 South Serrano Ave., Los Angeles, Calif., and the following brothers and sisters: Sgt. Winfred Nelson, AC, now serving overseas; Mrs. George Chase, Peter Nelson, Floyd Nelson and Irving Nelson of Greenville, Mich., and Mrs. Melvin Ross and Harry Nelson of Grand Rapids, Mich.

NEWLOVE—Died at Oakland, Calif., 4 September 1945, Maj. George Newlove, USA-Ret. Survived by his widow, Mrs. Jean C. Newlove, and two daughters, Mrs. Howard A. Malin and Mrs. Robert W. Burke. Interment was in San Francisco National Cemetery, 6 September 1945.

PIERCE—Killed in commercial airplane crash near Florence, S. C., 7 Sept. 1945, Lt. Col. W. E. Pierce, USMC. Survived by his

widow, Mrs. Mary Jeanne Pierce, and two children, Janette, 3 years, and William E., jr., 20 months, of 823 Church St., Alexandria, Va.

ROBINSON—Died on board Japanese prison ship while being transported to Japan, 21 January 1945, Lt. Col. William L. Robinson, USA, (USMA '37). Survived by his wife, Mrs. Elizabeth L. Robinson, of 2902 Porter St., NW, Washington 8, D. C. Also survived by his father, Mr. Hanson Robinson, formerly of Wayne, Pa., by two sisters and three brothers.

RUNNALS—Died at his home in Washington, D. C., 7 Sept. 1945, Maj. John B. Runnals, AUS.

RYAN—Died at his home at 1519 Thurston Ave., Honolulu, T. H., 25 Aug. 1945, of a heart ailment, Capt. James A. Ryan, USA-Ret. Surviving are his wife, Mrs. Margaret Ryan, and two daughters, Mrs. Morris Peterson of Hemet, Calif., and Miss Jean Ryan of Berkeley, Calif.; a sister, Mrs. Jean Falkenhagen of Signavon, Mich., and one grandchild, Capt. Ryan was placed on the retired list of the Army (CAC) on 1 Sept. 1934 at Fort Rucker, Oahu, and from that time until his death operated the Brookland Hotel at Honolulu.

SCHEUMANN—Died at Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, D. C., 2 Sept. 1945, Mrs. Katherine Moran Scheumann, wife of Col. William F. Scheumann, DC, USA, Director of the Army Dental School and Chief of the Dental Service at Walter Reed Hospital. Surviving also are two daughters, Mrs. Ralph E. Vandervort, wife of Major Vandervort, FA, and Mrs. Montague Harris of West Caldwell, N. J., and a son, Pvt. William F. Scheumann, jr., of Camp Blanding, Fla., and two grandchildren. Mrs. Scheumann was a member of the Army Nurse Corps during the first World War. Funeral services were held at Memorial Chapel, Army Medical Center 5 Sept. and interment was in Arlington National Cemetery.

SOLBY—Died while enroute to Alexandria (Va.) Hospital, from his home in Alexandria, 8 Sept. 1945, Dr. Bruno Solby, USPHS. Survived by his wife, Mrs. Trudy K. Solby; a son Michael, aged 7, and a sister.

UTKE—Killed in action in the Pacific area, 15 December 1944, while being transported on board Japanese prison ship, Maj. Gordon Arthur Utke, Inf. Survived by his widow, Mrs. Lois Carter Utke, 16 Elm Ave., Kentfield, Calif., and by his mother, Mrs. Arthur Utke, of Fargo, N. Dak., whose father, Col. James Donlson Carter, was recently liberated from Camp Hoten, Japanese prison in Manchuria.

Obituaries

Lt. Col. Clair McKinley Conzelman, CAC, USA (USMA '26), died while a prisoner of war of the Japanese government, 14 Jan. 1945.

Born in Bristol, Conn., 26 Oct. 1900, the son of Joseph and Carrie (Hager) Conzelman, he was appointed to the United States Military Academy from Connecticut. Upon graduation from West Point in 1926 he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Coast Artillery Corps in which he remained throughout his service.

First assigned to duty at Ft. Totten, N. Y., he was ordered to the Philippines where he served at Corregidor from 1928-1930. Returning to the United States he was stationed at Ft. H. G. Wright, N. Y., and in 1932-33 attended the Battery Officers' School at Ft. Monroe, Va. From 1933 to 1935 he served at Ft. Sherman in the Canal Zone, Panama. Returning to the United States he spent three years at Ft. Barrancas, Fla., and was ordered in February, 1939, to the Philippines for a second tour of duty at Corregidor. During the defense of that besieged fortress, Colonel Conzelman served as Harbor Defense Inspector for Manila and Subic Bays and as assistant G-3 on the staff of Maj. Gen. George F. Moore, commander of Corregidor and its outposts.

With the surrender of Corregidor he became a prisoner of war of the Japanese and was imprisoned at Cabanatuan, at Davao on Mindanao, and at Bilid in Manila. In December 1944 he survived the bombing of a Japanese prison ship on which with other American prisoners of war he was being transferred to Japan. His death occurred a month later from unknown cause at an unknown place.

Colonel Conzelman was a graduate of Bristol (Conn.) high school and was a student at Brown University for over two years prior to his appointment to West Point. He was a member of Delta Tau Delta, and of the Masonic Order. In the first World War he served as a U. S. Naval Cadet during the latter months of the war. In the army he distinguished himself as an outstanding artilleryman while commanding coast defense batteries of 12-inch and 14-inch rifles. He also received special commendation in 1937 for originating improved methods of training for artillery spotters and observers.

An excellent athlete in football and lacrosse while at Brown and West Point, he became a top-ranking golfer during his service. His loss will be mourned by classmates, fellow officers and enlisted personnel who knew him, as well as by his family to whom

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Obituaries

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he was deeply devoted.

He is survived by his widow, Mrs. Marjorie Smith Conzelman, and by his two children, Peter Smith, 17, and Patsy Jane, 15, of Barre, Vermont; also by his three brothers, Joseph H. Conzelman of Birmingham, Ala.; Lewis C. Conzelman of Forrestville, Conn.; and John H. Conzelman of Danbury Conn. His brother-in-law, 1st Lt. A. M. Olin Smith, a B-17 pilot in the 8th Air Force, gave his life 30 Nov. 1944 while on a mission over Germany.

Funeral services for Rear Admiral Hermann Kotschmar, Jr., USCG-Ret., were held 6 Sept. in Fort Myer, (Va.) Chapel followed by burial with full military honors in Arlington National Cemetery.

Admiral Kotschmar, who retired 1 March 1938, after 42 years of service, died 3 Sept. in Portland, Me., after a long illness. A graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he was commissioned as ensign 4 Feb. 1896. He saw active duty in both the Spanish-American War and World War I.

Surviving is his wife, Mrs. Ann Kotschmar, Portland, Me.

Those serving as pallbearers were Rear Admirals H. F. Johnson, Lloyd T. Chalker, Robert Donohue, Charles A. Park, Philip B. Eaton, Joseph Greenspun, Raymond T. McElligott and Commodore William J. Keester, all USCG.

Vice Admiral John S. McCain, USN, was buried with full military honors in the Arlington National Cemetery on 10 September.

Honorary pallbearers included General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC; Vice Admiral Russell Willson, USN-Ret.; Vice Admiral Aubrey Fitch, USN; Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN; Rear Admiral Ferdinand L. Reichmuth, USN; Rear Admiral George S. Bryan, USN-Ret., and Rear Admiral Matthias B. Gardner, USN.

The escort was under the command of Rear Admiral John H. Cassidy, USN.

Adm. McCain, formerly Deputy Chief of Operations for Air, and commander of one of the Navy's great task forces in the Pacific, died on 6 September at San Diego from a heart attack.

Among those expressing regret upon learning of Adm. McCain's death were Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, and chief of Naval Operations; Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air John L. Sullivan and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.

Said Secretary Forrestal: "The news of the death of Vice Admiral McCain was received with regret and sorrow by the entire Navy. He was a fighting man all the way through. His conception of the aggressive use of fast carriers as the principal instrument for bringing about the quick reduction of Japanese defensive capabilities was one of the basic forces in the evolution of naval strategy in the Pacific war. He was held in the deepest affection by all who knew him throughout the Navy, both military and civilian."

"The United States Navy and the nation has lost a great Admiral and we all bow our heads in tribute to the memory of Vice Admiral John Sidney McCain, USN," said Assistant Secretary Sullivan. "His outstanding qualities as a naval strategist and as a courageous leader will long be remembered. He had that rare touch which attracted to him strong and lasting friendships. These extended to all branches and among all personnel, both in and out of the services."

"It was my special privilege to have spent several days in close association with him aboard the Shangri-La during the initial phases of the final blow at Japan. For that

experience I shall always be grateful.

"Vice Admiral John Sidney McCain loved the Navy and the Navy loved Vice Admiral McCain."

"The United States Navy and the nation suffers a grievous loss in the death of Vice Admiral John S. McCain, USN, carrier task force commander and skillful leader of men," said Adm. King.

"As Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, I regarded him as a farsighted aviation enthusiast and a major asset to the strength of our seapower. He died in line of duty—killed by the stress and strain of war. He lived to defeat the enemy, and to witness the supreme moment which was the culmination of his efforts—the surrender of the Japs at Tokyo Bay."

"My regret that John McCain is no longer with us is also a personal sorrow. I have lost a good friend."

Lt. Frank Homewood Dean, Jr., USN, age 23, was killed when a Corsair fighter plane he was piloting crashed on Friday, 7 Sept. 1945 near San Diego, Calif.

Lieutenant Dean is the son of Capt. F. H. Dean, USN, and Mrs. Dean, whose residence is at 6342 32nd St. (N.W.), Washington, D. C., and are well known in Washington, having served a number of tours of duty at the Navy Dept. Captain Dean is now on duty at the Philadelphia Navy Yard and resides at 554 Hansel Road, Wynnewood, Pa.

Lieut. Dean was a graduate of Woodrow Wilson High School, Long Beach, California and of Rutherford Preparatory School in the same city before entering the Naval Academy where he graduated with the class of '43 in 1942. Following graduation he served 16 months in New Guinea in command of a PT boat and was awarded the Silver Star for outstanding and meritorious services in connection with sinking ten Japanese supply barges and probable sinking of four others. During this duty his boat was the one chosen to take Gen. MacArthur on a tour of inspection of the New Guinea Coast.

Lt. Dean returned to the United States in January 1944 and began training as a Naval Aviator at Dallas, Texas in March of that year and successfully completed the course to win his wings at Pensacola, Fla. in June 1945.

Services will be held Monday, 17 Sept. at two o'clock at Ft. Meyer Chapel, Arlington, Va. followed by interment in Arlington Cemetery.

In addition to his parents, Lt. Dean is survived by a sister, Mrs. Guy C. Leavitt who married one of Frank Jr.'s classmates of Annapolis, and by a brother, Richard W. Dean.

Designer of war memorials to American dead at Vannes, Chateau-Thierry, Charny, Fismes, Bellecourt and the cemetery of Waereghem, Dr. Paul Philippe Cret, internationally known architect, died at the Misericordia Hospital at Philadelphia on 8 September. He was 68.

Born in Lyons, France, Dr. Cret was graduated from the Ecole des Beaux Arts, Paris, in 1903. A veteran of the French Army in the first World War, he served for several years as consulting architect to the American Battle Monuments Commission. After coming to America, he became Professor of Design at the University of Pennsylvania, serving until 1937. He won the Philadelphia Bok Award in 1931 for his work on the Benjamin Franklin Parkway, the Rodin Museum, Rittenhouse Square and the Delaware River Bridge.

The late President Roosevelt appointed him to the Federal Fine Arts Commission in 1940, in charge of consideration and approval of plans for public buildings.

Development of Atomic Bomb

(Continued from Page 107)

to produce enough Pu-239 to be treated as an ordinary substance on the ultra-microchemical scale. Such quantities were produced by prolonged bombardment of several hundred pounds of uranyl nitrate with neutrons obtained with the aid of cyclotrons, first at Berkeley and later at Washington University in St. Louis. By the end of 1942, something over 300 micrograms had been obtained in the form of pure plutonium salts. Although this amount is less than would be needed to make the head of a pin, for the micro-chemists it was sufficient to yield considerable information; for one microgram is considered sufficient to carry out weighing experiments, titrations, solubility studies, etc.

6.35. From its position in the periodic table, plutonium might be expected to be similar to the rare earths or to uranium, thorium, or osmium. Which of these it will resemble most closely depends, of course, on the arrangement of the outermost groups of electrons and this arrangement could hardly have been predicted. On the whole, plutonium turned out to be more like uranium than like any of the other elements named and might even be regarded as the second member of a new rare-earth series beginning with uranium. It was discovered fairly early that there were at least two states of oxidation of plutonium. (It is now known that there are four, corresponding to positive valences of 3, 4, 5, and 6.) Successful microchemical preparation of some plutonium salts and a study of their properties led to the general conclusion that it was possible to separate plutonium chemically from the other materials in the pile. This conclusion represents the attainment of the second immediate objective of the Metallurgical Laboratory. Thus, by the end of 1942, plutonium, entirely unknown eighteen months earlier, was considered an element whose chemical behavior was as well understood as that of several of the elements of the old periodic table.

Miscellaneous Studies

6.36. Besides the major problems we have mentioned, i.e., the chain reaction, the chemical separation, and the planning for a production plant, there were innumerable minor problems to be solved. Among the more important of these were the improvement of neutron counters, ionization chambers, and other instruments, the study of corrosion of uranium and aluminum by water and other possible coolants, the determination of the effects of temperature variation on neutron cross sections, the fabrication of uranium rods and tubes, the study of fission products, and the determination of the biological effects of radiation. As typical of this kind of work we can cite the development of methods of fabricating and coating uranium metal, under the direction of E. Creutz. Without the accomplishment of these secondary investigations the project could not have reached its goal. To give some further idea of the scope of the work, a list of twenty report titles is presented in Appendix 5, the 20 reports being selected from the 400 or so issued during 1942.

The Fast-Neutron Reaction

6.37. The third initial objective of the Metallurgical Project was to obtain theoretical and experimental data on a "fast neutron" reaction, such as would be required in an atomic bomb. This aspect of the work was initially planned and coordinated by G. Breit of the University of Wisconsin and later continued by J. R. Oppenheimer of the University of California. Since the actual construction of the bomb was to be the final part of the program, the urgency of studying such

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reactions was not so great. Consequently, little attention was given to the theoretical problems until the summer of 1942, when a group was organized at Chicago under the leadership of Oppenheimer.

6.38. In the meantime experimental work initiated in most instances by G. Breit had been in progress (under the general direction of the Metallurgical Project) at various institutions having equipment suitable for fast-neutron studies (Carnegie Institution of Washington, the National Bureau of Standards, Cornell University, Purdue University, University of Chicago, University of Minnesota, University of Wisconsin, University of California, Stanford University, University of Indiana, and Rice Institute). The problems under investigation involved scattering, absorption and fission cross section, the energy spectrum of fission neutrons, and the time delay in the emission of fission neutrons. For the most part this work represented an intermediate step in confirming and extending previous measurements but reached no new final conclusions. This type of work was subsequently concentrated at another site (see Chapter XII).

6.39. As indicated by the "Feasibility Report" (in a section written by J. H. Manley, J. R. Oppenheimer, R. Serber, and E. Teller) the picture had changed significantly in only one respect since the appearance of the National Academy Report a year earlier. Theoretical studies now showed that the effectiveness of the atomic bomb in producing damage would be greater than had been indicated in the National Academy report. However, critical size of the bomb was still unknown. Methods of detonating the bomb had been investigated somewhat, but on the whole no certain answers had been arrived at.

(To be continued)

Reduce General Officers

(Continued from First Page)


per cent of the total officer personnel of 803,000.

"Despite the demobilization now in progress, officers and men are still being promoted in exceptional cases. Similarly, the process of reducing the number and rank of general officers will not bar future promotions to general officer grade. Recommendations for such promotions will continue to be made on the basis of superior performance of duty and qualifications for the particular assignment involved. While they will be few in number, the officer corps of the Army will have the incentive of knowing that advancement to senior grade is not completely blocked."

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Since V-J Day the Navy has terminated nearly 50,000 war contracts involving more than \$8,300,000,000, according to Assistant Secretary of Navy Struve Hensel. The great bulk of our cancellation work is completed.

Nearly three thousand soldiers in the Middle Pacific participated in off-duty study classes during July.



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"Our PX fountain is cleaner...
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Enlistment in Regular Services (Continued from Page 79)

Navy. This section does not enlarge the number of persons who are eligible to receive the mustering-out payments now authorized nor does it increase the amounts thereof, but merely accelerates the time when such payments may be made.

Reenlistment Allowance

"Section 10 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942 authorizes an enlistment allowance equal to \$53, multiplied by the number of years served in the enlistment period from which he has last been discharged, to be paid to every honorably discharged enlisted man of the first three grades (master sergeant, first sergeant, technical sergeant, and staff sergeant in the Army; chief petty officer, first class petty officer, and second class petty officer in the Navy) who reenlists within 3 months from the date of his discharge, and an enlistment allowance of \$25, multiplied by the number of years served in the enlistment period from which he has last been discharged, to be paid to every honorably discharged enlisted man of the other grades who reenlists within a period of 3 months from the date of his discharge.

"Section 8 of the bill makes clear that the enlistment allowance payable, under section 10 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, to any person enlisted or reenlisted in the Regular Army on or after 1 June 1945, or in the Regular Navy on or after 1 February 1945, shall be based upon the highest enlisted grade held at the time of discharge or release from his last period of active Federal military or naval service, without regard to the permanent or temporary character of such grade. This section further provides that, in computing the enlistment allowance payable to those now in the armed forces who enlist or reenlist in the Regular Army or Regular Navy, credit shall be given for all prior continuous active Federal service (whether commissioned, warrant, or enlisted) for which no enlistment allowance has previously been paid. Where interruptions in active Federal service do not exceed 3 months, the service performed is deemed to be continuous. In all cases where previous commissioned or warrant service is credited in computing the allowance, the above-mentioned rate now prescribed for enlisted men of the first three grades is employed.

Allowance for Quarters

"Under the provisions of section 10 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, enlisted men of the first three grades (master sergeant, first sergeant, technical sergeant, and staff sergeant in the Army; chief petty officer, first-class petty officer, and second-class petty officer in the Navy) are authorized to receive monetary allowances in lieu of quarters for periods during which quarters are not provided for their dependents. Prior to the enactment of the act of 26 October 1943, the dependents of such enlisted men were not entitled to receive family allowances provided by the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act. The act of 26 October 1943, authorized receipt of such family allowances by the dependents of enlisted men of the first three grades and provided that those who, on the effective date of the act, were receiving, or being entitled to monetary allowances, might choose to continue to receive such monetary allowances or to have their dependents receive family allowances instead. The election of an enlisted man to have his dependents receive the family allowance was made irrevocable. Since enactment of the act of 26 October 1943, no enlisted man who attained one of the first three grades has been eligible to receive the above-referred-to monetary allowance in lieu of quarters. If an enlisted man of the first three grades has a wife and one or more children, his dependents are entitled to receive more money under a family allowance provided by the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act than he is allowed as a monetary allowance in lieu of quarters by section 10 of the Pay Readjustment Act. Conversely, if such an enlisted man has a wife but no children, he is entitled to receive a larger amount as a monetary allowance in lieu of quarters. It is believed equitable to permit an enlisted man of the first three grades to elect to receive the allowance which is larger in amount in his particular case.

"Section 9 (a) of the bill would authorize enlisted men of the first three grades to receive at their option, so long as the family allowance payments are authorized to be made under the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act, either the monetary allowance in lieu of quarters for dependents or to have his dependents become entitled to receive family allowances.

"The Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act provides that enlisted men are entitled to receive family allowances for periods during which they are in the active military or naval service on or after 1 June 1942, during the existence of any war declared by Congress and the 6 months immediately following the termination of such war. Section 9 (b) specifically provides that the exercise of an option to receive the family allowance will in no wise have the effect of entitling an enlisted man to continue to have such family

allowance beyond the date when such payments are not authorized to be made under existing law. The committee is strongly of the opinion that the payment of the family allowance should not be used as an inducement for enlistments or reenlistments.

Free Mailing

"Section 10 of the bill extends to 31 December 1947, the free postage privileges now provided members of the armed forces by the Second War Powers Act.

Benefits of GI Bill

"The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI bill of rights), which provides educational, loan, and readjustment allowance benefits for persons who serve in the armed forces prior to the termination of the war, contains certain limitations as to the time within which eligible persons may take advantage of such benefits. An educational or training course is required to be initiated not later than 2 years after the date of discharge of the person concerned or the termination of the war, whichever is later, and no education or training can be afforded beyond 7 years after the termination of the war. An application for the guaranty of a loan must be made within 2 years after separation from the military or naval forces, or 2 years after termination of the war, whichever is the later, but in no event more than 5 years after the termination of the war. A readjustment allowance is authorized to be received by a veteran for each week of unemployment which occurs not later than 2 years after his discharge or the termination of the war, whichever is the later, but no allowance may be paid for any week commencing more than 5 years after the termination of hostilities in the present war.

"Section 11 of the bill is designed to effect an equitable extension of the above-mentioned time limitations so that they will not begin to run until the expiration of the first enlistment or reenlistment periods of persons who enlist or reenlist in the armed forces within 12 months after the date of enactment of the bill.

Pay for Foreign and Sea Duty

"Section 12 continues in effect the provisions of section 2 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942 which provide the overseas pay differential for military personnel while serving on sea duty or on duty outside the continental limits of the United States or in Alaska. The present law authorizes the base pay of an enlisted man, warrant officer, or nurse to be increased by 20 percent and the base pay of a commissioned officer to be increased by 10 percent during periods of such service."

Assumes Command

Aboard his flagship USS Panamint in Ominato anchorage, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, USN, Commander, North Pacific Force and area, formally assumed control of the northern portion of the Japanese home island of Honshu and all of Hokkaido at 1000 Tokyo time, 9 Sept., 1945.

Vice Adm. Kenji Ugaki, Commandant of the Ominato Naval Guard District; Lt. Gen. Toshimoto Hoshino, Commanding Aomori Defense Force; Mr. Motohiko Kanai, Governor of Aomori Prefecture, headed the Japanese Naval, Army and civil delegations and received U. S. Naval emergency occupation order Number One from the Commander, North Pacific Force.

Following officers of Vice Admiral Fletcher's staff were among those witnessing the ceremony:

Commo. Robert E. Robinson, jr., USN, Chief of Staff.

Capt. Merle Van Metre, USN, Planning and Intelligence Officer.

Capt. F. Weiss, USN, Operations Officer.

Comdr. Loren L. Kuske, USNR, Gunnery and Engineering Officer.

Comdr. George D. Good, USN, Aerology Officer.

Lt. Comdr. Marion J. Reed, USN, Aviation Officer.

Lt. Robert T. Hartmann, USNR, Public Information Officer.

Lt. John S. Kirten, USNR, First Lieutenant.

Lt. Clifford D. G. Armstrong, USNR, Supply Officer.

Lt. (jg) Earl D. Green, USNR, Photographic Officer.

Lt. (jg) Richard A. Swagts, USN, Personnel Officer.

Lt. (jg) John N. Rupp, USNR, Flag Secretary.

Lt. John D. Creigh, USNR, Communications Officer.

Present as guests of Vice Admiral Fletcher were Task Force commanders, Rear Adm. John H. Brown, jr., USN; Rear Adm. Francis C. Denebrink, USN; Rear Adm. Ernest W. Litch, USN; squadron and division commanders, and commanding officers of the North Pacific Force.

Mexican Visits

Furloughs and leaves of absence may now be granted to Army personnel to visit any areas in Mexico without securing specific authority of the War Department.

Navy Demobilization Plan (Continued from Page 112)

Specialist (X) Key Punch Operator
Specialist (X) Transportation
SK (D) Storekeeper (Disbursing)
MaM-Mailman
PhM-Pharmacist's Mate
HA-Hospital Apprentice

PARA 12. Effective 15 September, 1945 delete from paragraph 11 the classifications "PhM-Pharmacist's Mate" and "HA-Hospital Apprentice."

PARA 13 (a). General or special service male and female officers with the classifications MC, HC, H., Chief Pharmacist and Pharmacist, members of the Nurse Corps, are excluded from the release provisions of this ALNAV until 15 September. On 15 September 1945 they become eligible for release according to the following critical scores:

Male Officers classified MC..... 60
Female Officers classified MC..... 35
Male Officers classified HC, H., Chief Pharmacist and Pharmacist..... 49
Female Officers classified HC and H..... 35
Members of the Nurse Corps..... 35

PARA 13 (b). The following personnel will be transferred for separation only on approval of BuPers:

Shore Patrol Officers.
Military Government Officers.
Officer specialists in IBM or other electric tabulating machines.

Officers now assigned or in special training for civil censorship duties in occupied countries.

Postal Service Officers.
Officer graduates of naval schools of oriental languages.

Officers, officer candidates, and enlisted personnel under instruction (who will graduate as officers) in naval schools of oriental languages.

Personnel in these classifications or duties who desire release or discharge and who are otherwise eligible under this ALNAV will submit requests to BuPers for action.

PARA 14. Further steps to provide for orderly demobilization will be taken by reducing the critical scores when conditions permit. All forward planning should take account of this factor.

PARA 15. Personnel hospitalized or undergoing medical or dental treatment who are otherwise eligible for separation under this ALNAV shall not be considered fully eligible until discharged from hospitalization or treatment.

PARA 16. Officer personnel in a disciplinary status and enlisted personnel in a disciplinary status including probationary periods as the result of disciplinary action shall not be eligible for separation under the provisions of this ALNAV until disciplinary measures including probationary periods have been completed.

PARA 17. (a) In cases where it is necessary to retain personnel otherwise eligible for separation under this ALNAV for reasons of military necessity, Commanding Officers are directed to take immediate action to secure a replacement via established channels. Military necessity is hereby defined as a condition in which the transfer of one or more specific persons would make impossible or seriously impair the functioning of a significant naval operation. It is not to be confused with the convenience or the desires of the Commanding Officer or any other Commander. It is expected that Commanding Officers and other Commanders will act in conformity with the spirit and letter of this definition in order to expedite demobilization. Where military necessity is claimed, Commanding Officers shall report to their appropriate Type or Area Commander, District or River Commandant, or the Chiefs of Naval Air Functional Training Commands having cognizance over them. Bureaus, Offices and Activities of the Navy Department in Washington and the adjacent area not reporting to other Commands shall report to BuPers. Such reports shall be made as of 2400 on the first day of each month and shall contain the following information on each eligible individual so retained:

Name,
Rank or rate,
Classification or class,
File or service number,
Nature of alleged military necessity,
Whether relief is on board,
Whether relief has been ordered,
Whether relief has been requested.

These reports shall be appended to and forwarded with copies of NAVPERS 625 (Report of Enlisted Personnel) and NAVPERS 353 (Roster of Officers.) (Instructions contained in ALNAVS 211-45 and 216-45 will be modified to take into account the changes made by this ALNAV.) Commands referred to in this paragraph are hereby charged with the responsibility of determining the validity of such retentions and are hereby authorized to disapprove them whenever appropriate. In no event shall personnel be retained for military necessity in excess of 120 days from date originally eligible for release except as noted in paragraph 17 (b) and such personnel shall be transferred for discharge or release (or recommended for transfer in the case of officers) upon the expiration of that period.

PARA 17 (b) In cases of extreme mili-

tary necessity Flag and Commanding Officers may request that certain essential officers be retained in excess of the 120-day period stipulated above. Such requests shall (1) be instituted not more than 60 days after the date on which such officers achieve the critical score necessary for separation; (2) be addressed to BuPers; and (3) set forth the following information:

(1) Duration of excess period for which services will be required.

(2) Justification for retention of the particular officers in question.

(3) Status of officers in training for this billet and possible reliefs.

(4) Whether temporary out of line promotion will be requested.

(5) Include statement from Officers concerned as to whether they will interpose objections if requested to remain in national interest beyond 120 days.

PARA 18. From among those eligible for release to inactive duty or discharge under this ALNAV, Type and Area Commanders and Commanding Officers will give preference in the order of return to those personnel who have been longest overseas, afloat or ashore.

PARA 19. Eligible personnel aboard ships which are returning to the United States, either as members of the ship's company or as passengers, shall be returned on such ships. Eligible personnel serving outside the continental limits ashore or afloat on ships which are not scheduled to return to the continental limits are to be assembled at appropriate bases (to be designated as staging centers by Area Commanders) to await transportation. Such personnel are to be grouped at these staging centers according to the location of the Separation Centers to which they are to be returned for discharge or release to inactive duty.

PARA 20. To the maximum extent possible, personnel assembled at staging centers will be returned to the continental limits on vessels returning to ports near the Separation Center destination of such personnel. All surface vessels returning personnel who are to be released to inactive duty or discharged are directed to report by dispatch, at least sixty hours in advance of arrival, to the Commandant of the district in the port of entry is located (and to ComWesSecFron, in the case of ports of entry on the Pacific Coast) and in all cases to BuPers, first words of message to be "ATTENTION DCC" the following information:

Port of Entry,
Expected date and time of arrival,
Number of personnel aboard who are to be separated listed by the Separation Center to which they are ordered, sex and service status (enlisted or commissioned).

PARA 21. In effecting the transfer of enlisted personnel fully eligible for separation under the conditions herein stated, Commanding Officers are directed to issue orders for the transfer of such personnel without prior reference to BuPers, using this ALNAV as authority for the transfer and separation. Certain Type and Area Commanders, District Commandants and other appropriate authorities have been designated in ALNAV 108-45 of 15 August 1945 to issue orders authorizing the transfer and subsequent release to inactive duty of officers fully eligible for separation under this procedure.

CE Mechanical Advisory Service

The Chief of Engineers has established an Engineer Mechanical Advisory Service for the benefit of troops requiring assistance in training on any type of engineer mechanical equipment.

The Engineer Mechanical Advisory Service provides mechanical advisor teams to furnish expert instruction, inspection, technical advice, and assistance in the proper operation, preventive maintenance, repair, processing, and storage of engineer mechanical equipment. Under the plan personnel of these teams may be used as instructors to give conferences, lectures, or demonstrations whenever the local commanding officer considers such assignment desirable.

It is stipulated that in no case will a mechanical advisor be utilized as a mechanic, but will be maintained solely in an advisory capacity.

Upon the initial activation of troop units or when mechanical equipment is first delivered to units, it will be the function of mechanical advisors to render complete instruction to both officer and enlisted personnel with respect to its assembly, adjustment, servicing, inspecting and proper maintenance practices for efficient operation.

Marine Corps Generals

The nomination of Archie F. Howard to be a major general in the Marine Corps, for temporary service, was sent to the Senate 11 Sept.

The first cycle of a central sports school conducted by Special Service in the Mediterranean Theater graduated 350 soldier-coaches in four months.

Two Million Separations By Christmas

To clarify its own understanding, and that of the public, in regard to the demobilization plans of the War and Navy Departments, the Senate Military Committee this week held hearings at which representatives of the War Department gave statistics to prove that demobilization experience gained since V-E Day has enabled it to outstrip its planned number of separations, and that by Christmas 2,000,000 members of the Army will have been separated from it and that by 1 July 1946, six million and fifty thousand will be out of the Army.

Admitting that there have been delays in separating personnel from the Army, Maj. Gen. S. G. Henry, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, stated that it took over 4 years to build the Army yet it will be demobilized to the six million mark in ten months, whereas until the defeat of Japan it had been planned to separate only 2,000,000 during the 12 months after V-E Day.

Charging delay in discharging personnel to the unexpected early victory over Japan and to the lack of necessary transportation from the ETO and the PTO, as well as to the sudden need for more processing centers, General Henry asserted that the clogged line of separations will be cleared of 258,000 in 35 days and of 400,000 in 42 days. The General called attention to the fact that between V-E Day and V-J Day there were no Air Corps separations, all personnel of that service having been tagged to go to Japan, and that with the beginning of separation of AAF personnel the machinery became jammed.

In response to questions by members of the Committee, Under Secretary of War Patterson, declared that the present policy of the War Department is "to develop the maximum demobilization possible for replacement and transportation," and that this includes the needs connected with occupying Germany and Japan.

General Henry stated that General Marshall "wanted the officers who led the men overseas to head the separation centers—that he insisted on Brigadier Generals of long combat experience and proven administrative ability to head up the centers." General Henry declared that "this was done at V-E Day and that the Brigadier Generals were not given leave but were put at this work, being returned from overseas as casuals."

Ages of Army Generals

On 1 July 1945 the 1,539 General Officers in the Army were of an average age of 51.4 years, according to a study just completed by the statistical division of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Of this total 322 were General Officers of the Army Air Forces with an average age of 46.9 years.

The report states: "On 1 July 1945, there were 1,539 Generals in our Army, and their average age was 51.4 years. Almost 35 per cent of the Generals were under 50 years of age, a slightly higher proportion were concentrated in the age group 50 to 54, while an additional 20 per cent were in the age period 55 to 59; 8 per cent were 60 to 64, and less than 2 per cent were 65 years or over."

"The relation between the rank of the Generals and the distribution of their ages is shown in Table 1. As would be expected, the higher the rank the higher the average age. The ages of the five-star Generals of the Army averaged 60.5 years. The youngest of these is Dwight D. Eisenhower, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who is 54. Second youngest is Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, who is 59 years old. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, is 64. The oldest of the five-star Generals is Douglas MacArthur, 65 years of age. General MacArthur was recalled to active duty several months before Pearl Harbor. With the defeat of Japan, he was appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to receive her surrender. At the lower end of the list of Generals are the Brigadier Generals, who constitute 70 per cent of the total number; their average age on 1 July was 50.3 years, or ten years below that for the Generals of the Army and five years below the average for Lieutenant Generals.

"The promotion of younger men to positions of high responsibility has been common practice in the Army, particularly in the Air Forces, during the wartime expansion program. An outstanding example of this practice is the case of Richard C. Sanders, who was appointed Brigadier General last year at the age of 28. Another instance is Brigadier General Clinton D. Vincent, who was 29 when he won his high commission a year ago. Both of these men are in the Army Air Corps. The youngest man of General rank outside of the Air Corps is Brigadier General Frank S. Besson, Jr., of the Army Service Forces, who was 34 at the time of his appointment early in 1945.

"The average age of the 322 Generals in the Army Air Corps on 1 July was just short of 47 years, or 4½ years below the average for the Army as a whole. This fact reflects itself in the high proportion of Air Corps Generals at the younger ages. Whereas the Air Forces had one-fifth of all the Generals in the Army, they accounted for all five Generals under age 35, for almost three-fourths of those in the age period 35 to 39, and for fully one half of those at ages 40 to 44 years. On the other hand, at 50 and over the Generals in the Army Air Corps comprised little more than one-eighth of the total at those ages. In view of the exacting physical qualifications required for air service, and the increased emphasis on aerial warfare in the training of younger officers, it is little wonder that even in the top ranks of the Air Corps the accent is on youth."

TABLE 1—Age Distribution of Generals, by Rank, of the Army of the United States, Including the Air Forces, on Active Duty 1 July 1945

Age Group	Total of General Rank	Generals of the Army	Lt. Generals	Maj. Generals	Brig. Generals
25-29	1	—	—	—	1
30-34	4	—	—	—	4
35-39	58	—	—	—	58
40-44	142	—	—	20	122
45-49	326	1	9	51	265
50-54	555	5	12	158	370
55-59	306	1	4	10	291
60-64	118	1	2	7	108
65-69	21	1	1	3	16
70-74	3	—	—	—	3
Unknown	5	—	—	—	5
Total number in each rank	1,539	4	13	50	397
Average age in years	51.4	60.5	56.6	55.3	50.3

TABLE 2—Age Distribution of Generals, by Rank, in the Air Forces of the Army of the United States on Active Duty 1 July 1945

Age Group	Total of General Rank	Generals of the Army	Lt. Generals	Maj. Generals	Brig. Generals
25-29	1	—	—	—	1
30-34	4	—	—	—	4
35-39	42	—	—	5	37
40-44	72	—	—	10	62
45-49	73	—	5	12	56
50-54	100	2	4	33	61
55-59	23	1	1	8	10
60-64	5	—	—	2	3
65-69	1	—	—	1	—
Unknown	1	—	—	—	1
Total number in each rank	322	1	3	13	71
Average age in years	46.9	59	53.3	52.4	49.7

Colonel Sparks to RCA

Election of William H. Barsby as vice president of RCA Communications, Inc., and the appointment of Lt. Col. Sidney Sparks to succeed Mr. Barsby as traffic manager, were announced 7 Sept. by Thompson H. Mitchell, vice president and general manager.

Colonel Sparks, who has been released from active military duty, served almost two years as Officer in Charge of the War Department Signal Center, Washington, D. C.

In Washington, Colonel Sparks helped to institute efficiency measures which made it possible for the War Department Signal Center to handle more than 10,000,000 words of traffic a day with maximum speed and accuracy. The same methods were applied in varying degrees to other key centers of America's worldwide military communications system with highly beneficial results.

Gen. Wahl to Ft. Knox

Brig. Gen. George D. Wahl assumed command of the post of Ft. Knox on 5 Sept., replacing Col. R. C. Throckmorton, who is now in an Army hospital.

General Wahl, who will also command the personnel center soon to be established at Ft. Knox, was commanding general of the personnel center at Indian-town Gap, Pa., prior to coming to Ft. Knox. He served as assistant division commander of the famous 79th (Cross of Lorraine) Infantry Division in the European Theater until the end of the war in Europe.

Marine Corps Brig. Gen.

President Truman on 10 Sept. sent to the Senate the nomination of Col. Samuel L. Howard, USMC, to be a temporary brigadier general in the Marine Corps.

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Jap Air Suicide Attempt

From Yokohama this week came reports that three top ranking Japanese Officers of the Japanese Army Air Force planned to use the remnants of the once formidable Nipponese air armada by a mass suicide attack against American invasion forces, as a means of either crippling or destroying Allied attempts to land on the home land.

According to reports Gen. Shozo Kawabe, General Tazoe, Chief of Staff, and Gen. Ketsu Mina, deputy chief of Staff, had planned to hurl all of their available 6,000 to 9,000 airplanes against the sides of the American troop carriers. They expected to lose their entire air force in the attempt.

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7TH INFANTRY HISTORY

"FROM FEDALA TO BERCHTESGADEN"
A History of the 7th Infantry in World War II

"FROM FEDALA TO BERCHTESGADEN" a history of the 7th Infantry in World War II, is now being prepared for publication in Germany. It will contain a brief history of the Regiment from 1798 to 1941 and then a complete detailed description of all its action in this war in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, France, Germany and Austria. The Regiment started the war by capturing Fedala in French Morocco, November 8, 1942, and was first into Casablanca three days later. The "COTTON BALE" Regiment was in the assault for four major amphibious operations: French Morocco, Sicily, Anzio, and southern France. It was first into Palermo and Messina, and Rome. The assault Regiment of the 3rd Division across an offensive in the Colmar pocket; staged two rivers and two canals, in the dead of winter. This feat will go down as one of its greatest examples of aggressive spirit. The "COTTON BALE" Regiment out-maneuvered other units in the mad scramble of early May, and captured Hitler's hideaway of Berchtesgaden on the 4th day of May, to bring to a close, in a blaze of glory, its combat.

The volume will be a great addition to U. S. Military History and will contain 100 tactical maps and over 600 pictures. Anyone desiring to buy a copy of the History of one of the oldest and most decorated Regiments in the U. S. Army, with a fighting record second to none, mail five dollars and mailing address to: Lt. Nathan W. White, O-1311579, 7th Infantry Headquarters, APO #3, c/o PM, New York, N. Y.

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FINANCE

Financial Digest

President Truman, in his message to Congress last week, emphasized that taxes will play an important role in attaining a prosperous peace. He recommended that a transitional tax bill be enacted as soon as possible to provide limited tax reductions for the calendar year 1946. Like the Tax Readjustment Act of 1945, he said, the new bill should aim principally at removing barriers to speedy reconversion and to the expansion of peacetime economy.

Chairman George (Dem., Ga.) of the Senate Finance Committee, has estimated that next year will see income tax reduction of 15 per cent to 20 per cent for individuals and corporations. He also estimated that receipts would remain around \$30 billion in the coming year in spite of reduction. Lower levies, he reasoned, will stimulate the national income and make up through volume to \$5 billion to \$6 billion lost through a lower rate. The normal loss of revenue from repeal of the excess profits tax, the capital stock tax and the declared value excess profits tax would not exceed \$2.5 billion, he said. Individuals, he estimated, will save around \$3 billion through tax relief now projected.

A recent report to the President from John W. Snyder, Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, points out that it is still too early to measure progression on the road to full peacetime employment but that a survey in terms of Government action since surrender was first announced is in order.

In itemizing the steps which have been taken, cancellation of Army and Navy contracts previously described in detail in this column were listed and in addition those of the Maritime Commission, Reconstruction Finance Corporation and National Housing Agency. At present, contracts with a face value of approximately \$40 billion await settlement, of which about \$5 billion antedates VE-day. Fixed price contracts comprise \$30 billion

MERCHANT MARINE

of this amount; the rest were cost-plus contracts. In order to close out all these contracts within a year, \$4 billion worth must be cleared each month. Clearance of plants is closely related to settlement of contracts, and both actions must be initiated by the contractor.

Within ten days after Japan's surrender, 2,700,000 men and women had been released from war work. Of these, 900,000 were shifted immediately to peacetime jobs in the same plants. The War Department's cancellation of war contracts reduce their consumption of steel by 90 per cent and of other metals in various proportions. This is supplemented by similar cancellations and releases by the Navy Department and other agencies.

Business generally, the report states, has greater liquid assets than at any time in history, but this does not necessarily mean that every business has ample resources. As long as there are more dollars than goods in circulation, it is pointed out, the Government must hold the line against inflation. Government agencies are moving rapidly to declare and sell surpluses of Government-owned war goods, equipment and property.

Merchant Marine

Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, USN-Ret., War Shipping Administrator, has notified the Interstate Commerce Commission that WSA will support the water carriers seeking to return to the intercoastal trades to the utmost in their effort to get a square deal.

In a letter to Chairman John L. Rogers, of the ICC, Admiral Land exhaustively reviewed the years of effort by the railroads to stifle water competition and he asserted there is now imperative need of all the resources of both forms of transportation if the domestic economy is to be restored. He stressed the fact that in the WSA application to the ICC for temporary authority to engage in coastwise and intercoastal operations until 13 December 1945 the rails are not asked to abandon their business to competing transportation.

The Association of American Railroads has raised considerable objection to the War Shipping Administration's request. The Association claimed that there is no immediate and urgent need for such operation.

The Maritime Commission on 10 September opened bids and proposals for the private ownership and operation under the American flag for the American President Lines. Bids and proposals were received under the invitation issued 26 June and the modified addendum issued 21 August.

Four proposals were received and after due consideration the Commission will announce its decision.

A reduction of \$5.00 a day in the fees paid to general agents operating dry cargo vessels and tankers, and \$15.00 for colliers, was announced by the War Shipping Administration on 12 September.

Such husbanding fees cover compensation for services connected with providing fuel, stores, food supplies, and other services necessary to keep the vessel equipped to sail. The revised order also provides that the Administrator may order a downward adjustment not to exceed 20 per cent on the husbanding fees and accounting fees.

Four Liberty-type cargo vessels, battle-scarred beyond repair in war service, have been discharged from active duty

and are to be sold for scrap, the United States Maritime Commission announced on 10 September.

The four veterans are vessels of approximately 10,900 deadweight tons. They are 417 feet 8 3/4 inches long between perpendiculars, 56 feet 10 1/2 inches beam and 37 feet 4 inches draft.

Capt. John L. Beebe, USNR, who has had more than thirty-five years of experience on merchant and naval vessels, will retire 15 October as superintendent of the United States Maritime Service Training Station at Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, the largest training station in the world for merchant seamen. He has been in command there since May, 1943.

Captain Beebe plans to join the States Marine Corporation in an operational position. The company operates a fleet of dry cargo vessels between this country and Great Britain, India, South Africa and the Far East.

Name Joint Committee

The House-Senate Committee having decided to investigate the Pearl Harbor incident this week announced the members who will serve on the joint committee.

On the Senate side will be Senators Barkley, George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson.

On the House side will be Representatives Cooper, Gerhardt, Clark (N.C.), Murphy and Keefe (Wisc.).

Medical Demobilization Plan

The War Department announced yesterday a new plan for the speedier release of officers of the Medical Department.

Under the plan, by 1 Jan. 1946, 13,000 doctors and 25,000 nurses will be returned to civilian life.

Releases will be governed as follows: Doctors and dentists who have 80 points, or are 48 years old or older will be released. About 200 scarce specialists will be retained unless they had service prior to 1 Jan. 1941.

Nurses will be released who have at least 35 points, or who are 35 years of age or older, or who are married, or who have dependents under 14.

Physical therapists or dieticians who have 40 points or more, or who are 40 years or over, or who are married, or who have dependents under 14.

Medical Administrative Corps and Sanitary Corps officers who have 70 points or more, or are 42 years of age or more, or who have been on active duty since Pearl Harbor.

Veterinarians who have 80 points or are 42 years of age, or have had service prior to 1 Jan. 1941.

Last Military Govt. Class

The last class of officers to be trained in Military Government for assignment to the Orient is being recruited now and will enter the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Va., on 12 Nov., Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, The Provost Marshal General, announced this week.

"This will be the last opportunity for many officers to realize their dream of foreign service in the Orient," General Lerch said, urging those interested to start their applications through channels to The Provost Marshal General immediately.

The class will consist of 200 officers between the grades of Second Lieutenant and Lieutenant Colonel inclusive. Preference will be given to those 45 years of age or under. While graduation from a college, university or recognized professional school is desirable, this qualification may be waived.

The course will be cut from two months to six weeks for this last class and will not include instruction in the Japanese language, General Lerch said. After graduation, the officers will proceed directly to the Orient, without further training, he said.

Those who have had civilian experience in any of the following fields are urgently needed: Administration, public works and utilities, public safety, fiscal, economics, supply, public welfare, education, public relations, communications and telecommunications, legal, labor relations, transportation and property control.

Forty-two thousand GIs of Seventh Army have laid aside the tools of war for textbooks and are studying everything from livestock production to ballroom dancing and Chinese.

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Present at Surrender

Advance Headquarters, Guam—The following members of Fleet Admiral Nimitz' staff were with him at Tokyo for the surrender ceremony:

Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, USN, Deputy Chief of Staff and Plans Officer.
Brig. Gen. H. C. Mandell, GSC, Plans Section.
Brig. Gen. J. H. Fellows, USMC, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics.
Brig. Gen. H. Feldman, GSC, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, CINCPAC Staff.
Capt. T. B. Hill, USN, Combat Readiness Officer.
Capt. H. D. Krick, USN, Fleet Employment Officer.
Capt. E. T. Layton, USN, Combat Intelligence Officer.
Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, Public Information Officer.
Capt. P. R. Anderson, USN, Operational Communications Officer.
Comdr. Murray A. Ward, USNR, Chief of Censorship.
Comdr. H. A. Lamar, USNR, Flag Lieutenant and Personal Aide to Adm. Nimitz.
Ship's Clerk W. H. Freeman, USN, Secretary, Plans Division.

In addition, the following guests were with Fleet Admiral Nimitz' party in the Tokyo area:

Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, USN, Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific.
Lt. William S. Stringer, USN, Flag Lieutenant and Pers. Aide to Adm. Turner.
Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN, Commander Submarines, Pacific.
Lt. Comdr. Robert K. Kaufman, USN, Flag Lieutenant and Pers. Aide to Vice Admiral Lockwood.
Lt. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, USMC, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
Maj. Roy Hamilton Owsley, USMC, Aide to General Geiger.

Occupation Units

Following is the latest compilation of units which have been designated as occupation forces in Japan and the European area.

The listing includes those already serving as occupying forces in the areas named, units en route and units slated for early redeployment as occupation forces.

JAPAN	
Armies	
Sixth	Tenth
Eighth	
Corps	
IX	XIV
XI	XXIV
Divisions	
1st Cavalry	98th Infantry
11th Airborne	25th Infantry
27th Infantry	41st Infantry
32nd Infantry	51st Infantry
38th Infantry	24th Infantry
43rd Infantry	6th Infantry
77th Infantry	112th Cavalry RCT
Americal	158th RCT
33rd Infantry	
EUROPE	
Divisions	
32nd Airborne	3rd Infantry
1st Armored	9th Infantry
4th Armored	29th Infantry
1st Infantry	36th Infantry

Decoration For Gen. Pershing

To evidence continuing appreciation for the winning leadership of General of the Armies John J. Pershing in the First World War, and for his contribution to World War II, Representative Larcade, La., has introduced H.R. 3944, which would authorize the President to award to him, in the name of Congress, a special Congressional Medal of Honor.

The award would be made to him as General of the Armies "in recognition of his peerless leadership, heroic achievements, and great military victories, as Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe in World War I, and for his gallant and unselfish devotion to the service of his country in his contribution to the preparation for, and the prosecution of, World War II."

Lost Short Snorter Bill?

Mr. J. W. Davis, of Washington, D. C., recently received in exchange a short snorter bill which he will return to the owner in exchange for a regular bill. The bill he has carries the following inscription, "Short Snorter 324645, 26 July 1944. Verne E. Millard, Capt. AC, Capt. Fred Hutcherson, Jr., RAFFC, Dane Weigel, Ed Zella, S. Sgt. Liaison Pilot, Jackson Nesbitt." It can be claimed by addressing Mr. Davis, care of The Associated Press, 330 Star Building, Washington 4, D. C.

U. S. COAST GUARD

THE Coast Guard on 8 September announced that it had lowered critical points scores for discharge to 40 points from 44 for enlisted men and to 43 points from 49 for commissioned and warrant officers. The new scores became effective immediately.

The Coast Guard said no change would be made at this time in the critical point scores for Spars. The new point system it was said was necessitated by lower average age of the Coast Guard personnel than that of the Navy in order to maintain the rate of discharge increases proportionate to that of the Navy.

The nation's 650 state-licensed harbor pilots who have been in Coast Guard uniforms since December, 1942 are returning to civilian garb on 30 November. It will be a quiet, swiftly effected demobilization and the pilots will take with them a commendatory "well done" for the job they have done in the war.

Back in August, 1942 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox asked the Commandant of the Coast Guard to make a study with a view to bringing pilots at all ports in the country under military control. The study resulted in a recommendation that the pilots be inducted into the Coast Guard Temporary Reserve, to serve without pay while continuing to collect their regular fees, and that the pilots charge only half the regular fee for vessels taking refuge. The Pilots association immediately accepted both recommenda-

tions.

Most of the pilots were commissioned as lieutenant commanders. To head all pilots during their tour of military service, the Commandant appointed John S. Delano, President of the American Pilots' Association with the rank of Captain.

The Coast Guard, anticipating that its authorized post-war strength will be considerably in excess of its pre-war peacetime complement, is planning to take numbers of Reserve officers into the regular establishment, according to Washington Headquarters.

Transfer to the regular Coast Guard, it is announced, will place reserve officers on an equal footing with regular officers and give them an equal opportunity for promotions and assignments. Until the size of the post-war organization is established, the Coast Guard cannot state how many vacancies there will be. However, it is understood that among the sources for commissioned personnel will be the following: warrant officers and enlisted men of the regular Coast Guard, personnel of the regular and temporary Coast Guard Reserve, and officers of the United States Merchant Marine.

Because of the close association of the Merchant Marine and the Coast Guard, the Service expects to draw on the Merchant Marine for a supply of experienced men. Men holding licenses and certificates on the oceans, Great Lakes and western rivers would be eligible for commissions under present plans.

Return Prisoners To Europe

An accelerated prisoner of war shipping schedule, which contemplates the return of all Italian Service Unit members to their homeland by midwinter and the clearing of all enemy prisoners of war from the United States by early spring, was announced this week by the War Department.

"The increased rate of discharge for members of the Armed Forces and the release of workers from industry during the reconversion period make it possible for the War Department to accelerate return of the prisoners who heretofore have been required for essential work in agriculture and industry," said Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, The Provost Marshal General.

Under War Department priorities set up for the return of prisoners of war, the sick and wounded were shipped first, General Lerch stated. Through September, sick and wounded will continue to comprise the bulk of the shipments, with the exception of the Italian Service Unit men who are able bodied.

"Italian Service Units are being given priority in repatriation over other able-bodied prisoners because they were the most cooperative prisoners of war held by the United States," General Lerch stated. "Cooperative German prisoners will go next and noncooperative Germans will be the last to be shipped from the United States."

Naval Reserves

U. S. Naval Reserve Midshipmen's schools will have trained more than 65,000 young seagoing Reserve officers for the Navy when the last classes in the program graduate by December, the Navy Department announced this week.

From the time the Reserve Midshipmen's Program was instituted in July of 1940 until July 1945, 12 sites had been used to train young officers for the fleets. A total of 4,608 of the graduates of Midshipmen's schools are former enlisted men who entered the program directly from the fleets and shore establishments.

Retired Officers' Association

The following retired officers have joined the Retired Officers' Association during the month of August, 1945:

Comdr. Harry A. Mewshaw, USN; Lt. Svend J. Skou, USN; Lt. M. A. Banker, USN; Capt. Walter P. Dey, USN; Lt. Col. Henry W. Edmonds, USA; Col. J. P. Edgerly, USA; Col. Gordon P. Savage, USA; Lt. Col. Lucian C. Whitaker, USMC; Lt. Col. Stanley H. Hunsicker, USA; Maj. Edward A. Dodson, USA; Lt. Comdr. Walter E. Morton, USN; Ch. Mach. William J. Brennan, USN; Lt. Norris D. Whitehill, USN; Col. C. H. Wells, USMC; Lt. Comdr. Henry C. Kellers, USN.

Army 'Flu Vaccinations

All Army personnel will be vaccinated with influenza vaccine during the months of October and November 1945, it was disclosed this week.

After 1 October, the accomplishment of this vaccination will be a requirement for embarkation for overseas travel including travel to the zone of interior or from one theater to another.

It is understood that the Army is taking this action because of the prevalence of virus influenza, type B, in out-breaks of respiratory disease in widely scattered areas during the months of May and June. These and other indications have presented the possibility that there may be an epidemic of influenza during the coming winter.

Courts Martial Results

Secretary of Navy Forrestal at a press conference disclosed that Comdr. Charles E. Loughlin, commander of the submarine Queenfish which sunk the Japanese Relief ship Awa Maru, had after a court martial been reprimanded by the Navy for his action.

Secretary Forrestal said that Comdr. Loughlin had been sent a letter of reprimand because "it seemed to be in order," but that he had not been punished severely.

The Awa Maru was sunk at night during a trip on which she carried relief supplies to American prisoners of war.

West Coast Academy

Secretary of the Navy Forrestal revealed this week that the group headed by Capt. H. A. Spanagel, director of the Navy post graduate school at Annapolis, had returned from the West Coast and was making a report on a survey of the possibilities of establishing a post graduate school on the West Coast. He said the report had not been submitted.

Regular Army Nominations

The President on 12 Sept. nominated the following Lieutenant Colonels to be Colonels, Regular Army:

Rexford Edwin Willoughby, Cav. (temp. col.).
William Glenn Livesay, Inf. (temp. maj. gen.).
James Washington Barnett, Cav. (temp. brig. gen.).
John Charles Mullenix, Cav. (temp. col.).
John Andrew Weeks, Cav. (temp. col.).
Robert Lincoln Christian, Inf. (temp. col.).
William Hampton Crom, AC (temp. col.).
Delphin Etienne Thebaud, Inf. (temp. col.).
George Sheppard Clarke, Inf. (temp. col.).
Charles Andrew Willoughby, Inf. (temp. maj. gen.).
Walter Eyster Buchly, Cav. (temp. col.).
Harold Chittenden Mandell, Cav. (temp. brig. gen.).

Navy Okinawa Losses

The Navy Department this week disclosed that it had lost 30 combatant ships and another 223 were damaged in the Okinawa campaign.

According to the report Japanese suicide plane attacks were at their height during the Okinawa campaign but among the 30 vessels listed as sunk the largest in the regular combatant classes were 12 destroyers.

In the list of vessels damaged there were 10 battleships, eight aircraft carriers, two light aircraft carriers, three escort carriers, three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and 67 destroyers. Despite the losses and damages suffered, the Fleet proved its staying power, the Department said.

SHIPS LOST

A list of the ships sunk in the Okinawa campaign, and the cause of the loss follows:

Name	Cause
Skylark	Mined off Okinawa
Swallow	Suicide
Dickerson	High-Speed Transports
Bates	Damaged on 2 April by enemy air attack.
Barry (Decommissioned)	Sunk 5 April by our forces
Barry (Decommissioned)	Hit by suiciders
(25 May heavy damage by suiciders)	Hit by suicider
Destroyers	
Halligan	Probably mined — off Okinawa
Colbourn	Suiciders
Bush	Suiciders
Mannert L. Abele	Suicide
Pringle	Suicide
Little	Suicide
Morrison	Suiciders
Luce	Suiciders
Longshaw	Enemy shore battery
Drexler	Suiciders
William D. Porter	Suicide
Twiggs	Hit by aerial torpedo
High-Speed Minesweepers	
Emmons	Suicide
Landing Craft, Infantry	
LCI-82	Engagement with enemy MTB
Landing Craft, Support	
LCS-33	Suicide
LCS-15	Suicide
Landing Ships, Medium	
LSM-135	Suicide
LSM-195	Suicide
LSM-194	Suicide
LSM-190	Suicide
LSM-59	Suicide
Landing Ship, Tank	
LST-447	Suicide
Submarine Chaser	
PC-1663	Suiciders
Motor Gunboat	
PGM-18	Mine
Motor Minesweeper	
YMS-103	Mines

A list of the ships damaged in the Okinawa campaign follows, with the cause of damage given:

Name	Cause
Surveying Ship	
Dutton	Suicide
Hospital Ship	
Comfort	Suicide
Cargo Ships	
Carina	Suicide boat
Allegan	Suicide—near-miss
Cargo Ships, Attack	
Wyandot	Near bomb-miss
Acherner	Suicide
Tyrrell	Suicide
Starr	Suicide boat
Minesweepers	
Skirmish (hit again)	Suicide
Devastator	Bomb-miss
Recruit	Suicide
Defense	Suicide
Gladiator	Suicide
Gayety	Suicide
(hit again)	Bomb near-miss
Spectacle	Suicide
Oiler	
Taluga	Suicide
Transport, Attack	
Hinadale	Mine or torpedo
Henrico	Suicide
Goodhue	Air Attack
Telfair	Suicide
Chilton	Suicide
Alpine	Suicide
Barnett	Own gunfire
Oudrain	Own gunfire
Menard	Own gunfire
Sandoval	Suicide
High-Speed Transports	
Gilmer	Suicide
Daniel T. Griffin	Fire
Hopping	Shore Battery
Rathburne	Suicide
Sims	Suicide near-miss

(Please turn to Back Page)

Changes In Army Regulations

The War Department has issued the following Regulations and Changes in Regulations:

AR 40-15. "Dental Corps-General Provisions." Issued 8 Aug. Supersedes AR 40-15, 28 Dec. 1942, including Changes 1, 10 May 1943 and Changes 2, 30 Nov. 1943.

AR 40-1715. "Blood for Transfusion and Other Purposes." Issued 10 Aug. Supersedes AR 40-1715, 31 Dec. 1941 and all Changes, and sections of WD Circulars referring to the same subject.

AR 30-300. "Price List of Clothing and Equipment." Changes 2 issued 4 Sept. Supersedes Changes 1, 1 May 1945.

AR 30-3010. "Pricing Procedure for General Supplies Items." Changes 1 issued 4 Sept.

AR 40-590. "Administration of Hospitals, General Provisions." Changes 4 issued 31 Aug. Effective 1 Nov. Supersedes so much of AR 210-50, 1 June 1944, as pertains to the central hospital fund and post hospital funds (see headnote and footnote to AR 210-50, 20 Jan. 1945, and par 1, sec. V, WD Circ. 30, 1945).

AR 600-40. "Wearing of Service Uniform." Changes 6 issued 30 Aug. Supersede Changes 5, 23 Aug. 1945. Changes now in force: 1, 2, 3, 6.

AR 615-361. "Enlisted Men-Discharge-Medical." Changes 6 issued 31 Aug. Only Changes now in force; all others superseded.

AR 615-500. "Reception and processing of Men Inducted or Enlisted." Changes 2 issued 4 Sept. Supersede Changes 1, 25 June 1945 and section 1, WD Circ. 202, 1945.

Navy Cross to Adm. Chandler

For his heroism as commander of a cruiser division during action in Lingayen Gulf on 6 Jan. 1945, when his ship was struck by a Japanese suicide bomber, Rear Adm. Theodore Edson Chandler, USN, 61, has been posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. Rear Admiral Chandler died of severe burns, suffered during the attack on the following day.

The citation for the Navy Cross reads:

"For extraordinary heroism as Commander, Cruiser Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces in Lingayen Gulf, Philippine Islands, on 6 January 1945. Skillfully coordinating the fire of his division with that of other heavy naval units during the initial bombardment of Luzon prior to scheduled landing operations at Lingayen, Rear Admiral Chandler ordered the smashing broadsides of his powerful guns with unrelenting aggressiveness despite a heavy overcast which reduced visibility and while under persistent attack by enemy aircraft. Observing the progress of operations from an exposed position on the flag bridge when a Japanese suicide bomber attacked and hit his cruiser, setting the flag bridge afire, he emerged from the raging inferno with his clothing ablaze. Determined to remain in action, he steadfastly continued to direct his units until compelled by his Chief of Staff to proceed to the dressing station for treatment of severe burns. Stout-hearted and indomitable in the face of almost certain death, Rear Admiral Chandler succumbed to his injuries the following day. By his inspiring devotion to duty and heroic spirit of self-sacrifice throughout, he enhanced and sustained the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in defense of his ship."

Warning Against Japs

Well known for his dislike of the Japanese, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz has warned the American people against what he infers is synthetic Japanese friendship.

According to reports from Guam Admiral Nimitz states that in his opinion the present motive of Japan is to "get along with us."

"Later, of course," he said, "they'll use every means, including propaganda, to restore themselves as an independent nation as soon as they can."

The Admiral added however, that our occupying forces will do what is necessary, and do it effectively, to enforce the peace terms.

Not to Draft Vets

National Headquarters of Selective Service announced 6 Sept. that all registrants who have received an honorable discharge, or its equivalent, from the armed forces are to be placed in Class 1-C. They are not to be reinducted unless they volunteer or unless their reinduction is authorized by the Director of Selective Service.

Navy Okinawa Losses

(Continued from Preceding Page)

(hit again)	Suicide near-miss
Tattnall	Bombed by float plane
Register	Suicide
Chase	Suicide
Roper	Suicide
Loy	Suicide
Rednour	Suicide
Tatum	Bomb from suicide near-miss
Transport For Evacuation of Wounded	
Pinkney	Suicide
ARD-28	Floating Drydock
	Bomb
Pakana	Ocean Tug, Fleet
	Strafing
St. George	Seaplane Tender
Curtiss	Suicide
Kenneth Whiting	Suicide near-miss
Battleships	
Nevada	Suicide
(hit again)	Shore battery
West Virginia	Suicide
(hit again)	Bombing attack
Tennessee	Suicide
Maryland	Bomb
Missouri	Suicide
Idaho	Suicide near-miss
	Aerial torpedo near-miss
New York	Suicide
New Mexico	Damaged by own gunfire
(hit again)	Suicide hit; near-miss
North Carolina	Hit by own gunfire
Mississippi	Suicide with bombs
Heavy Cruisers	
Indianapolis	Suicide
Wichita	Shore batteries
(hit again)	Hit by own gunfire
Louisville	Suicide
Light Cruisers	
Biloxi	Suicide with bomb
Birmingham	Suicide
Minelayer	
Terror	Bomb and suicide
Aircraft Carriers	
Franklin	Bomb hits
Intrepid	Near-miss suicide
(hit again)	Suicide with bomb
Enterprise	Bomb hit
(hit again)	Suicide with bombs
Yorktown	Bomb hit
Wasp	Bomb hit
Hancock	Suicide
Essex	Suicide
Bunker Hill	Suicide carrying bomb
Aircraft Carriers, Escort	
Wake Island	Suicide near-miss (2)
Sangamon	Suicide
Natoma Bay	Suicide
Aircraft Carriers, Small	
San Jacinto	Bomb near-miss
Bataan	Hit by own gunfire
Destroyers	
Halsey Powell	Suicide
Kimberly	Suicide
Porterfield	Air attack
Murray	Aerial torpedo
O'Brien	Suicide and bomb
Sproston	Near bomb-miss
Hutchins	Bomb near-miss
Howorth	Suicide
Newcomb	Suicide
Mullany	Suicide
Leutze	Suicide
Morris	Suicide
Hyman	Suicide
Harrison	Suicide, near-miss
Charles D. Sperry	Probably suicide
Haynesworth	Suicide
Bennett	Suicide
Gregory	Suicide
Sterrett	Suicide
Charles J. Badger	Suicide boat and/or swimmers
Hank	Suicide
Brush	Suicide
Tausig	Suicide
(First hit)	Two bombs - near-misses
Harrison	Suicide
C. S. Sperry	Suicide
Black	Suicide
Hailey	Suicide
McGowan	Suicide
Norman Scott	Suicide
Remy	Suicide
Cassin Young	Suicide
Stanley	Suicide
Purdy	Suicide
Zellers	Suicide
Kidd	Suicide
Sigsbee	Suicide
McDermut	Hit by own gunfire
Laffey	Two bombs and four suicides
Bryant	Suicide
Wilson	Suicide and near-bomb-misses
Trathen	Hit by own gunfire
Benham	Suicide near-miss
Ammen	Bomb near-miss
Isherwood	Suicide
Hudson	While fighting fire on Sangamon
Hutchins	Suicide boat
Ralph Talbot	Suicide
Hazelwood	Suicide

Haggard	Suicide
(hit again)	Rammed sub
Wadsworth	Suicide
(hit again)	Suicide near-miss
Bennion	Suicide
Daly	Suicide
Hale	Probably suicide
Ingraham	Suicide
Lowry	Suicide
Bache	Suicide
(hit again)	Suicide
Evans	Suicide
Hadley	Suicide and bombs
Douglas H. Fox	Suicide
Thatcher	Suicide
Guest	Near-miss suicide
Cowell	Suicide
Stormes	Suicide
Braine	Suicide
Anthony	Suicide near-miss
(hit again)	Suicide
Shubrick	Suicide
Escort Vessels	
Foreman	Air attack
(hit again)	Bomb
Witter	Suicide—two hits
Fieblerling	Suicide
Wesson	Suicide
Manlove	Strafing by suicide
Rall	Suicide
Samuel S. Miles	Suicide
Whitehurst	Suicide
Riddle	Suicide
Bowers	Suicide
Carlson	Own gunfire
Oberrender	Suicide
England	Suicide
Bright	Suicide
John C. Butler	Suicide
O'Neill	Suicide
Cole (W.C.)	Suicide
Gilligan	Torpedo which did not explode
Gendreau	Enemy shore battery
Halloran	Strafing by plane which crashed close aboard
Light Minelayers	
Adams	Suicide
Harry F. Bauer	Aerial torpedo
(3 more hits)	Suicide, bomb fragments, suicide near-miss
Lindsey	Suicide
Shea	Suicide with bomb
(hit again)	Suicide
Shannon	Suicide
Aaron Ward	Suicide
Gwinn	Suicide
J. W. Ditter	Suicide
Minesweepers, High-Speed	
Dorsey	Air attack
Hambleton	Suicide close aboard
Rodman	Suicide
Jeffers	Suicide
Hobson	Suicide
Harding	Suicide bomb hit
Butler	Suicide
(2 more hits)	Suicide, near-miss
Macomb	Suicide
Hopkins	Suicide
Forrest	Suicide
Ellyson	Suicide near-miss
Landing Craft, Infantry	
LCI-407	Suicide
LCI-560	Suicide
LCI-651	Own AA fire
Landing Craft, Infantry (Gunboats)	
LCI (G) 558	Depth charges from Jap boats
LCI (G) 568	Suicide
Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)	
LCI (L) 90	Suicide
Landing Craft, Infantry (Rocket)	
LCI (R) 770	Bomb hit (Ricochet)
Landing Craft, Support	
LCS-30	Suicide
LCS-57	Suicide
(2 more hits)	Rocket or 40mm
LCS-116	Suicide
LCS-87	Enemy small arms fire
LCS-51	Suicide
LCS-37	Enemy suicide boats
LCS-25	Suicide
LCS-31	Suicide
LCS-88	Suicide
LCS-119	Suicide
LCS (unidentified)	Suicide
LCS-52	Suicide near-miss
LCS-122	Suicide
Landing Craft, Support (Large)	
LCS (L) 121	Bomb near-miss
Landing Craft, Tank	
LCT-876	Suicide
Landing Ship, Dock	
Lindenwald	Own gunfire
Landing Ship, Medium	
LSM-180	Suicide
LSM-190	No details
LSM-270	20mm shell
LSM-15	Broached on reef
LSM-213	Suicide
Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket)	
LSM (M) 188	Suicide
Landing Ships, Tank	
LST-884	Suicide
LST-724	Suicide
LST-509	Fire
LST-781	Possibly high wind
LST-557	Large mortar
LST-808	Suicide
(hit again)	Suicide
LST-534	Suicide
Submarine Chaser	
PCS-1396	Suicide

Devilfish	
Seahorse	Air attack
YMS-92	Depth charges
YMS-321	Motor Minesweepers
YMS-427	Mine
YMS-331	Suicide
	Shore battery
	Suicide

Navy Awards Atomic Bomb Men

Even if the atomic bomb had failed to explode at Hiroshima and the Japanese Government had gained possession of it, there would have been a year of research on their part to find out what it was composed of, Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, USA, disclosed this week.

Gen. Groves' statement was made at a press conference during which Secretary of Navy Forrestal awarded the Distinguished Service Medal to Commodore William Sterling Parsons, USN, and the distinguished Civilian Service Award to Drs. Philip H. Abelson and Dr. Ross Gunn for their aid in the development of the new weapon. Commodore (then captain) Parsons was the "weaponeer" in the attack on Hiroshima.

Following the presentation of the medals Gen. Groves told the conference that the development of the atomic bomb project was the result of American cooperation. Paying high tribute to the Navy department for its cooperative efforts, Gen. Groves cited one case in particular where there was a manpower difficulty at one of the plants. He said that within less than 48 hours the Navy had furnished 250 to 300 commissioned officers to solve his problem.

Asked what would have happened if the atomic bomb had failed at Hiroshima, Gen. Groves replied that he felt military security would now permit him to answer the question.

"The question came up at a board meeting," Gen. Groves said. "It was suggested that one answer would be to have all of us go on the trip. If the bomb went off, we would come back. If it didn't, we'd just keep on going!"

Earlier in the conference, before General Groves' statement, Commodore Parsons gave a detailed description of the take-off, dropping of the bomb over Hiroshima, and the return to base.

"We had taken every possible step to get away from the bomb once having unloaded it," Commodore Parsons said. "All hands were supplied with polaroid glasses of a very deep hue. When the bomb went off there were two strikes against the plane. The first was the actual concussion of the bomb itself and the second was the reflection. But they both came in quick succession preceded by a flash."

The Commodore said that once having experienced both the flash and the concussion, those on the plane knew it was safe to look back. The only expression made by each member of the crew as he realized the results of the weapon was "My God!"

"When we looked," he said, "we saw no city. Later we could still see the mushroom shaped cloud and at that time we were almost three hundred miles away."

Newsmen asked General Groves concerning the supply of atomic bombs. Gen. Groves replied simply that "we had enough."

Asked if the construction of the bomb was such that it could be stored for some years, General Groves replied that he saw no reason why it could not. With respect to the commercial harnessing of atomic power, Gen. Groves replied that it would be years, possibly decades, before such a development could be accomplished.

Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill Senator Thomas (D. Utah) proposed the creation of a commission of seven to "retain control" of the atomic bomb with the people.

In a resolution, the Military Committee Chairman suggested that the commission be composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the chairman of the House and Senate Military and Naval committees, a person selected by the President and a seventh member selected from among those who developed the bomb.

The schoolbook printing program in Munich has already printed 2,225,000 of the required five million de-Nazified textbooks. It was announced by George H. Geyer, Chief of the Educational and Religious Affairs Section, G-5 Division, USFET.